741.51/312: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:10 p.m.]
1994. I saw Bonnet this afternoon. He said that he was satisfied with the talks with the British yesterday. There had been complete agreement on “most” of the matters discussed.
He said that they had agreed to try to do something helpful for the political refugees from Germany.33 The idea first is to have a meeting in Holland between Rublee34 and a representative of the German Government with representatives of the British and French Governments present. Bonnet said that the French Government would probably have a proposal to make to our Government within a few days on this subject.
Bonnet talked at length regarding the Franco-German declaration. He said that complete agreement had been reached between the German and French Governments concerning the declaration on November 7 and it had then been intended to announce it about November 10. The shooting of vom Rath35 and the subsequent persecution of the [Page 102] Jews in Germany had made it necessary to defer the announcement. Bonnet said that he hoped that the true significance of this agreement would be understood in the United States. It, of course, did not mean that France was turning away from the democracies. It simply meant that Hitler liberated from the diktat of Versailles was of his own free will pledging himself to renounce any claim to Alsace-Lorraine and to respect the French frontiers. It would be absurd for France to refuse such an offer. Bonnet said that he was now convinced that France had no reason to fear an attack from Germany. Making all allowances for the fact that Hitler had violated undertakings before and might do so again he would certainly not have agreed to this declaration if he had had any intention of attacking France in the near future. The agreement would, of course, be known to the public in Germany; it stated that there were no questions in dispute between Germany and France; it would therefore be very difficult for Hitler to convince the German people who had shown uneasiness over the imminence of war last September that some new question had arisen which would warrant making war on France.
Bonnet said that in negotiating for the declaration he had persuaded the Germans to drop two important points which they had raised. One was the matter of colonies: France had given no promise or assurance whatsoever on the colonial matter. The second point concerned France’s alliances with other countries: this position had been protected by the reservation in the declaration of special relations with third countries.
Bonnet said that there were people in France who urged him to have no relations with Italy because Italy was Fascist; to have no relations with Germany because of Hitler; to have no relations with the Burgos Government because of Franco; and to limit France’s friends to Red Spain, Mexico, and Soviet Russia. Bonnet said that it was impossible for the French Government to carry out a foreign policy on such principles; that it was necessary to get rid of idealogical prejudices and in the world as it exists today employ the type of diplomacy which seeks to have as useful relations as possible with every country and to derive from those relations the maximum of benefit for one’s own country.
Bonnet said that it was absurd to pretend that the Franco-German declaration had irritated the British. He had kept the British fully informed and on November 7, the date the Germans agreed, he had notified Phipps thereof. He said that Chamberlain had assured him personally that he was greatly pleased over the declaration as an indication that France and Germany were coming to better terms.
I remarked that the impression that the British might have been irritated perhaps arose from the circumstance that the announcement [Page 103] had been made hastily while the British were en route to Paris. Bonnet’s only reply to this was that when Coulondre presented his letters to Hitler on November 22 he inquired when signature of the declaration could take place; Hitler replied that Ribbentrop could go to Paris any time between November 28 and December 5 and expressed the wish that the earlier it was done the better.
Bonnet said that it had been a question in his mind whether Ribbentrop should come to Paris or whether he, Bonnet, should go to Berlin for the signature. Since Hitler, however, desired that Ribbentrop should come to Paris he saw no reason why the French Government should decline to receive the visit of a German Foreign Minister who wished to sign an agreement in Paris renouncing any claim on Alsace-Lorraine. I remarked that there might be some disagreeable incidents during Ribbentrop’s visit. Bonnet said that this was true but he hoped nothing would happen.
Bonnet said that he had discussed with the British the question of guaranteeing the new Czech frontiers. It had been decided to inquire of the Czechoslovak Government exactly what countries they desired to join in the guarantee. It was for Czechoslovakia to say for instance whether Russia should be included.
I inquired regarding discussion of national defense matters with the British. Bonnet replied that cooperation in defense had been agreed upon between Great Britain and France after the occupation of the Rhineland,36 and particularly in recent months there had been demand for closest contact maintained between the two Governments in this matter. In the discussions yesterday it had been a case of reviewing plans and extending them. I asked if he believes that the British might establish a ministry of supply. He replied that he did not believe so.
I inquired whether the signature of the declaration with Germany might result in slowing up plans for French rearmament. Bonnet said that it would have no effect whatsoever in this field and that the British and French were determined to pursue their effort at rearmament. I asked if there had been any discussion with the Germans regarding limitation of air armaments. Bonnet replied that there had been nothing on this point since Hitler mentioned it to François-Poncet at their last meeting. Bonnet said, however, that he knew the Germans had this in mind and that it might well come up later as a second step after Munich. He believed, however, that there would be no air limitation until France had achieved in large measure her program of rearmament.
I asked if in fact the French Government was determined to make a great effort for air rearmament despite the financial sacrifices required. [Page 104] Bonnet replied that the French Government was in fact determined to do this.
Referring to the Far East Bonnet said that the French and British had agreed to take the same position which the United States had adopted in relation to the Japanese declaration that a new situation had arisen in the Far East. I pressed Bonnet to be more explicit on this point but he was vague and gave me the impression of not having gone into it thoroughly. He added that the British and French had agreed to instruct their ambassadors to discuss further with the State Department questions concerning the Far East; he mentioned specifically the Yangtze navigation problem.37
Regarding Spain Bonnet said that it had been agreed with the British that there could be no question of granting belligerent rights to Franco at present and that the provisions of the London Committee’s plan should be followed in this matter. I referred to his earlier remark regarding relations with Burgos and asked if the French Government was planning to send a representative there. Bonnet said that he would like to do so and the British would like to have him do so but no decision in this sense could be taken for the time being.
- See pp. 758 ff.↩
- George Rublee, Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees.↩
- See last paragraph of telegram No. 601, November 8, 6 p.m., p. 815.↩
- March 7, 1936; see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. i, pp. 180 ff.↩
- See vol. iv, pp. 143 ff.↩