793.94 Conference/61
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Aide-Mémoire
In their preliminary examination of the problems to be considered at the forthcoming Brussels Conference the following considerations have presented themselves to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. It should be understood that this is not a statement of policy but merely an appreciation of the difficulties which must be faced by and, if possible, discussed between the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government before the Brussels Conference meets.
The first objective of the Brussels Conference must be to reach peace by agreement. It is still uncertain whether Japan will attend and in her absence it is doubtful whether we can attain this object unless or until some considerable change occurs in Japan’s military or economic [Page 90] position. The Conference may thus be faced with the choice of (a) deferring any action in the hope that such a change will supervene, (b) expressing moral condemnation of Japan without taking or promising any positive action, (c) embarking on positive action in the form either of active assistance to China or of economic pressure on Japan.
Both (a) and (b) are open to the obvious objection that they are tantamount to acquiescence in aggression. Either course could only serve as encouragement to peace breakers. Course (b) has the additional weakness that it would further exasperate opinion in Japan to no purpose.
In these circumstances His Majesty’s Government feel that it is necessary for both the United States Government and themselves to go to Brussels in the full realisation of the implications of course (c).
So far as assistance to China is concerned (even if the United States neutrality law were not an objection to it) it must be remembered that there are material difficulties in the way of rendering assistance. If it is to be effective it must directly or indirectly involve supplying China with war material. The sea route is or will shortly be the only practicable one, and if such supplies were to reach China on a scale large enough to affect the issue of hostilities it is hardly conceivable that Japan would not extend the blockade to neutral ships. We should then be faced with the alternative of acquiescing in this extension of the blockade or of keeping sea routes open by armed force.
So far as economic measures against Japan are concerned a preliminary investigation suggests that they might be effective if they were applied by the United States of America, all countries of the British Empire and some six or eight other countries provided that satisfactory measures could be evolved to prevent evasion through third parties and provided that the measures extended both to imports and to exports. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are pursuing their study of this matter and would be happy to discuss it in all its aspects with the United States delegation, if they would agree to such a discussion. Whether economic measures would become effective in time to affect the issue of the war, unless China were simultaneously assisted, is perhaps doubtful. But irrespective of this it seems to His Majesty’s Government that if sanctions appeared likely to succeed in their object there would be a very real danger of Japan taking violent action to prevent their success either by making war on one or more of the sanctionist countries or by seizing the territory of some other Power from which essential war materials could be derived. In view of this danger it appears to His Majesty’s Government that no country could afford to impose effective sanctions unless [Page 91] it first received from the other participating countries an assurance of military support in the event of violent action by Japan. It would also be necessary to guarantee the territorial integrity of third parties. If such assurances were forthcoming it is possible although of course not certain that Japan would be deterred from taking any such action and that the knowledge that sanctions would eventually prove successful might lead her to consider an early peace.