Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

700.0011 Pacific/25½

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State on the Neutralization of the Islands of the Pacific⁸³

[Washington,] February 16, 1937.

I. Definition and Discussion of Terms

The subject for consideration is the question of the advisability of the American Government taking the initiative in action directed toward bringing about by international agreement “neutralization” of the islands of the Pacific. In considering this question there at once arises need of defining and clarifying the terms.

Webster’s New International Dictionary defines the word “neutralize” in its international law usage as follows: “To invest with conventional or obligatory neutrality conferring inviolability by belligerents, as in the case of Switzerland.” In the light of the long-standing attitude of the American Government and people, it would seem that there must at the outset be ruled out any proposal which would envisage agreement by the American Government to any sort of international alliance or to any commitment to use force. In this connection it seems pertinent to recall that the United States Senate ratified the Washington Conference Agreement of 1921⁸⁴ between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific subject to a reservation as follows:

“The United States understands that under the statement in the preamble or under the terms of this Treaty there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense.”

Furthermore, the term “neutralize” as used in international law normally envisages an attitude by one power or group of powers toward the territory of another power. One nation cannot unilaterally “neutralize” its own territory. Also, the term “neutralize” usually contemplates an attitude by a strong power or a group of strong powers toward the territory of a comparatively weaker power.

Thus, in considering the term “neutralization” for the purposes of this memorandum, there is eliminated any idea of a commitment to use force and there is kept in mind the fact that a government does not normally “neutralize” its own territory. There then remains within the general term “neutralization” the ideas of non-aggression and of the giving of pledges by each nation to respect the rights, the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity and political independence of some other nation or nations.

A neutralization project might also provide some practical means for effective and continuous consultation and cooperation, perhaps through the establishing of a permanent consultative committee or board of reference composed of representatives of the high contracting powers.

In some circumstances, consideration of the question of neutralizing the islands of the Pacific may raise the question of the non-fortification of such islands.

The term “islands of the Pacific” is of course very broad. For purposes of discussion, there will be included all of the principal island groups in the Pacific Ocean except Hawaii. The islands may be listed as follows:

[Here follows list of Pacific islands belonging to each country.]

The countries possessing islands in the Pacific thus are the United States, Australia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and the Soviet Union.

Of these countries Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico possess islands which are small in size and which are located in the eastern Pacific near the American continent. These islands are not of outstanding importance in reference to the general political problems of the Pacific and they are remote in distance from that part of the Pacific area, the western, where today political tensions exist. They might therefore not be included in an international agreement directed toward “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific. On the other hand, however, in view of reports that Japanese interests manifest activity from time to time looking toward gaining a foothold in some of these islands, it might be of some advantage if these islands should be included in any general international agreement which might be negotiated relating to the islands of the Pacific.

Portugal has only one insular possession in the Pacific, part of the island of Timor. Timor is located in the Netherland Indies section of the Pacific and thus is in an area of strategic and political importance.

With regard to the insular possessions in the Pacific of China and of the Soviet Union, China possesses Hainan Island and the Soviet Union possesses Saghalin (the northern portion) and the Commander (Komandorski) Islands. The insular possessions of these two countries are limited but both countries are so important in any approach to the problems of the Pacific that it is believed to be highly desirable that, if at all practicable, they be included within the scope of an international agreement directed toward “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific. It may be observed that the initiating by the United States of an agreement which would not include China and to which Japan would be a party might be viewed in China (and in Japan) as implying willingness on the part of the United States to accept the results of Japan’s aggressive acts of the past few years. The repercussions in China toward such an agreement would most likely be distinctly unfavorable and have a harmful effect upon American relations with China.

The insular possessions of the United States, Australia, France, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands and New Zealand are important and numerous and could not readily be excluded from consideration of a proposal to “neutralize” the islands of the Pacific.

II. Discussion of Possible Agreements

Within the limits of the definitions given in the preceding section there appear to be four possible types of international agreements which might be concluded providing for “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific. These four types are as follows:

A. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific.

B. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands.

C. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific.

D. An agreement containing mutual pledges of non-aggression in regard to the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific.

a. an agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the pacific

There are given below considerations which may be advanced in favor of or against a proposal that the American Government take the initiative in attempting to conclude an international agreement providing for the making of mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific. Such proposal would place no restriction on the right of each country to erect fortifications in islands possessed or administered by it. The type of proposal placing such restrictions will be discussed in section B, below, of this memorandum.

