793.94 Commission/767: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
29. I am given to understand through a strictly confidential source which I have generally found to be reliable that the situation in the drafting committee of nine of the Committee of Nineteen appears to turn directly or indirectly on the question of the nonrecognition of [Page 138] Manchukuo in the following manner. Respecting the character of the report to be made under article 15, paragraph 4, the British have advocated that it take the form of an abuse [acceptance] of the Lytton Report with a brief covering statement. The majority, however, regard it as incumbent upon the Assembly to arrive at findings and to issue a report of its own. The British have agreed to acquiesce in this latter procedure and have given way tentatively at least on certain other minor points. This acquiescence on the part of the British is, however, by inference at least contingent on their views being reflected in the final part of the report which among other possible “recommendations” must consider the question of nonrecognition of Manchukuo. The plan of the smaller powers has been that the element in the report respecting nonrecognition should be in effect to declare it as incumbent upon League members not to recognize Manchukuo. The position of the British appears to be that,
- (1)
- Chinese sovereignty must be affirmed although perhaps in some measured terms which would take into consideration the autonomy enjoyed by Manchuria and the future status of Manchuria respecting autonomy;
- (2)
- that they have no intention whatsoever of recognizing Manchukuo;
- (3)
- but that they do not wish to undertake not to recognize it for an unlimited time and under any conditions.
I am informed that the atmosphere in the drafting committee is perhaps to forego an unequivocal statement respecting the nonrecognition of Manchukuo and to give in on that point as in effect a compromise to meet the British giving way on other points.
The circumstances of the American Government having had recent conversations with the British and the French on the Sino-Japanese question has, as you are aware, been noted in the press. The preoccupation which is expected with my colleagues members of the drafting committee seems to be that it might be possible for a formula to be devised which would fit into the American declared position respecting nonrecognition and at the same time meet the British position. From this naturally flows the hope that it might be possible for some understanding to be reached between the United States and Great Britain to this end.
I must say however that I am submitting the foregoing with the following reserves. It is not clear to me to what extent what is said to be the British position is their publicly or privately declared position or how much is judged from perhaps well-justified inference—particularly as the drafting committee has not yet formally reached this question. Equally it is not clear, provided this be the British position, td what extent it is based on policy vis-à-vis the [Page 139] international situation or on a genuinely objective concern over the legal implications of the nonrecognition doctrine. I am however authoritatively informed that the British representative (Eden) stated in a conversation that the British Government was by no means certain as to what position it could take in respect to this “entirely new tenet in international law.”
The lineup of the other powers in the drafting committee seem[s] to be about as follows. Czechoslovakia and Sweden are standing strongly for a nonrecognition policy. Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland stand primarily for the upholding of the Covenant and favor nonrecognition as a concomitant of this. In the absence of Madariaga however Spain does not play her formerly pronounced part. France has accorded these small powers general support but has stopped short of openly opposing Great Britain. Germany mildly favors nonrecognition but her policy seems to be very uncertain. Italy I am informed remains absolutely silent in the meetings.
- Telegram in two sections.↩