Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VII

763.72119/5955

HD–9

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, July 17, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

Paris, July 17, 1919, 3:30 p.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. H. White.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
  • British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Pichon.
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta.
    • Capt. de St. Quentin.
  • Italy
    • M. Tittoni.
  • Secretary
    • M. Paterno.
  • Japan
    • Baron Makino.
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Lieut. Burden.
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux

1. (The Members of the Commission on Tientsin entered the room.)

Report of Commission To Examine Italian Claims in Tientsin The following Report was before the Meeting:—

The Commission entrusted with the examination of the Italian claim for the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin, considering on the one hand that

1. the demand of the Italian Government that the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin should be handed over to them is contrary to the principle laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 260 [132], of the Treaty of Peace signed on the 28th of June 1919 by the Allied and Associated Powers and the German State,

2. the said principle has been embodied after deliberation by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 22 [4], Section IV, Part IV, of the conditions drafted for re-establishing peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, and that this Article was submitted to the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 2nd June last,

3. the principle of restoring to China her full rights of sovereignty over former enemy concessions was unanimously adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers in spite of the fact that certain of them might have derived advantages from acquiring possession of enemy concessions bordering their own, in order to give evidence of the confidence which the high contracting parties are disposed to place in efforts towards improvement made by China, who, through declaring war against the enemy Empires, showed her determination to side with the Nations which defend the cause of right,

considering on the other hand that the objects of the Italian claim are deemed justifiable in the following respects:

i. As regards the urgent work which should be carried out for clearing the marshy portions of the former Austrian-Hungarian concession bordering the Italian concession,

ii. As regards the works which should be carried out in the Austro-Hungarian concession for regulating the course of the Hei-Ho river and preventing the recurrence of floods damaging to the Italian concession,

is of opinion,

I. that it is inadvisable to modify the principle embodied in Article 22 [4] of Part IV (section IV) of the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria;

II. that it would be expedient that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers should request from our Chinese Allies a formal promise that within a period of one year from the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria the necessary works of sanitation in the late Austro-Hungarian concession and the necessary works of improvement in the course of the river shall be undertaken with all desirable promptness and shall be entrusted to the Hei-Ho Commission which has already given proof of its competence and activity.

M. Tittoni said he wished to make the following declaration:—

The Italian Delegation expresses the wish that the minutes of today’s sitting of the Supreme Council should show that His Majesty’s Government, while giving its assent to what is set forth in Art. 22 [4], Part IV, Section IV, of the draft text of the Conditions of Peace with Austria, insists, nevertheless, on the soundness of its claims submitted in 1917 by the R. Legation at Pekin to the Chinese Government for a rectification of the boundary line separating the Italian concession of Tient-Tsin from the former Austro-Hungarian concession.

M. Pichon said that the Report of the Commission would be adopted, and no alteration would be made in Article 22 [4]. M. Tittoni’s declaration, however, would be inserted in the Minutes.

Mr. Balfour questioned whether the declaration referred to the same subject as the Report of the Commission.

M. Gout explained that the Italian concession was separated from the river by a small strip of the Austrian concession. The Italian Government in 1917 had asked for an alteration of the boundaries in order to obtain easier access to the river. The Commission had asked for fuller information on this subject than was available. The Italian delegate had undertaken to obtain it, but it had not yet been received, and the Commission therefore had reserved judgment on the subject.

M. Pichon said that the Council was therefore asked for no decision on this matter. It would, however, be necessary to fix a time limit within which the works of sanitation should be undertaken. He thought it might be sufficient to state that the work should be undertaken within a “reasonable time”.

Mr. Balfour thought perhaps the matter might be left to the League of Nations.

M. Pichon observed that there was a Health Section of the League of Nations which might take an interest in the matter.

Baron Makino observed that the sovereignty over the ground in question was Chinese; the Chinese Government would, therefore, have to be approached on the subject.

M. Gout said that if the Chinese Government took steps within a year to set the enterprise going, there need be no complaint. Once the Hei-Ho Commission had taken the work in hand, it would certainly complete it thoroughly well.

Baron Makino observed that if the Chinese Government were asked by the Powers to execute a sanitary measure it would surely agree. The determination of the time limit would appear to be a sort of imposition.

M. Pichon said that it might be difficult to get the Chinese Government to undertake the work. Once it had undertaken it, it would no doubt execute it.

After some further discussion it was agreed to fix a time limit of one year for the undertaking of the work.

Baron Makino said that as his objection was a matter of form he would agree.

(The Report of the Commission as above quoted was therefore adopted, and it was decided that no alteration need be made to Article 22 [4], and that the Chinese Government should be asked in the name of the Powers to undertake the sanitary work required by the Italian Delegation within a year.)

(The Members of the Commission withdrew.)

