My first criticism of Professor Kerner’s report is his title and the
way that he tends to confound two separate things. That is to say
“German Bohemia”, a queer mis-shapen geographic entity which as he
says has no basis in history or in law, and “German Bohemia” in the
sense of the parts of Bohemia inhabited by the Germans, which has
very distinct and in some ways well founded claims. While the
Austrian Empire was a single state with a centralized administration
and no internal customs barriers, it is comprehensible that the
German population of Bohemia, especially of late years has demanded
with increasing insistence a division of the country into separate
Czech and German “circles” (Kreiseinteilung)
and, violently as the Czechs opposed this plan for national reasons,
it was economically and administratively feasible, not to say
defensible. Today it is easy to point out that German Bohemia by
itself looks contrary to all laws of geography and economics and
that even joined as a unit to Austria it would form a
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distorted appendage, but
these are not the only alternatives. Many, if not most, German
Bohemians care little about maintaining a difficult and artificial
unity between the separate portions of their territory provided only
they can be parts of the same general whole, and even if it is
impossible, provided they can be united with brethren of their own
nationality. All this Professor Kerner barely suggests.
From a geographical point of view there are no difficulties to a
union of the German speaking regions of Southern Bohemia and Moravia
to the adjacent territories of Upper and Lower Austria with which
they have always been closely connected and where the present
boundaries are for the most part the result of historical accident.
In the northwest, the Eger Territory, which was not part of the
original Bohemian State, could go without difficulty to Bavaria. The
Sudeten-land in the east would fit in well with Prussian Silesia,
and its loss would not seriously impair the natural geographic
frontiers of Bohemia. By far the most difficult and important
question is that of Northern Bohemia. Here is where the largest and
most important block of German speaking territory is to be found. It
might conceivably be annexed to Saxony or made a separate state in
the new German Republic, but, owing to its barrier of mountains, it
would seem to belong by clear geographic law to Bohemia and not to
Saxony. Without it Bohemia would lose her obvious natural frontiers
as much as Hungary would without Slovakia—a parallel, by the way,
which the Czechs do not like to admit but which is continually being
thrown in their faces. Northern Bohemia is also the seat of the
recent great development of industry. It is economically the most
valuable part of the country. We can understand the Czech
determination not to let go of it under any circumstances. I should
like, in this connection, to call particular attention to Annex No.
2349 to Professor Kerner’s report.
It is in this region of Northern Bohemia that for economic reasons
there has been in recent years the greatest increase of the Czech
population, especially in the Brüx-Teplitz district to which
Professor Kerner makes special reference in his report, thereby, it
seems to me, tending slightly to confuse still further the general
issue. No one questions the right of the Czechs to go there in as
large numbers as they want, but to call the coming of the Germans “a
later infiltration” and that of the Czechs “re-immigration” is an
unjustified play on words. We might just as well term the coming of
the Germans in the 13th century a “re-immigration” because, as
Professor Kerner himself states, there were Germans in Bohemia seven
hundred years earlier. In point of fact, the much disputed question
as to the antiquity of various Germanic or Slavic settlements in the
country is not a matter that need be taken seriously except by the
conscientious
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historian.
Both peoples have been there centuries enough to have well
established claims, and their opposing claims must be decided on
other grounds. Professor Kerner points out, as do other writers on
the Czech side, the interdependence of the different parts of
Bohemia, and he uses the familiar and obvious arguments in that
connection. Among the replies made to those arguments are that they
fail to take into account changed political conditions and the
larger factors of the world situation. It is by no means certain
that in future the industries of Northern Bohemia, if included in
Germany, could not compete with those of other parts, though
doubtless some of the manufacturers will suffer in the process. Nor
is it sure that German laborers could not be found to take the place
of Czechs. The real answer to that should be “What are the desires
of the people themselves?” What do they think best, and not what do
others think best for them; and here Professor Kerner frankly admits
that they would vote for separation. There are strong arguments for
the thesis that the possession of German Northern Bohemia is
“vitally necessary” for the prosperity of the future
Czecho-Slovakia. It only weakens the case to insist that it would be
for the good of the Germans themselves. Such arguments have been
used against every discontented people.
