893.24/993: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 21—11:55 a.m.]
71. My telegram No. 69, December 19, 7 p.m., the following comments may be made:
Although the Japanese are primarily responsible for the immobilization of the great bulk of the cargo at Haiphong, the Government General has been in general far from energetic in urging the Japanese to release much of this cargo. Unquestionably the Government General hopes to supply Indochina’s needs by the sale of part of this cargo. During the 2 months since the suspension of reexportation only a limited amount of cargo has been shipped, chiefly goods not wanted by either the Japanese or Indochina.
There appears to be some divergence of opinion among the high officials as to how the situation vis-à-vis the Japanese should be handled, the person84 referred to in my telegram No. 69, December 19, characterizing the policy towards the Japanese as weak and that [Page 245] towards the United States and Great Britain as likely to antagonize the only possible [ones?] able to assist Indochina. This lack of unanimity among the leaders does not impress one as indicating a united front against further Japanese aggression.
It must be admitted that Indochina’s problems are difficult and will continue to be as long as the Japanese are virtual masters of Tongking and presumably have the force necessary to take over southern Indochina at any time they desire. Native troubles, designated as “communistic” by the authorities but probably largely Japanese-fomented, and Thailand activities, believed to be Japanese engendered, contribute to the general adversity of the situation.
Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department, Chungking, Peiping, Shanghai, Canton.
- An officer of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs indicated in a notation that this reference is to the “Secretary General.”↩