Considerations Pro.

1. The advancing by the American Government of a proposal that there be negotiated an international agreement providing for the making of mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific would afford satisfaction to peace groups in the United States. There is no doubt that the American people sincerely believe in peace and that they would welcome the adoption of such measures as would appear to afford reasonable basis for progress toward that objective, provided such measures would not involve anything more than moral (including diplomatic) support by the United States.

2. In some respects such a proposal would probably be pleasing to Japan. At the present time Japan is the strongest power in eastern Asia. Japan desires to exercise dominant control in that area. The giving of a self-denying pledge by the United States and by other Occidental powers which possess islands in the Pacific would tend to make Japan’s position in that area comparatively stronger and to give indication to Japan that such powers would in the future rely entirely upon pledges for the protection of their territorial rights in their insular possessions or in islands administered by them. Moreover, since Japan embarked in 1931 upon a program of active aggression in China, Japan has signed no political agreement of importance with Occidental powers, except the anti-communist pact with Germany.⁸⁵ Probably some elements in Japan would welcome the inclusion of Japan in a political agreement to which the United States, Great Britain and France were also signatories (other elements in Japan, however, would be likely to oppose the signing by Japan of such an agreement. For argument in this sense, see item No. 4 in the section under “Considerations Contra.”).

3. Some Americans favor “withdrawal” by the United States from the Far East. They use the term “withdrawal” with little precision as to meaning, but apparently their thought is that the United States—in view of the facts that Japan has become more powerful, that Japan claims for itself a position of paramountcy in eastern Asia, and that Japan is embarked on a course of active aggression—should liquidate its rights, obligations and interests in the Far East. This group would favor an international agreement “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific if such agreement could be expected to lessen American responsibilities in the Far East.

4. The stabilization in the Pacific effected by the conclusion of the group of treaties signed at the Washington Conference in 1921–22 has been disrupted by Japan’s imperialistic activities in eastern Asia and by Japan’s withdrawal from the treaties providing for limitation of naval armament. Some day an attempt will have to be made to devise some new means directed toward the bringing about of greater stabilization in that area. There are indications that some elements in Japan question the leadership of the military. A move at this time directed toward the conclusion of a political agreement relating to the islands of the Pacific might possibly serve to encourage the moderate elements in Japan and to hasten the day when the Japanese people will no longer support the aggressive program of the Japanese military. (However, see item No. 3 under “Considerations Contra.”)

5. In case the American Government feels that it should now decide, for reasons special to the problem of the Philippine Islands, to abandon, after the date of the complete independence of the Islands, all naval bases in the Islands, the American Government might utilize the fact of such decision—before making the decision known—as a bargaining point toward obtaining agreement by other powers to a general pact covering islands of the Pacific which pact might contribute toward greater political stabilization in the Pacific.

Considerations Contra.

1. There are already in existence a number of international agreements which provide for substantially everything that could be incorporated in a treaty containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific.

In 1921, the United States, France, Great Britain and Japan signed a treaty at the Washington Conference wherein those powers promised to respect each others’ rights “in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean;” to refer any controversy “arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy” to a conference of the four powers “for consideration and adjustment;” and, in case “the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power,” to “communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.”

With the exception of the United States and Japan, all the Governments which would be party to a pact “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific are members of the League of Nations and are obligated by the League Covenant “to respect … the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.”⁸⁶ The League Covenant also lays down provisions for settlement of disputes.

Moreover, the powers holding mandates in islands of the Pacific are obligated by the terms of the mandate not to establish military or naval bases or to erect fortifications in the mandated territory. So far as the Japanese Mandated Islands are concerned (the Carolines, Marshalls and Mariannas), the pledge that those islands shall not be fortified was repeated by Japan in the treaty with the United States, signed February 11, 1922.⁸⁷

The Kellogg-Briand Pact,⁸⁸ to which are signatory all the powers which would logically be party to any agreement “neutralizing” the islands of the Pacific, condemns recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and provides for the settlement or solution of international disputes or conflicts by none but pacific means.

