761.62/536: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Grummon) to the Secretary of State

431. My 379, July 10. I am informed in the strictest confidence that the German Ambassador saw Molotov on August 395 and assured the latter under instructions from his Government that Germany entertained no aggressive designs against the Soviet Union itself; had no intention of impairing the status quo in the Baltic; and would respect all Soviet interests. Molotov, I am informed, expressed the greatest interest in the Ambassador’s communication and inquired whether the reference to the Baltic included Lithuania, to which the Ambassador replied in the affirmative. Molotov then frankly set forth the specific bases of Soviet distrust of Germany which he outlined as follows: (1) the Anti-Comintern Pact;96 (2) the direct or indirect encouragement given by Germany to Japan in the Far East; and (3) the apparent intention of Germany since the advent of Hitler to “outlaw” the Soviet Union as evidenced by the refusal of Germany during recent years to attend any European Conference at which the Soviet Union was represented. The Ambassador stated that the Anti-Comintern Pact was in reality not directed against the Soviet Union but against England and that Germany was interested in developing good relations with the Soviet Union. He added however that if the Soviet Union allied itself with England and France it could naturally expect to incur a share of the German hostility directed against those countries. Molotov replied that the Soviet Government was interested in “normalizing” and improving its relations with Germany but at the same time would continue its policy of attempting to assure a “genuine defence against aggression”.

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My informant offered the opinion that Molotov’s reception of the Ambassador’s assurances indicated that an improvement of Soviet-German relations was possible but that because of past German policy it would take some time to remove Soviet distrust. He stated that Molotov’s reference to the continuation of present Soviet policy of attempting to assume a “genuine” defence against aggression would appear to indicate that the Soviet Union is prepared to conclude a pact with the British and French but only on Soviet terms.

My informant added that the instructions to the Ambassador here had resulted from political conversations along the above lines which had taken place in Berlin between the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires Astakhov, Schnurre, and Ribbentrop in connection with the economic negotiations there.97 In respect of the economic negotiations my informant stated that they were progressing satisfactorily and that there was reason to expect a successful conclusion within 2 or 3 weeks.

In respect to German-Japanese relations my informant stated that there were indications that the Japanese were alarmed at the recent developments in Soviet-German relations and that at the present moment the Japanese were more disposed as a result thereof to join the military alliance of the Axis powers but that for the same reason the German Government was less eager to conclude such an alliance with Japan.

Grummon
  1. For report of this meeting, see telegram of August 4, from the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the German Foreign Office, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, p. 39.
  2. The Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded between Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936; for text of the treaty, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 153, and for text of the secret additional protocol, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, vol. i, p. 734, footnote 2a.
  3. See the German accounts of these conversations in Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941 pp. 32–38.