Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia

Paris Peace Conference 180.03101/40

Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, February 15, 1919, at 3 p.m.

[Extracts]

B. C.–32

• Present.—America, United States of: Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. House; Secretary, Mr. L. Harrison.—British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P., The Rt. Hon. W. C. Churchill, M.P.; Secretaries, Lt.Col. M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Mr. Norman.—France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; Secretaries, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Bearn.—Italy: M. Sonnino, M. Crespi; Secretaries, Count Aldrovandi, M. Bertele.—Japan: H. E. Baron Makino, H. E. M. Matsui.
• Joint Secretariat.—America, United States of: Lieut. Burden.—British Empire: Major A. M. Caccia, M.V.O.—France: Captain Portier.—Italy: Major Jones.—Japan: M. Saburi.
• Also Present.—America, United States of: Gen. T. H. Bliss.—British Empire: Gen. Sir H. H. Wilson, G.C.B., D.S.O.—France: M. Alby, M. Bertin, Major Aublet.—Italy: General Cavallero.

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Interpreter.—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

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3 (b) Prinkipo Conference

Mr. Churchill said that everyone there present knew the reasons which had led the Conference to adopt the policy of Prinkipo. Since then a month had passed and no decision which made any effect on the forces of the Allies had yet been reached. On the other hand, as General Alby’s statement had shown, very disastrous events had been taking place in Russia during that period. In his opinion, it was essential to try and bring the faction war in Russia to an end, and Great Britain adhered entirely to the position previously taken up. But if Prinkipo was not going to come to anything, the sooner it could be got out of the way the better. At the present moment all military action was paralysed by suspense, and there was very grave danger that as a result, the Allied and friendly armies would gradually melt away. The British Government held the view that that process of disintegration was proceeding very rapidly, and that the existing friendly armies would probably be the last, which it would be possible to raise against Bolshevism. Consequently, it was essential, either to carry Prinkipo through to a definite result, or to get it out of the way. With this object in view he had drafted a wireless message which he submitted for discussion. This telegram would, he thought, have the desired effect of settling affairs within a certain limit of time. The effect hoped for would be either to bring about a discussion at Prinkipo and a cessation of fighting in Russia, or the field would be left clear for such action as the Allies might wish to take.

Mr. Churchill then read the following text of the draft telegram:

“The Princes Island proposal of the Allied Powers has now been made public for more than a month. The Bolsheviks have replied by wireless on the 6th instant offering to meet the wishes of the Allied Powers as regards the re-payment of loans, the grant of concessions for mineral and forest rights, and to examine the rights of eventual annexation of Russian territories by the Entente Powers.

“The Allies repudiate the suggestion that such objects have influenced their intervention in Russia. The supreme desire of the Allies is to see peace restored in Russia and the establishment of a Government based upon the will of the broad mass of the Russian people.

“It is solely with this object that the Princes Island proposal has been made. It is not essential to that proposal that any conference should be held or that representatives of the various Russian forces in the field should meet around a common table. But what is imperative is that fighting should stop and stop forthwith. The Bolshevik Government while verbally accepting the invitation to Princes Island have, so far from observing a truce of arms, taken the offensive in many directions and are at the present time attacking on several fronts. In addition they have called up new classes and expedited and expanded their military preparations.

“It is therefore necessary to fix a precise time within which the Princes Island proposal must be disposed of. Unless within 10 days from the 15th instant the Bolshevik forces on all fronts have ceased to attack and have withdrawn a distance of not less than 5 miles from the present position of their adversaries’ outpost lines, the Princes Island proposal will be deemed to have lapsed. If, however, within 5 days a wireless notification is received from the Bolshevik Government that they have so ceased attacking, so ceased firing and so withdrawn, and if this is confirmed by the reports received from the various fronts, a similar request will be addressed by the Allies to the forces confronting them.

“It is in these circumstances only that a discussion at Princes Island can take place.”