2. The advancing by the American Government at this time of a proposal that an international agreement be concluded to “neutralize” the islands of the Pacific would be disadvantageous to the United States from point of view of tactics in dealing with the general situation in the Far East. The equilibrium in that area has been upset, primarily as a result of Japan’s moves. Japan has made impossible the continuance of the 1922⁸⁹ and 1930⁹⁰ treaties providing for limitation of naval armament. Japan has violated the provisions of the Washington Conference Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China;⁹¹ Japan has also violated provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The system of treaties and agreements applicable to the Far East which existed prior to the embarking by Japan in 1931 upon a program of aggression represented a well-integrated plan. Part of that plan has been destroyed or seriously impaired. The situation in the Far East is still in a state of flux. It has not as yet crystallized sufficiently to warrant reasonable hope that there might be concluded at the present time a satisfactory general system of treaties and agreements which would establish an equilibrium in that area. Until that time comes, it is believed that the making by the American Government of any new restrictive commitment in regard to the Far East would tend to tie this Government’s hands in regard to merely one element of the whole situation and thus represent a substantial concession or sacrifice on the part of the United States.

3. Any agreement concluded now would rest on an insecure foundation. Today, important changes are taking place in the Far East. The situation in that area is confused, it is changing, and it is changing under the application of armed force. The political, economic, military and social forces manifesting themselves there are too vigorous to be checked by or to be kept within the bounds of political pledges. During recent years Japan has repeatedly broken treaty pledges. Until the attitude of Japan becomes more sober and more moderate than it is today, it would be hazardous to place reliance on treaty provisions which may very soon be broken. It is believed that the cause of peace and security and stability in international relations is harmed rather than benefited by the conclusion of treaties which do not reasonably represent the national attitudes and objectives of all of the signatory powers. Moderating influences are making themselves felt in Japan, but the military remain the dominant factor; and it is as yet too early to predict with any accuracy whether the military will become more aggressive or less aggressive.

4. There is ground for doubt whether the attitude of some of the other powers would be favorable toward the conclusion at this time of a general “neutralization” agreement.

Great Britain, France and the Netherlands might well be hesitant toward entering into a new agreement which would provide for nothing that is not already covered in existing agreements. On the other hand, however, it is conceivable that they might favor an agreement such as is under discussion. They have some apprehension in regard to Japanese aggression against their Far Eastern territories. They realize that Japan is no longer bound by the provisions of the League Covenant. They might welcome an agreement wherein Japan undertook to respect the integrity of their islands. Each of them, however, would approach the question from an angle different from that of the others.

Japan would probably object to the exclusion of Hawaii from the scope of the agreement, on the ground that the distance between Hawaii and the United States is greater than the distance between Japan proper and the Japanese islands which would be included in the agreement. Moreover, there is a strong tendency among the Japanese military to dislike the signing of restrictive political agreements with Occidental countries and to approve such agreements only if they promise to strengthen Japan’s position (tend toward giving Japan a “free hand”) in her effort to attain paramountcy in Eastern Asia.

Conclusions and Observations.

Examination of a proposal that the American Government take the initiative toward concluding an international agreement providing for the making of mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific indicates that the considerations which may be advanced in favor of such proposal are largely idealistic. An agreement of the character under discussion would probably entail no sacrifice by the United States other than the loss of the tactical position which the United States now holds by reason of the fact that so long as it takes no initiative and remains quietly self-reliant any nation which is embarked upon an aggressive course may be restrained to some extent because of the fact that the United States may choose to object. Such an agreement would provide little, if anything, that is not included in existing treaties and inherent as a principle in normal relations among nations. It might possibly have some beneficial results from a psychological point of view. A treaty of this sort would be somewhat along the lines of the treaties which various European powers have during the past few years been concluding among themselves, treaties which in their literal texts seem to contain provisions of little intrinsic weight but which are deemed to have a calming and beneficial psychological effect flowing from the very fact that the nations concerned have at the moment entered into new agreements.

The most important question appears to be that of the opportuneness of making such a proposal at this time.

The action contemplated in this proposal would not go beyond the making of mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in its island possessions or insular administered territories (mandated islands). It would place no restrictions on the right of each country to fortify or defend its insular possessions and territories. The suggestion may be made therefore that there would seem to be little objection to including the Hawaiian Islands in the scope of such an agreement. Such inclusion would probably serve toward removing one objection by Japan to participation in such an agreement.