Finally, it may be admitted that the Austrian statistics of
nationality for 1910 are neither fair nor exact, and I think we may
expect quite different results when the Czechs have made, as they
are doing in some cases, a census of their own. All those who are
unfairly counted by prejudiced or dishonest authorities, those who
were afraid to confess their true nationality, and those who did not
care were formerly reckoned as Germans. They will now appear as
Czechs. But whether the census will be more impartially conducted
than before and will give a fairer idea of the proportion of the two
nationalities, is perhaps open to question. All we can say is that
the errors will be on the other side. Even Professor Kerner’s
statement about the extraordinary increase of Czech children in the
schools, his statement I have heard confirmed by President Masaryk
himself, loses some of its force in view of the rumors one hears of
the closing or transfer of German schools, as well as other measures
of Czechisation which are now going on.
The above remarks are not meant as a wholesale condemnation of
Professor Kerner’s point of view. Especially on the question of the
treatment of minorities he is most liberal, but I have been asked to
criticize his reports with particular care and in consequence I am
doing so.
[Enclosure]
Professor R. J.
Kerner to Professor A. C.
Coolidge
Subject: Deutsch-Böhmen with especial reference
to the Brüx-Teplitz coal region.
Explanatory Note.
Within the space usually allotted to reports such as this it is
possible only to outline general ideas and to support them here
and there by references to special detail included in the
appendix.50 To discuss the
problem in detail or to exhaust the material in the appendix
would require several reports like the one which follows.
In this report the writer hopes to convey the impressions which
he has received as a result of the study of the problem in the
field and through its contemporary literature, as well as
through conferences with various German and Czech political and
business leaders.
I Historical Basis.
Deutsch-Böhmen, as a separate political entity, has no basis in
history or in law.
It was demanded by some German leaders in 1848, but it was
opposed by others who belonged to the Pan-German party. The idea
was not taken up again until the late eighties and nineties of
the last century when it became certain that the Germans could
no longer obtain a majority of the Bohemian Diet.
Until the present war, it remained a movement which aspired to
divide Bohemia into a German and a Czech Bohemia purely for
administrative matters. In other words, it was not a movement
to’ divide Bohemia politically into two crown lands. This
movement was opposed by two powerful forces: first, the natural
geographic and economic unity of Bohemia; and second, the
determined resistance of some Germans and most of the Czechs who
stood on the basis of historic boundaries and refused to allow
Bohemia to be divided even administratively.
Pacher incorrectly maintains that the electoral law of 1907 (for
the Austrian Parliament) laid the legal basis for
Deutsch-Böhmen. This law was never intended for such a purpose,
and it is not so considered by the acknowledged leaders of the
movement, Lodgman and Seliger.
In short, Deutsch-Böhmen, taken as a whole, has no historic
rights, nor can it assert them against the acknowledged historic
rights of the Bohemian crown i. e. Bohemia, Moravia, and
Silesia. The former duchy of Eger alone may lay some claim to
recognition in this way.
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II Ethnographic
Basis.
If Deutsch-Böhmen has no historic rights, it may be truthfully
asserted that it has ethnic rights. It includes, with perhaps
one exception (the Brüx-Teplitz region), the territory which the
official Austrian census recognizes as preponderantly German.
The Czechs contest the basis of the statistics i. e. language of
intercourse (Um-gangssprache) and point
out that this basis does not properly record the Czech
minorities in Deutsch-Böhmen. In the case of the coal region of
Brüx-Teplitz the Czechs claim about 50%, the Germans, who live
there, and the official census give them about 25%.
In regard to the very fundamental difference of opinion about the
census, the reader is referred to a memorandum which the writer
prepared for the Inquiry. It will suffice to state here that
both the official census and the private census as well as the
census about to be taken should be carefully compared. The
German leaders in the Brüx-Teplitz region admit that the
official figures of the number of Czechs should be raised—some
say “4 to 5%”, others say “somewhat”. It was the impression of
the writer, who visited the region, that there were many more
Czechs in the Brüx-Teplitz region than could be found in the
census. Since the revolution (October, 1918), the pupils in the
Czech schools have increased from 10 to 30 even 40% above their
average for the year 1918. These were children of people who for
the most part were economically dependent upon the Germans for a
livelihood and who under pressure (explained in memorandum
already referred to) allowed themselves to be recorded as
Germans. In other words, the conclusion which the writer reached
in the mentioned memorandum has been substantiated by field work
and the admission of German leaders themselves.
