760d.61/480: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:05 p.m.]
355. My telegram number 350, November 24. I am reliably informed that last week a member of German Foreign Office reiterated to Finnish Minister at Berlin advice previously given to Finnish Government to accept Soviet demands. On this occasion advice was reinforced by explanation of Soviet Government’s determination to secure its ends as illustrated in the statement that at the time of Soviet demands on Estonia which led to decision of German Government to undertake mass evacuation of its people from Baltic States, Soviet Government had threatened if necessary to deport entire population of Estonia to Asiatic Russia. I am also informed that German Embassy at Moscow has lately urged again that Finland accede to the Soviet demands.
Foregoing is considered here as further evidence of cooperation between Germany and Soviet Union but may in fact be more revealing of degree of subordination now reached by German policy in relation to the Soviet Union especially as there has been no disclaimer by Soviet Government that its encroachments on south shore of Gulf of Finland and the Baltic or its attempts to obtain foothold on the north shore are inspired by idea of defense against Germany.
In public address November 23 Finnish Prime Minister76 reviewed history of Finnish-Soviet relations including latest controversy and suggested that security of Leningrad, if it could be considered really threatened at all from Finland, would certainly be better served by friendly and strictly neutral Finland prepared to resist any attempt to use Finnish territory against Soviet Union than by refugee [sic] encroachments on Finnish territory which could not be obtained without destroying integrity and independence of this country.
It seems possible that the. Soviet Government might be open to [suggestion?] from some quarter in which it had confidence that it could now claim that safety of Leningrad had been assured by success of its diplomacy and strength of its military forces in having induced such an undertaking as the latest utterances of the Finnish Prime Minister confirming previous official statements to the same effect. Soviet Government might be brought not only to see futility of persisting in its recent course but how it could save face. If German Government for instance were willing to make such representation without using it for incidental purposes of its own, proof would also be [Page 999] afforded of sincerity of its deprecatory advice to Finland and alleged disinterest.
It seems likely that Finnish Government will do nothing for the present to make situation more embarrassing for Soviet Government but neither does it seem probable that former will deviate from position consistently taken while continuing to hope that correct interpretation of strategic facts will dawn on the Soviet Government’s mind and incidentally afford test of latter’s sincerity in claiming that its security has been the sole issue.
- Professor Aimo K. Cajander, until December 1, 1939.↩