From point of view of the United States, the question whether the Hawaiian Islands should be included in the scope of any such agreement presents greater difficulty than does the question of including any other major American insular possession in the Pacific. Would it be practicable to choose a meridian in the Pacific and to state that all islands lying east of that meridian would be excluded from the scope of the agreement and all islands lying west would be included? If it be desired that the Hawaiian Islands be excluded, the answer would seem to be in the negative, inasmuch as no meridian which would exclude the Hawaiian Islands would at the same time include all the Aleutian Islands and other important island groups in the southern Pacific. It may be pointed out also that both the Hawaiian Islands and the Aleutian Islands are administered as integral parts of the United States and not as outlying possessions, and that there would therefore be no basis for differentiating between the two groups of islands from the point of view of their relationship administratively to the United States. Should the Hawaiian Islands be excluded, would not the Japanese Government be in position to ask with warrant that the Island of Taiwan (Formosa)—which from point of view of population, wealth and strategic importance is perhaps as important to Japan as are the Hawaiian Islands to the United States—likewise be excluded.

Such an agreement would not provide for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands as contemplated in the Philippine Independence Act, Section 11.⁹² Such neutralization could be effected by a separate agreement, or the Philippine Islands could be afforded an opportunity to adhere, upon attaining complete independence, to such an agreement.

The proposal might include only the Philippine Islands and such islands as are within a certain radius of the Philippines; but it would be difficult to establish a radius which would have basis in logic and which would be equitable as regards the scope of the islands included.

Formula.

A formula for a treaty restricted to mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory power in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific might read somewhat as follows:

Article I

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to each and to all of the other Parties to respect their rights in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties agree to establish a continuing board of reference to which there may be referred any question or controversy arising in regard to said rights.

b. an agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands

Under a broad construction the concept of “neutralization” may comprehend the idea of nonfortification or of limiting the right to fortify (although such is not the fact in the cases of Belgium and Switzerland). There are therefore given below statements of considerations pro and contra in regard to a proposal that the American Government take the initiative in endeavoring to conclude an international agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands.

Considerations Pro.

1. The considerations set forth in the previous section apply in general to this proposal and are not repeated here.

2. The advancing of such a proposal would indicate that the American Government has not lost interest in the question of disarmament. As a corollary to their interest in peace, the American people believe in disarmament, provided that the interests of the United States be not sacrificed. They view with disapproval the active program of armament among the countries of the world. They are groping in their thought for some practicable way to reduce the burden of armament not only in the United States but in other countries and to replace the naval disarmament treaties which expired on December 31, 1936. Any measure which would tend to remove the need for armament or to prevent increase of armament would command the support of many of those who favor general disarmament.

3. Such an agreement might result in reducing the cost and burden of armament. (But, there is basis for doubt whether even in the absence of any limiting agreement the United States will exercise the right which it now possesses to increase the fortifications on those islands previously covered by Article 19 of the Washington Conference Treaty.)

Considerations Contra.

1. The considerations set forth in the previous section apply in general to this proposal and are not repeated here.

2. The conclusion of an agreement at this time which would limit the right of the United States to erect fortifications in American islands in the Pacific would represent a substantial sacrifice by the United States. It will be recalled that Article 19 of the Washington Conference Treaty relating to naval armament was accepted by the American Government, by way of concession to Japan, as one part only of a group of agreements of the most comprehensive character, and that, in order to reach agreement, concessions and counter-concessions were made and ultimately a collection of interdependent agreements was adopted which was intended to promote peace and stability, particularly in the Far East. The comprehensive system of agreements reached at Washington in 1922 has been disrupted to a considerable extent, largely as the result of action taken by and the attitude of Japan. The question arises: would it be wise to attempt to crystallize one aspect of a previously well-integrated system before there develops an opportunity to reestablish a comprehensive system aimed at stabilizing the situation in general in the Pacific.

In relations with Japan, the most powerful diplomatic weapon which the United States possesses today is the fact that, free to do either or both, this country is easily capable of building a Navy greater than any that Japan could possibly afford and of building fortified naval bases on soil over which we possess sovereignty which bases, if built, would be powerful obstacles to Japan’s activities in the field of imperialistic expansion. Surrender by the United States at this time of this powerful diplomatic weapon, a weapon of potential action, by entrance now into a new agreement for non-fortification of American islands in the Pacific would be an act of diplomatic as well as military disarmament on the part of the United States. It would seem advisable that the United States keep this diplomatic weapon in reserve, for it has value (a) for its present psychological effect and (b) as something which could be used in an offer of concessions-for-concessions at a moment in the future when larger questions (such as questions of disarmament and of general policy) may to advantage be discussed with Japan (i. e., when the Japanese people shall have developed a new and more conciliatory viewpoint and attitude).