Mr. Churchill, continuing, said that simultaneously with the above message, or something like it, he would propose the immediate setting up of an Allied Council for Russian affairs. This Council should have political, economic and military sections, with executive powers within limits to be laid down by the present Conference. In that way continuity of policy, unity of purpose and control would be obtained. He thought the Council should get to work during the period before the Prinkipo proposal could be disposed of one way or another, for the proposed Council would be useful whatever happened in regard to Prinkipo. The Council would receive general directions from the Allied Governments in the light of what happened at Prinkipo, so that there would be no delay. But he laid stress on the fact that the military section should be formed and should get to work at once. If the Bolsheviks continued to attack and to drive back the Allied and friendly forces, a definite military policy would be required and it would then be necessary to know what action was possible with the available resources. The military section of the proposed Council should, therefore, be asked at once to draw up a plan for concerted action against the Bolsheviks. The details in regard to the organization of the Council could naturally be worked out in a variety of different ways: but it was essential to have a body whose duty it would be to study the situation and to estimate the forces the Allies disposed of for the purpose of waging war against the Bolsheviks. Then, if the Prinkipo proposal gave no results, the Supreme War Council would be in possession of a definite war scheme, together with an appreciation of the situation and an estimate of the chances of being able to carry through to success the suggested plans. The Supreme War Council could then make their choice: either to act, or to withdraw their troops and leave everyone in Russia to stew in their own juice. But in any case, the Supreme War Council would have been placed in a position to enable it to arrive at a decision. His proposal, therefore, contained two definite lines of action. Firstly, that a wireless message be issued with the object of bringing the Prinkipo proposal to an issue. Secondly, that a scientific and careful study of the situation be carried out in order to be ready with a plan of action in the event of the Prinkipo proposal falling through.

In conclusion he wished earnestly to bring the following facts to the notice of the Conference. A month ago a meeting had been held in London at which it had been decided that the Russian situation was so serious as to demand the immediate acceptance of a policy. A month had passed, and no decision had been reached. The situation in Russia did not brook delay. It was essential that some policy should be laid down. The alternatives were these—either to prepare some plan of military action in Russia, consistent with the resources available, or to withdraw the armies and to face the consequences of abandoning Russia to her fate. Before the war Russia was the counterpoise of Europe. Now the balance was maintained by large British and American armies. The British forces were being demobilised and the American forces were going home. He himself did not believe that Germany could resume war at the present moment, but he begged his hearers to consider what the position would be in five or ten years’ time. The population of Germany was twice that of France. The number of conscripts annually available would be almost three times as great. If, in addition, the Allies abandoned Russia to her fate, would it be possible to make sure that Germany would do the same? Would it be possible to make certain that Germany, either by alliance with the Bolsheviks or with the other parties at present friendly to the Allies would not in the near future become the supreme influence in Russia? It was only from Russia that Germany could derive those resources which she had lost through the loss of her colonies and through her defeat on the Western front. But should Russia fall into her clutches, Germany would thereby become stronger than ever. In his opinion Russia was the key to the whole situation, and unless she formed a living part of Europe, unless she became a living partner in the League of Nations and a friend of the Allied Powers, there would be neither peace nor victory. He would therefore implore the Conference to take up the Russian question and to pursue it unceasingly until a policy was agreed on. The terrible situation which faced the Allies in Russia compelled him to speak in very direct terms.

Mr. Lansing agreed that with a few changes in the text the message could be sent, but as regards anything like the formation of a policy or the creation of a Council, he thought no action should be taken until an opportunity for consultation had been given.

Mr. Churchill expressed the view that the creation of the Council might be postponed, but he considered it essential that the military section should forthwith be constituted.

M. Clemenceau agreed that the Supreme War Council could, without any inconvenience, call upon its military advisers to study the question.

Colonel House proposed that a decision in regard to the creation of a Council should be postponed until Monday next. He was willing to agree, however, to the immediate despatch of the proposed wireless.

Baron Sonnino pointed out that there were two questions to be decided. A military question and a question which entailed negotiations. As regards the military question he agreed that it was most urgent; that a policy was essential and that delay would be very dangerous. In his opinion it was not a question of what would happen in five or ten years’ time. The danger to be faced would have immediate reaction in all Allied countries.

M. Clemenceau asked that the military question should be considered at once as being most urgent.

Mr. House proposed that the military question should be adjourned until Monday, and that the Conference should confine itself to a consideration of the cable.

M. Clemenceau said that he had been completely opposed to Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal, but he had accepted it in order to avoid the introduction of elements of discord into that Conference. But the fact must now be recognised that the original wireless message had not been a great success, either in Europe or elsewhere. The people whose greatest interest it would have been to support the proposals therein contained (he was now speaking of the Russian political refugees of all kinds who continually visited their offices, with petitions for guns, munitions and money)—those people had gone off in a bad temper, instead of taking the unique opportunity offered them by the Conference of indicting Bolshevism and its abuses before the whole world. These people had refused to go to Prinkipo, whilst the Bolsheviks had offered the Allies money. When people got into an awkward situation, they usually made an effort to get out of it. The Conference should not attempt to deceive itself, for that was what it was now trying to do. He thought that it should get out of its troubles as discreetly and as simply as possible. No further reference should be made to Prinkipo. He was not altogether opposed to Mr. Churchill’s draft message, but what was said in two pages could be put in ten lines. It would be very simple to summarise it. Personally, he would prefer to say nothing, but if the Conference insisted upon sending a message, it should be as simple as possible. Why should the whole world be told that this plan had failed. That was already known. Mr. Churchill had described the Allied situation in Russia as cruel and terrible, but he had described it truly. He himself agreed with all that Mr. Churchill had said; and he attached a great importance to the creation of the proposed Council. He did not favour the policy of leaving Russia to her own devices, because she would rapidly fall a prey to the Germans. He favoured the policy of encirclement: the policy of setting up a barrier around Russia. The results of such a policy would be that in the end the Russians would ask the Allies to intervene.

