Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A4/2488: Telegram (part air)

The American Delegate (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, April 15, 1934—8 p.m.
[Received April 17—8:30 a.m.]

832. 1. From my 830, April 12, 10 a.m. and Mr. Davis’ correspondence from London the British point of view has been set before you with some thoroughness. The meeting of the Bureau together with conversations during and subsequently thereto as well as the five power document just circulated (see my 831, April 15, 7 p.m.⁴) lead me to endeavor now to give a more general analysis of possibilities.

2. It appears that the French Government have felt that the trend of events was toward a treaty of status quo limitation. They were under this impression not only from the attitude of Germany and Italy but because of the increasing pressure of Beneš and the Little Entente in this direction. Until they came to the Bureau I do not believe the French had taken into sufficient account the attitude which still existed in favor of reduction of many participants in the Conference. When the French had a chance to ascertain views both within and outside of the Bureau they were surprised to find how much determination remained to achieve a measure of reduction. Unquestionably Massigli was perturbed at the decisiveness with which Eden spoke in favor of reduction and I know that the news of the note which the five powers subsequently submitted came as an additional blow to the French. To summarize, after some months in which thought was turned to a status quo limitation the idea of reduction has now definitely raised its head again.

3. The French delegation came to the Bureau with the expectation that a meeting of the General Commission would be called in which measures should be adopted (see my 822, March 23, 2 p.m.) which would tend either to put an end to the Conference and start afresh on another or to revise the basis on which we are working. This thought was countered by Eden’s insistence on the Bureau’s meeting before the General Commission since the Bureau can only act on its present terms of reference, namely, the working out of the draft plan submitted by MacDonald on March 16, 1933.^4a Briefly the present position seems to be as follows: The British insisting upon reduction desire to maintain their draft convention as the basis for discussion, the French, on the other hand, opposing reduction wish to change the basis for discussion from the British draft convention.

4. Quite apart from the direct negotiations now being carried on a struggle which will be ostensibly procedural but really fundamental will turn on whether the Conference will or will not adopt a new basis on which to work.

5. I feel that the time will be ripe for us at the Bureau meeting to follow up your memorandum to Lindsay⁵ and thus throw the weight of our influence in favor of reduction by marking our preference for the maintenance of the present basis of the Conference. The situation will be one in which we can take part without entering a purely European political discussion. We would take part in the discussions of a procedural matter and one which affects all participants in the Conference and all persons interested in disarmament. The memorandum of the five powers gives us a neutral platform. There is much in this document that is sympathetic to us but certain phases of it, notably their desire for a new basis for the convention, we could take exception to and thus mark visible desire that the Conference follow a path which will lead to reductions. Sandler, Foreign Minister of Sweden, said to me in the Bureau, “The only barrier now against a status quo treaty is the British insistence upon a quid pro quo for their guarantees of execution”. I think Sandler has correctly analyzed the situation. The moral force of many other states that desire reduction including our own will I fear be ineffective unless the British maintain their insistence upon it. Such a course as I have sketched would give support to the British Government and public opinion in their insistence upon reduction as a quid pro quo for their guarantees. Furthermore, in the event that the British dropped their insistence upon reduction and eventually accorded guarantees of execution for a treaty of status quo limitation the fact that we had at this crucial juncture again urged reduction would make it easier at that moment if it seemed advisable to disassociate ourselves from the proceedings.

6. I noticed in the memorandum of the five powers, as no doubt you have, the inconsistency between an appeal for reduction and an advocacy of a revision of the basis of the Conference thus playing directly into French hands. Westman, Swedish Minister in Bern, appears to be largely responsible for this memorandum. I therefore questioned him in the above regard. This dangerous inconsistency had not seemed to have occurred to him. He said, however, that the four points enumerated in the memorandum are the essential portion, not the argument before it. I also gathered from Westman’s statement that it was necessary to admit that the basis of the Conference had to be changed in order to gain Spanish adherence to the memorandum. I do not believe that the authors of this memorandum fully realize the danger to the thesis of reduction really dear to them which is inherent in opening the question of the basis of the Conference.

7. Without going into detail at this time what I have in mind for possible action at the Bureau meeting is a statement covering the following points:

(a) The favorable impression we have gained from the general tenor of the memorandum of the five powers and from discussion in previous Bureau [meetings?] with regard to reduction.

(b) Discuss the final section of the memorandum of the five powers with regard to the difficulties of a limitation agreement, comment to which we subscribe, recalling the negotiation of the armaments truce in 1931.⁶

(c) Question the advisability of bringing up for decision in the General Commission the bases of the decisions of the Conference; the danger of thereby scrapping the present basis—the only tangible achievement of the Conference; suggestion that the British draft convention whose modification seems practicable in view of the British memorandum of January 29th is sufficiently comprehensive to provide framework for any necessary alteration.

(d) Statements in support of reduction.

(e) Disavowal of my [any?] desire to take a position which may jeopardize the possibility of the states of Europe making peace among themselves pending settlement.

Wilson

4. Not printed. This telegram transmitted text of observations presented by the Danish, Spanish, Norwegian, Swedish, and Swiss delegations; see Conference Documents, vol. iii, pp. 867–868, and Great Britain, Cmd. 4559, p. 16.
5. Conference Documents, vol. ii, pp. 476–493.
5. Ante, p. 22.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. i, pp. 440 ff.