817.00/5423: Telegram

The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

92. My 70, February 7, 11 a.m., and Department’s 38, February 8, 6 p.m. We have withheld further recommendations until we should have an opportunity to appraise the effect of Congress’ decision to take a recess. All of us still feel that a statement along the lines suggested would have a good effect, first, because it would help to convince the Conservatives in Congress that the United States Government definitely intends to carry out the Tipitapa agreement and cannot be forced into any compromise.

We suggest however that the statement outlined in my No. 70 be changed as follows to eliminate the dangers pointed out by the Department:

1.
Omit last sentence of first paragraph beginning “neither the Government of the United States” and ending “the arrangements agreed upon.”
2.
Change the third paragraph of the statement to read as follows: “The Government of the United States therefore has no alternative but to supervise the 1928 election in the manner contemplated in the Tipitapa agreement and it could not without dishonoring its pledged word entertain any proposals for a change in the essential features of the plan which it has promised to carry out. It confidently hopes to receive the cooperation and support of all other parties to the agreement in the execution of its provisions.”

We feel that it would be advisable to give out this statement in the very near future in order to allow time for it to take effect and for any possible irritation to wear off before Congress reconvenes. We should like, therefore, to be authorized to make it at such time as seems most opportune. It should be realized that Congress will be in session but a few days when it reconvenes and that it is of the utmost importance that the Conservative leaders should be convinced, before Congress meets, of the necessity of approving the electoral law.

While the President and his advisers now profess to be rather hopeful that the law will be approved as the result of Cuadra Pasos’ influence after his return, there is no apparent change in the attitude of Chamorro or the leaders in Congress.

Eberhardt