That very moment a telegram had been received to the effect that the Germans had, in spite of the orders issued, attacked the Poles on a wide front, and had already taken two towns. The Germans were endeavouring to meet Marshal Foch with an accomplished fact. He would speak of this matter again presently, because a decision would have to be taken. But he wished to mention it at once, because the Russian policy must be examined in its entirety and Poland was concerned in that policy.

He did not oppose the sending of a new message about Prinkipo. But he foresaw grave troubles, and a decision in regard to military policy in Russia should be reached without further delay. He himself was ready to make new sacrifices, but he did not court defeat in Russia, after having been victorious on the Rhine.

Mr. House thought the question to be decided was how to finesse the situation against the Bolsheviks. In England and America the Russian question has created a very serious situation and the Prinkipo proposal has produced a good effect in circles hostile to the Government. The point to be decided was how best to defeat the Bolsheviks and the German purpose. Unless tact were used, all people east of the Rhine might be thrown against England, the United States of America, and France. It was already being said that England and America were using France as an instrument for obtaining Anglo-Saxon supremacy throughout the world.

Mr. Balfour thought it was necessary to take steps to put the Bolsheviks in the wrong, not only before public opinion, but before those who held the view that Bolshevism was democracy gone astray with large elements of good in it. Personally, he thought Bolshevism was the worst form of class tyranny. M. Clemenceau held the view that public opinion in France was unanimous against Bolshevism, and that any truck with it meant trafficking with the powers of darkness. But other views existed and could not wholly be ignored. He himself had never been sanguine about the issue of the discussions at Prinkipo; but he had perceived certain benefits arising out of the Allies’ declaration of an endeavour to secure peace in Russia. In any case, the Allies had embarked on the Prinkipo proposal, and, if abandoned as M. Clemenceau had proposed, all the advantages gained by the original proposal would be thrown away. Therefore, it would merely be worldly wisdom, having once invested money in Prinkipo, to extract all that was possible from the debacle. He thought, therefore, some sort of message should be sent to the Bolsheviks, which would compel them either to cease hostilities or to refuse negotiations. Such a message would put the Bolsheviks on the horns of a dilemma, and at the same time place the Allies in a better position in regard to public opinion.

Mr. House said that he had never been in favour of the Prinkipo proposal, but it had been embarked upon, and therefore they must go along with it and, if eventually the Allies were compelled to embark on military operations, they would do so in a stronger and better position.

M. Clemenceau said that he knew quite well that his proposal to take no further action in regard to Prinkipo would not be accepted. For that reason he had suggested shortening and simplifying Mr. Churchill’s draft. He thought it right to mention that French opinion had throughout been unanimously opposed to the Prinkipo policy, and the protests had not been limited to France. A violent protest had been received from Admiral Kolchak, who had accused the Allies of having thereby practically disarmed his troops. Were not the Allies responsible to some degree for the recent failures in Russia? The soldiers in the line did not know whether they ought to fight or to await the next armistice. The Allies should not lose sight of that. He (M. Clemenceau) was not reproaching them, but it was nevertheless a fact.

As Colonel House and Mr. Balfour had remarked, the Allies had got into this Prinkipo business, and now they had to get out of it. He merely asked them to get out of it in as simple a manner as possible. He had no objections to offer to Mr. Churchill’s draft, but he would like it to be made simpler and shorter.

M. Sonnino agreed that the Allies would have to get out of the Prinkipo business. He himself had been opposed to it from the commencement, and he had then expressed the opinion that the Bolsheviks would be the only ones to accept the Allies’ invitation, as it gave the Bolsheviks the means of enhancing their prestige. His predictions had come true, and today the Allies possessed good grounds for abandoning the whole project. It could truthfully be said that the Bolsheviks had ignored the Allies’ requests and had not ceased hostilities, and that the other Governments had not accepted the Allies’ invitation. The matter should therefore be ended. It was proposed to send another message, with a short time limit for reply, say ten or fifteen days. It was said that procedure would lead to no harm. But it would do harm, if by enhancing still more the prestige of the Bolsheviks, the Allies increased still further the state of demoralisation of the friendly Russian forces, and of the Entente troops operating in Russia. Mr. Balfour had said “We must compel the Bolsheviks to acknowledge their errors”. The Bolsheviks would never do that, and ten days hence the Allies would find themselves assailed by new and innumerable difficulties. The Bolsheviks would put forward many excellent reasons to prove that they had been compelled to attack in self-defence, and meanwhile the situation would have become worse, the Allies would have gained no benefits whatever, and the Allied troops would have become even more demoralised.