3. It is doubted whether Japan would at this time become a party to an agreement identical with or substantially similar in its terms to the insular non-fortification provision of the Washington Conference Treaty. The United States would not be prepared to include Hawaii in any such agreement. There has been some indication that, if the inclusion in such agreement of any part of Japan proper (such as the Kuriles and the Loochoos) were proposed, Japan would contend for the inclusion of Hawaii, on the ground that the distance between Hawaii and the United States is much greater than the distance between Japan proper and the Japanese islands which would be included in the agreement.

Conclusions and Observations.

Examination of a proposal that the American Government take the initiative toward concluding an international agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands, would seem to indicate that the considerations against such a proposed agreement are stronger than the arguments in favor thereof. It is believed that the conclusion of such an agreement at this time would be largely at the expense of and greatly to the disadvantage of the United States.

c. an agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the pacific

In considering possible agreements applicable to islands of the Pacific, thought has been given to the question of expanding the scope of such an agreement to include outlying territories, such as French Indo-China and the Federated Malay States (including Singapore), the problems with regard to which are similar to the problems in regard to islands. The considerations pro and contra in regard to such an agreement would be substantially the same as those applicable in regard to a possible agreement of the type discussed under subheading “A”. The scope of the agreement would, however, be somewhat broader and, if such scope could be attained, such an agreement would by virtue of that fact appear to offer greater possibility of producing a stabilizing effect on the Far Eastern situation than would the less comprehensive type of agreement discussed under sub-heading “A”.

Formula.

A formula for a treaty containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific, might read somewhat as follows:

Article I

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to each and to all of the other Parties to respect their rights in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties agree to establish a continuing board of reference to which there may be referred any question or controversy arising in regard to said rights.

d. an agreement containing mutual pledges of non-aggression in regard to the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the pacific

At intervals during the past few years the Japanese Government has indicated that it would welcome the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with the United States. Study has been given to this question, and the conclusion has been reached that any such pact, if and when negotiated, should not be restricted to the United States and Japan but should include also the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands—thus making it a pact which would provide a substantial assurance that peace will be maintained in the Far East.

Such a pact might be drawn in such a way as to supplement the provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Pact.

The considerations pro and contra in regard to an agreement of this type are similar to those set forth hereinbefore in regard to agreements of type A or type C.

In considering a non-aggression pact among Pacific powers, it needs to be borne in mind that it is doubtful whether Japan would be willing at this time to enter into a general non-aggression agreement with China or with the Soviet Union. It is highly probable that Japan’s aggression in China has not ended and that the Japanese military would oppose any agreement which might serve as an international check upon Japan’s freedom of action in and with regard to China. Insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned, the Japanese Government during the past few years has consistently declined to accept Soviet proposals looking toward the conclusion of a bilateral Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact. The Japanese Government has affirmed that before it would be in position to conclude such a pact with the Soviet Union, there should be settled questions in dispute between the two countries. A number of such questions have already been adjusted by negotiation, the principal remaining questions being connected with matters relating to boundaries.

Although, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, there is doubt whether Japan would at this time enter into a general non-aggression agreement to which China and the Soviet Union would be signatories, it is possible that if the proposal of agreement were restricted in its reference to China to China’s Pacific islands (Hainan) and its reference to the Soviet Union to Soviet Russia’s Pacific islands (Saghalin and the Commander Islands), Japan’s attitude might be favorable.

A non-aggression agreement including all or most of the countries mentioned would be broader in scope than any of the types of agreement previously discussed and by virtue of that fact would seem to offer greater promise than do the other types of contributing to a general easing of existing tensions in the Far East and toward ensuring to greater extent than it now is ensured the keeping of the peace in that region.

Formula.

A formula for a treaty containing mutual pledges of non-aggression in regard to the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific might read somewhat as follows:

Article I

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to each and all of the other Parties, in regard to their insular possessions and mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean, and to their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific, to respect the rights of each, to maintain the existing state of peace and friendship, and in no case to use armed force for purposes inconsistent with the principles enunciated in the treaty concluded at Paris on the 27th day of August, 1928.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties agree to establish a continuing board of reference to which there may be referred any question or controversy which in the opinion of any High Contracting Party may involve the provisions of Article I.

