793.94 Commission/751: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 18—9:58 p.m.]
82. My 79, January 16, 10 p.m. Following is résumé of discussions at meeting of Committee of Nineteen this afternoon as furnished by Sweetser in strictest confidence.
Hymans reported Japanese Government’s reply with regard to proposal submitted (see my 80, January 18, 7 p.m.). Hymans explained Japanese had insisted very strongly on one point, namely, that the United States should not be invited to participate in conciliation. Japanese had authorized him so to inform Committee. Japanese had advanced two reasons for this: (1st) juridical reason that Covenant did not authorize inclusion of nonmember states and (2d) political reason that Japanese feared China would use United States to her advantage. Also Japanese were not desirous of Russian participation but felt Russia would probably come if United States accepted. Japanese felt that in view of intensity of feeling in Japanese public opinion it would be an act of political wisdom not to issue the invitation. Japanese even thought that United States would prefer this.
Hymans then presented Japanese amendments to resolution and statement of reasons (see my 80, January 18, 7 p.m.). He explained that generally speaking Japanese suggestions would change conciliation committee from present Committee of Nineteen plus United States and Russia into a small committee selected by the Committee of Nineteen without the United States and Russia. The duty of the committee instead of “to conduct in conjunction with the parties the negotiations with a view to settlement on the basis of the principles set out in chapter 9 of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry and [Page 111] having regard to the suggestions in chapter 10” would be that “of helping the two parties to reach a final and fundamental solution”. Likewise the resolution proposed by the Japanese would omit the paragraph with regard to respect for the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty. Furthermore the “statement of reasons”31 would be amended to omit (1) the description of the Lytton Report as a “balanced, impartial and complete statement of the facts”, (2) to omit the phrase regarding the necessity for a statement under paragraph 4 of article 15 in case of failure of conciliation, and (3) to omit the last paragraph concluding “that the maintenance of the present regime in Manchuria could not be regarded as a solution”.
A lengthy debate then ensued both on the question of procedure involved in invitation to the United States and Russia and on the question of substance regarding the terms of the “resolution” and “statement of reasons”.
The Committee finally agreed that while it could not impose an invitation to nonmember states in case of conciliation against the wishes of one of the parties to the dispute and while also the Committee might accept certain minor changes in drafting it could not accept the Japanese proposals if maintained on their broad lines. In order, however, to make the situation absolutely clear and to show that if the Japanese refuse to conciliate it was on the basis of substance rather than of procedure, the Committee decided to request Hymans to put to the Japanese whether if the invitation to non-member states should be dropped the Japanese would be willing to accept the substance of the Committee’s proposals of December 15 (see my 71 and 7232).
Sweetser gave me to understand that according to his clear impression all the members of the Committee felt that there was no hope for conciliation and that the important point now to be considered was to maneuver so that final disagreement would come on matters of substance rather than of form. Hymans is discussing the matter with the Japanese tonight although as Sweetser expressed it his mandate from the Committee was not entirely clear. Sweetser assumed that the sense of the Committee was to put it up strongly to the Japanese that while the Committee might be willing to give way on the point of the invitation to nonmember states it stood firm on the necessity for the Japanese to maintain intact all the rest of the original resolution proposal.
- For text, see telegram No. 71, December 15, 1932, 8 p.m., from the Minister in Switzerland, Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. iv, p. 480.↩
- Dated December 15, 1932, 8 p.m. and 9 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. iv, pp. 430 and 432.↩