The Conference wished to create a Council to draw up a military plan of action for these troops, and at the same time measures were proposed which would still further demoralise these same troops. Prinkipo had failed: there was no doubt whatever about that. Prinkipo had, however, proved to the world the friendly desire of the Allies to be at peace with Russia. The Prinkipo policy had been a failure, and the less said about it the better: and the proposed Council should now be asked to suggest other solutions.

He would accept the proposal to send another message, but the offer to meet at Prinkipo should not be renewed.

M. Clemenceau expressed his desire to support Baron Sonnino’s proposal.

Mr. Churchill said that Mr. Lloyd George was very anxious, should the Prinkipo policy fail, for the Allies to be ready with another policy. But the British Cabinet would never agree, having gone so far, to break off the Prinkipo policy without making it quite clear to the world that that proposal had been sincerely put forward and sincerely pressed, as long as any chance of its succeeding existed. He thought the dignity of the Conference demanded the acceptance of that procedure. The Conference had unanimously adopted the proposal which had been put forward by President Wilson himself. No one should be able to say “You made a false movement, and you abandoned it. The Bolsheviks were about to accept, and you withdrew”. The British Government wished it to appear that they had acted fairly by the Bolsheviks. He had put forward proposals for a military enquiry to be held, but he did not pre-judge the decision. It might be that as a result of that enquiry, no action might be found possible. But, in any case, until the military experts had reported, it would not be wise brutally to brush aside the Prinkipo proposal until alternative plans were ready.

M. Sonnino enquired what would be the result if the Bolsheviks stated that they would stop all hostilities and come to Prinkipo. In ten days’ time it would be impossible to ascertain whether hostilities had really been stopped. On the other hand, the effect would have been to disorganise still further the Allied forces in Russia. His thesis was this: The Bolsheviks had been given a period of time up to the 15th February in which to comply with the conditions contained in the original wireless. The Bolsheviks had not complied with those terms and conditions (the Bolsheviks had continued their offensive). Why, therefore, prolong by ten days the period already granted? The Bolsheviks could not do more than fail to comply, as they had done, with the conditions of the Allies, and in ten days’ time the Allies would be faced with the same situation; but with the additional disadvantage that their own forces would have become further disorganised. He begged the members of the Conference to realise what effect this policy would have, not only in Russia but in Allied countries. The prestige given to Bolshevism was a real disaster in its effect on Allied countries. Consequently, no good effect could be obtained by granting the Bolsheviks this added prestige. The Bolsheviks had been given a chance; why should they be given a second and a third and a fourth chance? He strongly opposed the sending of the proposed message.

Baron Makino said that he also had received messages from Siberia bearing out the statements made by M. Clemenceau as to the disastrous effect the original wireless had created in the minds of all friendly groups in Siberia. At the time that the invitation had been issued to the various groups in Russia, no such consequence had been anticipated. If now a second telegram were sent, it was most important that its intent and purpose should not be misunderstood by the friendly forces in Siberia.

Mr. Balfour wished to ask the military authorities a question of fact. It was being said that the Bolsheviks had pretended to accept, but they had not in reality done so, because they had not complied with the fundamental condition in regard to the cessation of hostilities. But had the Allied troops abstained from hostilities? Or, to put his question in another way: had all the Allied military operations been defensive in their character?

Mr. Churchill pointed out that during the interval between the dispatch of the invitation and the present moment, the Bolshevik forces had made the most heavy attacks on all fronts.

Mr. Balfour expressed the view that a good many points of great difficulty had been raised that afternoon. He proposed therefore that the further consideration of the two questions: the dispatch of the message and the creation of a Council on Russian Affairs, should be adjourned till Monday afternoon.

(It was agreed to adjourn until Monday, 17th February, at 3 p.m., the further consideration of the two questions relating to the situation in Russia, namely:

(1) The wireless message in regard to Prinkipo, and

(2) The creation of an Allied Council for Russian Affairs.)

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(The Conference adjourned to Monday afternoon, February 17th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

February 16th, 1919.