761.94/986
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 18.]
Sir: I have the honor to observe that since the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese hostilities in July the question of relations with [Page 563] Soviet Russia has become increasingly delicate although relatively quiet on the surface. The new Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Michael Slavutsky, arrived here on August 23 to succeed Mr. Constantin Yureneff who left in May for his new post at Berlin. A few days after the new Ambassador’s arrival, on August 29, the Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact was formally announced. This had somewhat less effect here than the announcement last November of the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact had in Moscow. While the latter agreement burst like a bombshell upon Moscow the Sino-Soviet pact was less unexpected, due to the several approaches made in that direction in recent years, and consequently its effect had already been somewhat discounted. Nevertheless the conclusion of this agreement, with its supposed secret arrangement for the supplying of war material and other assistance to the Chinese, has had a serious effect upon relations between Tokyo and Moscow.
On the surface there have been perhaps fewer of the ordinary run of irritating incidents between the two countries than has been the case in less troublous times. For instance, the border skirmishes and frontier violations along the Manchurian-Siberian frontier have practically ceased since the outbreak of hostilities with China, and it is argued by some observers that this fact tends to indicate that the previous border incidents were largely instigated by the Japanese, although this by no means necessarily follows. It is nevertheless probable that the Kwantung Army would not be interested at the present time in forcing a clash with the Soviets on the Siberian border.
There have been incidents of other kinds, such as the arrest and detention by the Soviets of some 28 Japanese fishing vessels off the Russian coast in the Japan Sea on the charge that the Japanese vessels were violating Soviet territorial waters. This brought sharp protests and counter protests but there appears to have been no disposition on either side to allow the matter to become very serious. The Japanese have also complained that their nationals in Soviet territory have been subjected to unnecessarily harsh treatment, especially in North Saghalien where Japanese merchants and businessmen have been severely treated because of alleged minor commercial offenses. Japan has also been forced by Moscow to close its Consulates in Odessa and in Novosibirsk on the grounds that the agreement entered into in August 1925 provided that each country should have an equal number of consular offices in the territory of the other.
Incidents such as these are rather the result of the truculent attitude which has governed relations between the two countries in recent years and in themselves are not so charged with potential danger as were the border incidents which involved the clash of armed troops and loss of lives.
[Page 564]It is fairly clear that at the present time neither country wishes to force the other into a position where a break may occur or which would lead to hostilities. Probably when the time comes it will scarcely be found necessary to trump up an excuse in the form of an incident; hostilities will be launched without previous warning. There is a school of thought in this country, rather widely held, that when Japan was forced to fight either China or Russia she would be forced to fight the other; consequently the present Chinese campaign is being waged in the full realization that Russia may become an active enemy at any time. However, it appears to be the intention of the military to get the China situation in hand as rapidly as possible in order that China will be rendered ineffective if and when the Soviets are to be confronted. Some observers believe, in fact, that the best of the Japanese troops are not being employed against the Chinese, but only the younger and the older troops, while the best of the younger and physically fit reserves are being held for later possible use against the Russians. This is difficult to confirm but it is fairly certain that the army in “Manchoukuo” and Korea is being kept at full strength and at peak efficiency to meet all possible eventualities.
The effective military assistance in the form of war materials which the Soviets will be able to furnish to China against the Japanese is not regarded here as constituting any great menace, although strenuous efforts are being made to cut the routes between Siberia and China through Outer Mongolia. Travel in Outer Mongolia is largely restricted to caravan routes over which the transport of any considerable quantities of heavy war material would be out of the question. Airplanes, however, are another matter as they can be flown from some point along the Trans-Siberian Railroad where they would be assembled, and light arms, such as machine-guns and ammunition could be flown and delivered, along with the airplanes themselves, into Chinese territory. Most of the assistance which could be rendered by the Soviets would necessarily be through supplying military and other advisers, and by giving moral support. For these reasons, then, the feeling against the Sino-Soviet pact is not so strong as it might be. However, the press does not hesitate to state that the attitude of the Soviets toward Japan has become more menacing since the conclusion of the pact.
In the light of what has transpired it must be admitted that whoever may have fired the first shot at Marco Polo bridge on July 7, the Japanese military sensed that this was a most opportune moment to undertake hostilities with China without incurring the risk of immediate intervention on the part of Soviet Russia. Not only is the European situation thoroughly engaging the attention of the Soviets but the internal situation is believed seriously to have impaired the efficiency of the Soviet army. It will be recalled that Major General [Page 565] Homma, a Japanese general staff officer, on his return from England last June after visiting Moscow shortly after the recent executions of Soviet military leaders, told the press on several occasions that the “Soviet Army is greatly weakened by the recent developments within the Red Army and is facing destruction.” He also went on to say that the Japanese have consistently overrated the Soviet Army, implying that he and other Japanese officers have shared the belief of the Japanese public that the Soviet Army is stronger than is actually the case.* Such a statement coming from a high-ranking Japanese officer is especially significant in view of the fact that his opinion was expressed not more than 3 weeks prior to the outbreak of the present hostilities.
If General Homma’s views prevail it will support that portion of the army, especially the younger element, which may wish to settle the Russian question once and for all in the near future.
As there are generally conflicting opinions on every question, however, the Department will no doubt have in mind the view expressed not long ago by the British Chargé dAffaires in Moscow, concurred in by Mr. Eden, that the Soviet Union had not been weakened by the recent purge but on the contrary had been strengthened by the removal of elements hostile to Stalin, and that the future policy of the Union would follow lines of “intensive defense.”†
There now comes a report‡ to the effect that the U. S. S. R. is about to supply 300 airplanes to China and that preparations to receive and condition these planes are being made at Lanchow. In this connection the following memorandum has been submitted by the Military Attaché69:
“A recent confidential cable report from the American Embassy, Nanking, stated authoritatively that 300 Soviet planes would be sent to China and concentrated at Lanchow (Kansu Province) where accommodations are already under construction. If this report is true, the planes will undoubtedly be flown via Tacheng, Tihwa, Hami (all in Sinkiang Province), and Suchow (Kansu Province) where airfields are located. Intermediate hops along this route are only about 300 miles or less and Tacheng is only 30 miles from Semiopol on the Turkish [Turksib?] Railroad. This is the only route from Russia along which landing fields have been established and it has the additional advantage of being beyond the radius of probable action of Japanese aviation and so immune to interruption—advantages not enjoyed by routes farther to the east.”
Among the welter of rumors invariably flying about in time of war, there comes to me today a story from one of my colleagues that plans are already being developed for a Japanese attack on Vladivostok. Considering the various circumstances set forth in this despatch I regard this rumor as made out of whole cloth. The Military Attaché concurs.
Respectfully yours,
- Military Attaché’s report to War Department, No. 8882, July 9, 1937. [Footnote in the original; report not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s telegram No. 195, July 13, 8 p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.]↩
- Nanking’s telegram to the Department No. 733, September 29, 8 a.m. [p.m.] [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.]↩
- Infra.↩