793.94/2155
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Castle)
I asked the Japanese Ambassador to come to the Department to speak with me about the various newspaper reports today from China and the attached telegram from Mr. Peck in Nanking.5
As to the demand on the Chinese that the boycott be stopped, the Ambassador said he thought it might well be true that the Japanese Consul General in Nanking had used very strong language since it was the belief of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government was inciting the boycott. He said that he could not imagine the Consul General having threatened resort to forcible measures on the part of Japan as Japan had no idea of taking any measures which will bring war with China. He referred again and again to war as unthinkable.
As to the landing of Japanese forces in Chapei, the Ambassador said that he had heard nothing of it, but could not believe that anything [Page 133] of the sort was intended unless possibly some few troops from destroyers might have been landed. He pointed out that Japan had no Marines to land as we do. The Ambassador said that it was quite true that there was a cruiser at Nanking, but that it was unthinkable that Japan should do any such thing as bombard Nanking.
Mr. Debuchi said that the Consul in Nanking had authority to evacuate, Japanese throughout the city to the water front, where they could be protected, if this was necessary, but he had told his Government that he did not consider it necessary at this time. I pointed out to the Ambassador that it would certainly create a very bad impression in the world if, as the newspapers seem to report, the Japanese Government made the withdrawal of its troops to the railway zone in Manchuria contingent on the stopping of the boycott. I said that, on the other hand, the world would sympathize with Japan if it withdrew its troops in Manchuria into the railway zone and, after it was done, urged the Chinese Government to stop the boycott. I told him that it seemed to me very unfortunate to take any measures which would undermine the Chinese Government since, whether that Government was liked or not, it was the only government with which any of us could negotiate. The Ambassador agreed to this, but said he felt the Chinese Government was in a very bad position since the Cantonese would apparently insist on the resignation of Chiang Kai Shek and there seemed to be no one to take his place. He said the best man in the Government seemed to be T. V. Soong.
As to the troops in Manchuria, the Ambassador said that they had been entirely withdrawn from two places and he believed they were being withdrawn from others, but not as quickly as he wished they might be. He said that he was not a military man and could not understand why the evacuation was not being more quickly carried out.
I told the Ambassador that we were, of course, very much disturbed by all these reports that kept coming in, not necessarily because Japan was doing something which should not be done, but because as the situation continued it became inevitably more and more tense and might lead to exceedingly unfortunate incidents. The Ambassador told me that he had sent a very long and vigorous telegram to Baron Shidehara about the wireless in Mukden and also the banking situation in Mukden, telling him that the military there should certainly understand that it was to their disadvantage to interfere with such important institutions as the National City Bank and the wireless with its Radio Corporation interests.
The Ambassador said he hoped I would feel free to call him at any time to comment on reports we got because he wanted to cooperate to the limit.