740.0011 European War 1939/13678: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:38 p.m.]
1445. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary only. Shortly before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war members of the German Embassy in Moscow expressed the opinion that such a war could be brought to a successful conclusion by the German armies in 6 weeks, but that owing to the uncertainties of warfare the German leaders recognized the possibility of a 2 months campaign. I believe that these statements reflected the conviction I felt if not [Page 635] the time schedule of Hitler and his military advisers. Similar views were held by a majority of the foreign observers here whose opinions were based upon the lower standard of general efficiency in the Soviet Union, the weakness of the rail and road transport systems, the belief that the leadership of the Soviet armies had suffered irreparable harm from the purge that began in 1936 and the unwillingness of the Soviet authorities to disclose the extent of their armament or production facilities.
As matters stand at present, the German advance into Soviet-held territory has been to a considerable depth over a long front and against determined and courageous Soviet resistance. In consequence it is logical to suppose that a period of reorganization is necessary in order that communications and transport facilities may be established and supplies and forces brought up preparatory to the resumption of a large scale attack. Nevertheless—insofar as I can judge—during the past 2 weeks or more the main German forces have not advanced appreciably towards either Leningrad or Moscow.
Since any respite must afford the Soviet armies the same opportunity it does the Germans to reorganize for the resumption of large scale hostilities and since I find no evidence of any tendency toward a collapse of the Soviet defense, it appears reasonable to assume that although the so-called Stalin line appears to have been penetrated, when the German drives are renewed they will again meet with determined and perhaps effective resistance. If I am correct in the foregoing conclusion the significance lies in its bearing upon two factors of vital importance: (1) The ability of the Soviet armies effectively to engage the bulk of the German armies until the advent of winter; and (2) their ability eventually, if necessary, to withdraw in force with their equipment and to continue hostilities farther east. The absence of any foreign military observers at the front, and in consequence the nonexistence of reliable information regarding the actual military position, makes it impossible to form a sound opinion on either factor, but the general picture as I see it at the moment warrants a conviction that both of these desirable objectives may be attained at least in part. I have ventured the foregoing opinion in the distinctly military field with considerable hesitancy and only because it is my understanding that neither the German nor Soviet authorities have permitted foreign military observers at the front, and for the further reason that the press censorship in both countries is so partisan and rigid as to make it impossible for the newspaper correspondents to transmit anything other than “official handouts”.