2. (Mr. Hoover, M. Seydoux, M. Crespi¹ and Mr. Gorvin² entered the room.)

Report From Mr. Hoover on the Revictualling of Austria Mr. Hoover gave a summary and explanation of the memorandum annexed in Appendix “A”.

M. Pichon asked how much in Mr. Hoover’s estimation, had been spent on the revictualling of Austria?

Mr. Hoover said that he estimated that to complete the present programme up to the 15th of August, Righty Million Dollars would have been spent.

M. Pichon asked whether Mr. Hoover thought there were securities in Austria enough to cover the cost of the scheme he proposed to undertake.

Mr. Hoover said that he doubted whether the sums already spent could be recovered for three or four years. Everything that could be realised had already been realised. The Austrian Authorities latterly had gone so far as to offer the National Art Galleries in payment for food.

M. Pichon said that under these circumstances it seemed hardly possible to advance money.

M. Tittoni said that the alternative was Bolshevism.

Mr. Hoover said that his hope was if priority were given to payment for food, even over payment of reparations, the Austrian Government might take heart and set to work in order to meet its liabilities. This was the only means of giving the present Government enough encouragement for it to hold on. Should the harvest succeed in Hungary, there would be a surplus of food in that country. It was only Allied help that had hitherto kept Austria from Bolshevism. The Hungarians were employing most active propaganda. Should they take the place of the Allies in the supply of food, it could hardly be expected that the Austrians would not join them and become Bolshevik. It seemed clear that the Austrian Delegation sincerely wished to keep a moderate Government in Power in Austria. If they could be assured by the Powers that the help he suggested would be given them, he thought they might resist Bolshevism.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought Mr. Hoover had made out a most serious case. He was not quite sure that the Bolsheviks in Hungary would have much food to spare. He was told that Bela Kun had quarrelled with the peasants, who would’ be inclined to resist requisition. The main point was that it was desirable to set up Austria economically. She could not be left to starve. Food must be advanced to her either on such securities as existed, or she must be put in a way to earn money. She could not produce the food she required, as the territory left her by the Treaty was insufficient. Mr. Hoover’s proposal was first to encourage the Austrians by a promise, and secondly, to tell the Reparation Committee to think first of making Austria a paying concern before getting money out of her. This appeared to him to be the most statesmanlike method. If a man were kept alive by charity, he could not be asked to pay his debts. He was not quite sure, however, what the functions of the Reparation Commission were, or whether the Council could give it orders as suggested by Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Hoover said the wording of the German Treaty enabled the Reparation Commission to furnish food and raw material to Germany, and to obtain payment for these in priority to payment of reparation. In any case, as the Reparation Commission had complete control of all resources,—no other body could intervene.

M. Crespi said that the Reparation Commission had the right to raise resources with the object of obtaining food. The Reparation Commission could certainly be given orders by the Governments as it was itself merely an Agent of the Government.

(At this point M. Clemenceau entered the room.)

M. Clemenceau asked how payment for food would be obtained?

M. Crespi said that money could be raised by taxation. Hungarian food might turn Austria Bolshevik. It was for this reason that Italy had sent food into Austria.

Mr. Balfour said that he was ready to accept Mr. Hoover’s plan, but he would take the opportunity of telling the Austrians that they must give up the arms and ammunition in Austria to the Czechs.

Mr. Hoover suggested that the Austrians might be told that the food supplies would cease unless they did so.

M. Tittoni considered that the question of the delivery of the arms should be kept quite separate from the question of food. These arms represented one of the securities in Austria for the payment of Reparation. He did not say that the arms should not be delivered, but an equivalent in value should be available for the Reparation fund.

Mr. Balfour said that it was most urgent to send the arms to Czecho-Slovakia at once.

Mr. Hoover said that this difficulty had already arisen. Trade had been arranged between Austria and Serbia. Five steel bridges were to be given to Serbia in exchange for food. The same objection had been raised, that these bridges represented a security for the payment of reparation. The Czechs were prepared to exchange coal for arms, but once the Czechs had given coal and the Serbians food, there was no means of making them contribute anything towards the reparation fund.

Mr. Balfour said that if M. Tittoni’s thesis were carried to its logical extremity, all Austrian trade would be put a stop to. Austria could get neither food nor anything else. He had no wish to reduce the reparation fund to Italy’s detriment. He thought it imperative that Austria should be fed, and Czecho-Slovakia armed.

M. Tittoni said that he acquiesced regarding food, which was a matter of primary necessity. It was not so vital a matter to arm the Czechs. Italy and the other Allies should get some equivalent for the liquidation of a valuable Austrian security. If the Czechs were ready to give coal in exchange, Italy should obtain her share of this coal, for the coal situation in Italy was as bad as that in Austria.

Mr. Balfour said that in his opinion it was to Allied interests that the Czechs should be armed. If so, it was nearly as important that commerce between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia should be carried on as between Austria and Serbia for food. He thought nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of the passage of arms from Vienna to Prague.