The real question at issue is, how large is the percentage of
error which the Umgangssprache basis
causes? This can only be determined by a new census which would
aim to investigate nationality, and not the language of
intercourse (Umgangssprache). In the
opinion of the writer such a census would reveal a larger number
of Czechs—perhaps not as high as the Czechs themselves claim—,
but still high enough to threaten the German majority in the
Brüx-Teplitz region. In other words, the Brüx-Teplitz region is
a debatable territory. And should this region prove to have
Czechs to the number of 50% it would cleave Deutsch-Böhmen in
two.
There are other regions which have strong Czech minorities as for
instance the Reichenberg region and the Hohenelbe District. But
these are clearly minorities and do not assume the proportion of
possible majorities as does that in the Brüx-Teplitz region.
The present German population of Deutsch-Böhmen is for the most
part, undoubtedly a later infiltration. Down to the sixth
century German
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and
Celtic tribes occupied Bohemia. From the sixth to the twelfth
Bohemia was completely Czech. Such Germans as remained were
insignificant in numbers. The present German population in some
cases goes back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but for
the most part to the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
century and represents pretty much the different kinds of
Germans who live around the border of Bohemia from the Prussians
on the east to the Bavarians on the west.
On the other hand a great proportion of the Czech minorities in
Deutsch-Böhmen represent a recent “reimmigration” on the part of
the Czechs who were drawn there by the industrialization of
Deutsch-Böhmen, which occurred before that of the rest of
Bohemia.
Summing up then, it may be said that the present German
population in Deutsch-Böhmen represents in general a later
infiltration, but that the Czech minorities there are for the
most part a recent Czech “reimmigration”; that Deutsch-Böhmen is
threatened with a partition by the very strong Czech minority
(or even Czech majority according to their claims) in the
Brüx-Teplitz coal area; and that Deutsch-Böhmen, as viewed from
ethnographic conditions, is a reality which must be reckoned
with even if it can be proved that the Brüx-Teplitz region has a
Czech majority or a powerful minority of, let us say, 40%. In
the latter case it is certain that the Czechs would not give up
the region should the Peace Conference decide to lop off parts
of German Bohemia.
III Economic Basis.
It is the opinion of some German and Jewish capitalists, as well
as of the Czechs, that Deutsch-Böhmen cannot exist independent
economically and that it cannot compete with the industry in the
German empire. We leave aside the question of Deutsch-Böhmen
forming a part of Deutsch-Österreich. This is a political
impossibility. On the other hand, German politicians maintain
that they can find a way to exist in the German empire, or, if
need be, even as an independent state.
It can be proved statistically that Deutsch-Böhmen cannot feed
itself. It can also be shown that Deutsch-Böhmen is largely
dependent (except in one or two cases) on exporting its
industrial products to the south and southeast and that it
cannot compete (except in a few cases) with the powerful
industry of the German empire. German leaders have admitted to
the writer that they expect to be independent, or to be a part
of Germany, or even to be a part of Deutsch-Österreich and yet
maintain their free Czecho-Slovak market! It goes without saying
that should they be excluded from the Czechoslovak republic that
the latter state will have to resort to a fairly high
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protective tariff.
They will likewise be unable to secure Czech labor without which
they cannot run their factories.
Viewed from the other angle, the Czecho-Slovak Republic would be
crippled economically although helped politically, by the
exclusion of all or part of Deutsch-Böhmen. Not only does this
part of Bohemia represent great wealth and hence income, but it
contains mineral resources vitally necessary to the Czechs in
their steadily growing industry. Under no circumstances would
they give up the Brüx-Teplitz region which would not only retain
for them a large Czech population, but likewise the richest part
of the Northwestern coal area.
