800.51/431

The Ambassador in Germany (Houghton) to the Secretary of State

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I do not want to offer unsolicited advice. But I know you welcome an expression of the considered opinions of officers of the Government in Europe, who are able to study conditions at first hand. And one solution of the problem presented by our foreign loan remains so insistent in my mind, and seems to me to offer so much of advantage, that I venture to lay it before you.

As I understand the matter, the people of the United States want their European loans repaid. They remember that these loans were only part of a far greater expenditure,—many more billions of dollars, thousands of boys’ lives, and countless thousands of other [Page 172] boys who will go through life maimed and mutilated and crippled,—made to bring peace back into the world. They gave these lives and gave these billions to secure peace. And they did not get what they sought. There is greater hate, greater fear, greater suspicion and far greater unrest in Europe today than existed prior to the war. Realizing, then, their failure, and seeing only the apparently inevitable approach of another war, into which they themselves not unlikely may be drawn, they say, naturally enough,—“Pay us back our money. If we cancel your obligations, we shall merely enable you to make war on one another the sooner.” The position appears reasonable enough. It looks to be based on good common sense. It is nevertheless a counsel of despair because it fails to take into account one possibility. If the American people want peace, the way is still open. Peace can be obtained.

I mean this: Look pretty much where you will today in Europe, you find men and women living under conditions of great hardship,—insufficiently nourished, insufficiently clothed, unprotected against the bitter cold of the approaching winter. They live, literally, from hand to mouth. There is no future to beckon them on, unless it be the mirage of Bolshevism. These conditions exist in France and England and Italy just as truly as in Germany, although here the picture may be more sharply drawn. These men and women know, and they appreciate, thoroughly, the fact that not only their lives but their children’s lives and the lives of their children’s children, are involved. And the knowledge tends to break them down, physically and morally,—to fill their minds and hearts with sullen distrust. If now, under the existing conditions, our own debt be clamped down upon them, the situation obviously becomes worse. It may even be intensified beyond bearing. If, on the other hand, our debt were cancelled against other debts, a large part of the burden would be lifted. The situation would instantly become better. Despair would give way to hope, and with hope economic prosperity would quickly follow. Either course is open. We can make the conditions under which millions of human beings in Europe must live almost infinitely better, or we can make them almost infinitely worse. It is for us alone to decide.

Now we cannot wisely make an unconditional remission of what is owed us. That is certain. Unless peace is assured, the relief would be temporary. It might, in fact, even hasten the war which, unless relief comes, seems to me inevitable. But, obviously, such a statement leaves the fundamental question untouched. If peace is to come, it must come by the will of the peoples most concerned,—the European peoples. Why not then put the question squarely to [Page 173] them? I do not mean to their governments. Governments have not been successful in avoiding war. We must, of course, deal through governments, but we can make it clear that the issue itself must be left for the people themselves to decide,—the men and women who work in factories or on farms or on railroads or in stores, who pay the bills of war with their bodies and perhaps with their souls, and who, even when victorious, reap no gain. Let them answer. We can, if we will, in this way, say to the plain people of England and France and Italy and Germany, that if, first, they will, by a plebiscite, agree not to make war on one another for fifty years; if, second, they will make it a part of their fundamental law that such a war cannot thereafter be declared except by their affirmative vote; and if, third, there shall be a substantial disarmament,—the American people, believing that peace, humanly speaking, would then be assured, will remit and cancel the debt. That much the American people can do, if they will. They can give the peoples of Europe an opportunity, hitherto denied them, to choose. If these peoples desire present conditions to endure, if they want to upbuild productive forces only to destroy them a little later by war, they can say so. If, on the other hand, they prefer the ways of peace and security and of mutual good will and helpfulness, that too lies open to them. The choice would then be theirs. The essential point to keep in mind is that the power of choice must be given these men and women. At present they are powerless. Each of these nations is caught in the gin of its own historic continuity. It is in a sort of groove. It cannot escape. If relief is to come, it must come from without. And the only people who possess the power to give the necessary impulse are the people of the United States. They can give the impulse that will lead to prosperity by giving the peoples of Europe the opportunity to choose the peace that leads to prosperity, and they can make the meaning of that choice both real and vital by making known just what is involved. And having done this, they will have done all that they can. Anything less is, I believe, a moral duty either neglected or refused. But the time is short. If we mean to do our part, we must not delay. Already the conditions are dangerous. Already the Bolshevist tide is beating against the barriers of European civilization. And if once those barriers go down, if the German people, in despair, believing that sympathy and help and understanding of their position are denied them, turn, for relief, to the East, the time is past. That tide will sweep resistlessly to the Atlantic. This is not mere rhetoric. I know reasonably well the situation in Germany. I know the minds of those most qualified to understand conditions here. I give it [Page 174] as my sober judgment that either some measure of hope and assistance must soon be given these desperately pressed and despairing human beings, or the worst may be expected. They may get through the winter. I think they will. They may even get through the summer. That is possible. But, unless help reaches them, that is the end.

I have not thought it worth while to discuss whether it would be better to cancel the debt or to hold it in abeyance during the time allotted. I make no effort to bolster up my suggestion by economic arguments which point to our own greater prosperity when Europe is prosperous. I lay no stress whatever on the fact that we can probably collect only a fraction of what is owing us, and that at the cost of friendship. In my own poor opinion, the matter cannot be safely handled in terms such as these. God has been good to us in America. He has made it possible for us to create and pile up huge wealth. I believe most humbly that He has given our people also the vision, once the essential facts are laid before them, to use any necessary part of this wealth to bring about a real and, it may be, a lasting peace, among the four great nations involved.

There are, of course, a thousand practical objections. The time to meet and to settle such objections, however, it seems to me, is after peaceful conditions have been prescribed,—not before. I have limited my suggestion to four nations only. They are the important nations. The others can be dealt with when we see fit. I realize, too, that any one of the powers mentioned, by refusing, may block the entire plan. But if so, that power will be left in a most unenviable and isolated position, and the payment of its share of the debt must come as a matter of course. After all, my suggestion, offering the possibility of relief, puts the responsibility of repayment upon the European peoples where it belongs. We shall not thereafter be accused of trying to extort money from them which they believe in their hearts ought not to be paid.

I wish I could talk the situation over with you, for there are many things I should like to add, but will not. I hope you may consider the suggestion of sufficient importance, not in its details but in its essential thought, to discuss with the President, and that you will make such use of it as seems deservable. The Administration, so far as I know, has itself taken no position in this matter. It is merely following a Congressional order. The final word remains to be spoken. The most effective way to present the matter to our people would, of course, be through some one directly connected with the Administration. If, for reasons, this is not practicable, then I venture to suggest that you permit me to make it the basis of a short address, say on Thanksgiving Day, stating, frankly, that the suggestion [Page 175] is merely personal. Inasmuch as the time between now and Thanksgiving Day is limited, will you not cable me whether I may go ahead with such an address? I know the situation is delicate. If you wish to know exactly what I would say, I shall be glad to cable the address to you at my own expense. Personally, after months of thought and consideration, here on the ground, I cannot escape the conscientious belief that the plan outlined offers not only the best but the only solution. Any other method leaves the fundamental problem unsolved.

Let me again apologize for the length of this communication. I have written it with a certain reluctance and wholly from a sense of duty. When one sees the forces of civilization in the balance, one must be lacking in moral courage to withhold any suggestion that points to safety, especially when this suggestion is the result of months of study and careful thought.

With high esteem [etc.]

A. B. Houghton