861.00/3858: Telegram
The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received February 15, 1919, 9:50 a.m.]
Following from [Harris at] Omsk.
“111. February 13, noon. Weekly summary press opinion in Siberia. Press continues give paramount importance to Princes Island proposition. Press is very antagonistic to idea of the Conference. Even moderate newspapers in leading articles state that [Page 55] decision of Allies makes it clear that members of Peace Conference do not yet fully understand the Russian situation, despite the well-known suffering of Russia, statements of well-informed resident foreigners. If from them the Allies do not yet know the terrible condition of Russia, it is very doubtful if the representatives will succeed in convincing them. Princes Island inquiry in Russian anarchy therefore becomes superfluous. The many foreign missions and official representatives in Siberia, for example, can verify the ruin of industry and the decay of transportation, to discover the underlying reason for which it seems unnecessary for Allies to debate. We do not wish to believe, these papers state, that commercial interests only given [prompt?] the decision of Allies and that this indifferent attitude comes from idea of waiting until Russia is absolutely in ruin when they can do as they please. We have, they state, not finally lost all belief in our friends, but we hope time is close when they will understand the danger to world in development of Bolshevism.
In discussing situation with individual Russians of practically all classes I find they no longer expect large numbers of Allied troops to fight here. They have now become accustomed to this fact. On the other hand, there is a small party which favors Japanese because Japan has expressed willingness to send large numbers of troops to western Siberia front.
Senator Longworth’s speeches in Senate [sic] have been largely circulated in Siberian press. Owing to Russian ignorance of our party politicians they are considerably confused as to the real attitude of American public opinion as concerns Russian affairs.
It is apparent that one of three things will eventually become policy of Allies towards Russia; namely, first, leave Russia entirely to herself to carve out her own destiny without foreign assistance to operate; second, directly intervene and with large armed forces crush Bolshevism beyond hope of recovery; third, afford Russia material support to operate by supplying money, arms, and ammunition, thus enabling the forces opposed to Bolshevism for a considerable time to suppress Bolsheviks.
The first is out of the question, as it spells Bolshevik [mis] rule and anarchy for years to come. In a [any?] case it is advisable for the Allies to make a quick and definite decision in order that present conditions in Russia may be liquidated within some reasonable length of time. Harris.”