394.115 Panay/78½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The British Ambassador called to see me this morning. The Ambassador said that he was somewhat perplexed because he had received early this morning the full text of the note of protest which the British Government was addressing to the Japanese Government with regard to the recent incidents on the Yangtze River which text [Page 504] followed very closely the lines of the United States note of protest. Just a few minutes before coming to the Department, the Ambassador said, he had received a further cable saying that the instructions to Craigie in that sense had been cancelled. He did not know as yet whether that implied that the British had accepted the note of apology and offer of compensation spontaneously sent by the Japanese Government to the British Embassy in Tokyo, or whether it meant that the Cabinet in London had decided upon a stiffer note than that originally drafted.
The Ambassador then expressed very great concern about the contents of the article written from London by Ferdinand Kuhn which appeared this morning on the front page of the New York Times, Sir Ronald Lindsay remarked that the worst of it was that one could not blame the correspondent who undoubtedly was accurately quoting opinions which he had heard expressed in London, but that what the Ambassador resented was the fact that such opinions were actually being expressed. Sir Ronald went on to say that, of course, unless the British Government gave effective evidence of its being able to cope with the outrages being committed upon its nationals and its national interests in the Far East, many of the traditional friends of Great Britain in Europe, and he enumerated the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Belgium, Turkey, Greece, and one or two of the Central European powers, will begin to wonder if they had not better try and take care of themselves without hoping for any support from Great Britain and that in that event they would undoubtedly tie more closely to Germany and to Italy than they had been willing to do up to the present moment. He said the worst of it was that, of course, Great Britain under normal conditions would already have taken forceful measures in the Far East, but under present conditions, as I well knew, they could not contemplate such action. For that reason a large part of public opinion, and official opinion in England as well, felt that at this critical moment a very real measure of cooperation, if necessary even of a forceful character, between Great Britain and the United States in the Far East was imperative. He said that that was the explanation of the “lament” from Mr. Eden which he had conveyed yesterday to the Secretary of State complaining about the unwillingness of this Government to consider the form of joint action proposed.
I again went into the analysis which I had previously made to Sir Ronald Lindsay of that particular question and indicated my own belief that concurrent or parallel action was preferable and equally effective. I said that, of course, as he knew, I was conveying the President’s views in this regard.
Before Sir Ronald left I told him of the President’s desire to see him at tea at the White House before the end of the week. I told [Page 505] him that I would notify him subsequently myself as to the day and hour selected by the President.