The truth is that from an economic point of view Bohemia cannot
be divided without serious damage to both parts. This is the
point of view of certain German and Jewish capitalists, of
newspapers like the Prager Tagblatt, and
virtually all Czech bankers and business men. The Prager Tagblatt very ably points out now,
as it did when the question of dividing Bohemia came up before,
that even if this division were carried through, two German
taxpayers of Pilsen (which would be Czech) would pay more than
three purely German districts of Deutsch-Böhmen and that the
Germans of Prague would be delivering to the Czech government
one-half as much as the total tax payment in Deutsch-Böhmen.
Such men see the inclusion of Deutsch-Böhmen in the
Czecho-Slovak Republic as necessary, not only from the economic
point of view, but likewise from the national point of view. If
there are three millions of Germans in the republic, it will not
necessarily mean that they will be assimilated. Otherwise, the
Germans of Prague, as well as the German islands elsewhere in
the republic, will soon be assimilated.
Deutsch-Böhmen cannot exist as an independent economic unit nor
can it obtain the favorable economic conditions on which it now
subsists if it is either independent or becomes a part of
Germany. In order to get the same favorable conditions which
caused the industry to spring up and which gave it its physical
supply (Czech labor), it must be a part of the Czecho-Slovak
republic. Should Deutsch-Böhmen be given to Germany the Czechs
will undoubtedly demand the Brüx-Teplitz region and certain
areas including Reichenberg and Hohenelbe. The best condition
which the Germans of Bohemia might obtain is autonomy in the
Czech republic. But the Czechs will insist on giving full
protection to German minorities on some such basis as the
Moravian Nation-Register system.
In other words, the Germans cannot have national independence and
economic prosperity at one and the same time, nor can the Czechs
have a purely national state and economic prosperity at the same
time.
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Each must
concede to the other, if they wish to continue the wonderful
economic evolution of the lands of the Bohemian crown. The
Germans will have to give up their claims to national
independence or exclusion from Bohemia. The Czechs will have to
make concessions on that basis either in the form of autonomy or
a liberal Moravian National-Register system and Anglo-Saxon
local government. Otherwise both will suffer.
IV The Political
Solution.
The political solution of the problem of Deutsch-Böhmen naturally
depends upon the fundamental principles which the Peace
Conference will adopt.
If ethnic rights are to be given the predominant place in the
calculations then the problem of Deutsch-Böhmen resolves itself
into the calling of a plebiscite. This would favor, without a
doubt, annexation or “connection” (Anschluss) with Germany, because the course of events
in Deutsch-Österreich points very strongly in that direction. If
the Czechs succeeded in getting the Brüx-Teplitz region,
Deutsch-Böhmen would go in two sections, otherwise as one,
although it is to be doubted whether it would remain one
province or state in the empire very long. There is very little
geographic, economic, or even ethnic cohesion in Deutsch-Böhmen.
For that reason it would perhaps be partitioned between the
various states which border Bohemia and to which ethnically and
dialectically the different kinds of Germans in Bohemia belong.
For Deutsch-Böhmen to remain a part of Deutsch-Österreich and
then enter the German empire does not seem likely (except in
legal fiction) because the thin strip with [which?] joins both through the mountains west of
Klattau will in all likelihood be given to the Czecho-Slovak
republic. This strip (the Judicial Districts of Taus and
Neugedein) according to official statistics contained in 1910 a
German population of 17.5% and a Czech population of 82.3%. The
strip to the south and east of this might go to
Deutsch-Österreich.
If historic rights and geographical, strategic, and economic
conditions be given the predominant place in the solution of the
problem, then Deutsch-Böhmen will be included in the
Czecho-Slovak republic. The remaining problem will concern
itself with the manner of its inclusion. The Germans will insist
on autonomy, using the right of self-determination to bargain
for it; the Czechs will be willing to give the Germans what the
latter had given the Czechs in Moravia on the basis of the
National-Register law of 1905, as well as equal civil and
political rights and full protection to minorities. It is to be
hoped that an international law for the protection of minorities
will be one of the results of the Peace Conference.