Article III

In case there arises a conflict between any of the Parties to this Treaty, any or all of the High Contracting Parties may hold a Conference, which Conference, if held, shall examine the situation and publish its findings.

Article IV

The High Contracting Parties, other than those in conflict, may in conference assembled and by unanimous vote declare any party in conflict to have forfeited, insofar as its relations with other signatories to the present treaty are concerned, the benefits^* afforded by the treaty denouncing war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on the 27th day of August, 1928, and the benefits afforded by the present treaty.

III. General Conclusions and Recommendations

There have been examined the merits of the question of there being concluded an international agreement to “neutralize” the islands of the Pacific. Four possible types of agreement have been discussed.

A. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific.

B. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and to limit or refrain from erecting fortifications in such islands.

C. An agreement containing mutual pledges to respect the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific.

D. An agreement containing mutual pledges of non-aggression in regard to the rights of each signatory in their insular possessions and in their mandated islands in the Pacific, and in their outlying dependencies in the region of the Pacific.

It is evident that the term “neutralization” does not accurately describe the types of agreements which have been discussed. Use of this term is likely to create confusion and possible misunderstanding. It might, for example, cause Great Britain or Japan to raise questions relating to the “neutrality” legislation of the United States and the applicability of that legislation to American territory covered in the proposed agreement. It is suggested that the term “non-aggression” might be used.

Of the four types of possible agreements which have been examined it is believed that type B, “An Agreement Containing Mutual Pledges To Respect The Rights Of Each Signatory In Their Insular Possessions And In Their Mandated Islands In The Pacific, And To Limit Or Refrain From Erecting Fortifications In Such Islands”, would be to the disadvantage of the United States. With regard to type A, “An Agreement Containing Mutual Pledges To Respect The Rights Of Each Signatory In Their Insular Possessions And In Their Mandated Islands in the Pacific”, type C, “An Agreement Containing Mutual Pledges To Respect The Rights Of Each Signatory In Their Insular Possessions And In Their Mandated Islands In The Pacific, And In Their Outlying Dependencies In The Region Of The Pacific”, and type D, “An Agreement Containing Mutual Pledges Of Non-aggression In Regard To The Rights Of Each Signatory In Their Insular Possessions And In Their Mandated Islands In The Pacific, And In Their Outlying Dependencies In The Region Of The Pacific”, it is seriously questioned whether any, if consummated, would be of material advantage to the United States. On the other hand, however, none of these (A, C and D) would appear to offer likelihood of serious disadvantage to the United States. The question whether the American Government should initiate proceedings directed toward the conclusion of one of these three types of agreement would seem to be largely a matter of opinion and to hinge largely upon the matter of timeliness. There has been mentioned the fact that the general situation in the Far East is in a state of flux. Japan is expanding, and the comparatively chauvinistic “immoderates” remain in control in that country. Important changes are occurring in China. British trading interests in the Far East clash with the economic and industrial expansionist activities and aspirations of Japan. During recent years Soviet Russia has increased its military establishments in the Far East and has become an important factor in that area. There is a conflict of interests between Japan and Soviet Russia. The forces—political, military, economic and social—which today are having revolutionary effects in the Far East are still so vigorous and so active as to make uncertain the general situation in the Far East. Japan is moving rapidly toward what may develop into some kind of a political explosion or collapse. It is axiomatic that political agreements, to be successful, should have a basis of reasonably satisfactory economic equilibrium and of mutual confidence and good will. In the light of the present Far Eastern situation, would it not be advisable to defer, during a period of watchful waiting, the making of any proposal the mere making of which might be likely further to disturb an already too much disturbed situation and add to the perplexities of already hard pressed officialdoms (e. g., the high authorities in Japan, China, Great Britain, etc.) responsible for the decisions of statesmanship in the countries concerned?

