817.00/5379: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation to the Sixth International Conference of American States (Hughes) to the Secretary of State
90. The following has been sent to the American Legation in Nicaragua:
“From Francis White. Yesterday Cuadra Pasos showed me a telegram which he had just received from President Diaz. It stated that he was doing his best for the electoral law but that the difficulty was that Congress and the public in general feel that the United States is supporting not the Liberal Party but General Moncada personally.
I replied that I was not at all impressed by such a message. I stated that these were exactly the same tactics which were used in the past. Chamorro used the same argument in 1923 when the Government of the United States suggested that the Government of Nicaragua might want to consider the desirability of asking Dr. Dodds and experts designated by him to go to Nicaragua to help the authorities of Nicaragua to put the new electoral law into effect. After the death of President Diego Chamorro, however, Emiliano Chamorro did not hesitate immediately to say, when Martinez supported Solorzano rather than him as the candidate for President, that there could not be free and fair elections without American supervision. I told Cuadra Pasos that the attitude which was taken in any given case depended upon whether the person was in office or out of office, and that it was an old story to say that it will look like the Government of the United States is supporting somebody else.
[Page 465]I told Cuadra Pasos that such a contention could not be advanced in the present case because President Coolidge in a letter personally signed by him to President Diaz stated that the Government of the United States would run a free and fair election, and that when Cesar, acting presumably under instructions from Chamorro, brought up the same question in November, 1927, Secretary Kellogg in a letter to him dated November 17, 1927, very definitely set forth our position.33 I informed Cuadra Pasos that I could consider such a message only as an attempt to becloud the issue and that he could not expect me to give it any consideration.
I told Cuadra Pasos that it had been made abundantly clear to him by Secretary Kellogg when he was in Habana, by myself, and also to the Nicaraguan Legation in the United States and to the authorities in Nicaragua, that the Government of the United States was going to live up to its agreement and carry out a free and fair election. We desire to do this with the concurrence and support of the Nicaraguan Government and the Conservatives, but whether we gain their support or not, we intend to do it, and it was my hope that this would be made abundantly clear to Chamorro and any others who were obstructing the passage of the electoral law. Cuadra Pasos said that he understood perfectly our Government’s position; that he is in hearty support of it, and that he had cabled it many times to Nicaragua; for that reason he had hesitated to show me the telegram from President Diaz. …
I told Cuadra Pasos … that the interests of the Conservative Party certainly lay in fulfilling their obligation and agreement, and in doing so in a manner which would show them to be in accord with, and not in opposition to, the Government of the United States. I added that it was my belief that Chamorro’s own selfish interests lay in this same policy, for if Chamorro is looking for power, he cannot get it now; and that his only chance seems to be in supporting the Conservatives to the utmost to carry out their agreement and to endeavor to have the Conservatives win the election legitimately, in order that he might become the candidate of the Conservative Party 4 years from now. I told Cuadra Pasos that I thought Chamorro might well consider whether his chances for election in 4 years would be greater if the Liberal Party won the election of 1928. I stated that I believed the best interest for all lay in carrying out the agreement in perfect accord with the Government of the United States, and that by placing themselves in opposition, the contingency which Chamorro had told me in Washington—that he was fearful that the floating vote would go to the Liberal Party—would in such case be enhanced. Cuadra Pasos said that he shared my views completely and that he would again cable to Nicaragua. The cable of President Diaz stated that he was working for the electoral law. Cuadra Pasos said that he was optimistic that they would succeed. The difficulty over Chamorro is great, but the Conservative Party will overcome it because Zepeda has more influence with Chamorro than does Cuadra Pasos. I again urged Cuadra Pasos to use his influence in favor of the law. Cuadra Pasos agreed to do so, but stated that he had received no word [Page 466] from Chamorro for some time, which he attributed to the fact that Zepeda has come out strongly in favor of the electoral law and is, of course, in opposition to Chamorro, and Chamorro no longer communicates with him.
Cuadra Pasos also said that he was again instructing Cesar in Washington to cable his support of the electoral law.”
I believe it would be well to ask Cesar to call and then impress upon him the necessity for taking the action instructed by Cuadra Pasos.
- Telegram in two sections.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. iii, p. 376.↩