Would the American people be likely at this time to be favorably disposed toward proposal of an agreement along any of the lines outlined? Judging by press and magazine comment, the American people are earnest in their desire for peace and equally earnest in their desire not to become involved in any armed conflict that may develop abroad. They therefore would seem likely to approve proposals along idealistic lines which fall within the general principles of established American foreign policy and which do not involve commitments likely to lead the United States into foreign entanglements or into foreign wars. At the same time, however, are not the majority of Americans averse to the United States becoming party to any international agreement unless that agreement offers a reasonable promise of something substantial being attained thereby? Would not a good many Americans be skeptical, in the light of Japan’s recent record in regard to the keeping of treaty pledges, of the worthwhile-ness of the United States exchanging with Japan political pledges of a character already contained in existing treaties and recently disregarded by Japan?

Consideration of the problem which has been made the subject of this memorandum should carry with it consideration of several other problems in the conducting of the relations of the United States with countries of the Far East and countries which have interests there. Among such other problems may be mentioned the problem of extraterritorial rights in China: negotiations were begun in 1929 by China with the American Government (and likewise with the British Government) looking toward a new agreement on that subject; those negotiations have been in a state of suspension since they were interrupted in 1931 by China’s preoccupation with more urgent matters; the moment will come when it will seem opportune to suggest resumption of negotiations looking toward relinquishment by gradual process of the extraterritorial rights involved. Another such problem is the whole question of the program to be adopted toward facilitating achievement by the Philippine Islands of independence, involving such questions as that of future trade relations, retention or abandonment by the United States of naval reservations and fueling stations in the Islands, negotiation for an agreement to provide for perpetual neutralization of the Islands if and when their independence shall have been achieved, etc. Although it does not appear that the making of a proposal by the American Government looking toward an agreement with regard to the islands of the Pacific would be inconsistent with any steps which have been or which appear likely to be taken in reference to these questions, it is believed that, while consideration is being given to the possibility of making such a proposal, examination should also be made, in order to ensure adequate perspective, of these other important and related questions. At present, various agencies of the Government are giving intensive study to questions of policy in relation to the Philippines, and conversations with President Quezon are on the eve of being held. In the course of a few weeks it will be known much better than now where we stand in regard to matters thus under consideration. (Note: On the subject of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, a memorandum is in course of preparation. There is also in course of preparation a memorandum with regard to another possible step which might be taken by the American Government looking toward improvement of the general situation in the field of our relations with the Far East, which will soon be forthcoming.)

If, after a careful weighing of various considerations, it should be decided that the American Government should take action directed toward the proposal of an agreement relating to the islands of the Pacific, it is believed that the Department of State should be authorized to approach the British Government and the Japanese Government, informally and in confidence, to elicit the probable reaction of those governments to such an agreement. Should either of those governments indicate that it would be reluctant formally to discuss the subject, it would seem the part of wisdom not to press the matter at this time. In case both those governments should indicate that they would favor the conclusion of such an agreement, it might be advisable to sound out the French Government. If the French attitude proved to be also favorable, plans might then be made for the calling of a conference, presumably at Washington (or perhaps at Honolulu or some point in the Far East), for the purpose of negotiating such a treaty.

The study which has so far been made of this subject, the results of which are set forth in this memorandum is merely preliminary and not exhaustive. In our opinion, before the American Government should proceed toward approaching any other government in reference to any of the proposed agreements outlined in this memorandum, further study would be needed toward defining with greater precision the terms and scope of any such proposed agreement. This study would involve consultation with technical officers of this Department (such as the Geographer and the Legal Adviser), with other interested Divisions of the Department (such as the Office of Philippine Affairs and the Division of Western European Affairs), and perhaps with the War and Navy Departments.

83. In submitting this draft memorandum to the Secretary of State on February 20, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs wrote: “The memorandum is prepared without indication of source, in such form that you might if you wished hand it right on to the President. It is in large part the work of Mr. Hamilton”, the Assistant Chief.
84. Signed December 13, 1921, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 33.
85. Signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 153; for secret additional agreement, see Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. i, p. 734, footnote 2a.
86. Article 10 of the League Covenant, Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 69, 83.
87. Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. ii, p. 600.
88. Signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, ibid., 1928, vol. i, p. 153.
89. Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, ibid., 1922, vol. i, p. 247.
90. Signed at London, April 22, 1930, ibid., 1930, vol. i, p. 107.
91. Signed February 6, 1922, ibid., 1922, vol. i, p. 276.
92. Approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456, 463.
93. (Note: This provision is based upon that section of the preamble of the Kellogg-Briand Anti-war Pact which reads as follows: “Convinced … that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty”.) [Footnote in the original.]