M. Tittoni said that Italy recognised the need of Austria for food, but, as to coal, Italy needed it just as badly. Italy must therefore have her share in the coal which paid for the arms.

Mr. Hoover said that the amount of the surplus of Bohemian coal was infinitesimal, and barely enough to supply the needs of Vienna. Moreover, the Czechs had ceased to export coal because they received no arms from Austria. Austria was afraid of exporting these arms out of fear of the Hungarian Bolsheviks. By a threat to with-hold food, the Austrians; could be prevailed on to deliver the arms. They could also be promised, in case they did so, Bohemian coal. The Italians, short as they were of coal, had realised Austrian needs, and had themselves supplied coal to Vienna.

M. Crespi observed that it was the duty of the Separation Commission to see that all Austrian securities were not one by one spent to the detriment of the common reparation fund.

Mr. Balfour said that he would be content to allow the arms to go, and to find out afterwards in what way payment could be obtained. So long as they were delivered to the Czechs, he did not mind in what way the re-adjustment was made for the benefit of the reparation fund.

Mr. Hoover suggested that if his formula were adopted, a few lines might be added regarding the sending of arms to Czechoslovakia.

(It was therefore agreed that the following reply should be made to the Austrian Delegation:—

“In respect to the Request laid before the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian Delegates that provision of further food supplies should be immediately undertaken by the Allied and Associated Governments, this request has been laid before the Council of Five and the Council wishes to state that as food and raw materials for Austria during the forthcoming year are fundamental to her recuperation and her ability to make reparation, the method of provision of such food and raw material will be one of the first considerations of the Reparations Commission.

The Council wishes, however, to make this assurance contingent on an undertaking by the Austrian Government. The delivery of arms to Czecho-Slovakia has been greatly delayed despite the offer of coal in exchange. It must be understood that the continuation of the present supplies of food to Austria, as well as the above assurances, depend on the execution by Austria of the delivery of the arms and ammunition required by Czecho-Slovakia.”

The question raised by M. Tittoni was remitted for further study to the Supreme Economic Council.)

3. (At this stage, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, M. Benes, M. Kramarcz, M. Pachitch, M. Misu, and M. Vaida Voevod enterd the room.)Report of Marshal Foch on Plan for Military Operations Against Hungary

Marshal Foch read a memorandum annexed to these Minutes in Appendix “B”. He also quoted from a telegram sent on the 10th. July to the British War Office by Colonel Cunninghame from Vienna to the effect that the red army was composed of 9 divisions, one of which, the 4th infantry division, had been disbanded. Each division could only muster a small number of rifles. For instance, the 9th division had only 2 to 3,000 rifles. To liberate Hungary from Communism in one week a force of 8 infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 100 aeroplanes and as many armoured cars as possible would suffice.

Mr. Balfour said that one statement in the very remarkable report read by Marshal Foch gave him some apprehension. He referred to the passage in which Marshal Foch alluded to the necessity of establishing in Hungary a Government with which the Entente could negotiate peace. Such a Government would not appear to be a Hungarian Government, but one set up by the Entente Powers. The Peace would be represented for all time, not as one between the Powers and the Hungarian people, but as a Peace between the Powers and their own puppets. This would furnish a weapon to all the enemies of the Entente. He would not ask Marshal Foch to say how this difficulty could be avoided, as the Marshal would doubtless reply, with justice, that that was the business of the politicians.

M. Tittoni said that the Hungarian situation was a very difficult one. As to the military proposals, he had nothing to say, but, regarding the political side, he had some observations to make. Hungary was ruled by a small minority. 80 per cent, of the Hungarian troops were against Bela Kun, so were the peasants and the bourgeoisie. At Szeged, there was an opposition Government which was a nationalist centre. If the Council determined to have Hungary attacked by Czech, Roumanian and Serbian troops, Bela Kun would be able to drape himself in the national colours, and pose as a patriotic Hungarian. In the end, it would not be Bela Kun who would be destroyed, but the Hungarian nation. If the Allies, on the other hand, could act in concert with the Szeged Government, they would appear as the deliverers of the country from tyranny. All the Governments had to contend with the criticism and opposition of the Labour parties in their own countries. It was therefore, highly opportune to appear to act on behalf of the majority in Hungary. He made no criticism of the military means proposed by Marshal Foch, but he thought they should be accompanied by political action of the kind he had described.

Mr. White asked in what manner M. Tittoni would suggest that this political action should be begun?

M. Tittoni said that he would send Allied Agents to get into touch with the Government at Szeged before any military action began.

Marshal Foch said that he had, in his report, asked for Governmental instructions. When the armies set out for Budapest, they would be preceded by proclamations conveying the intentions of their Governments. It was for the Governments to determine what these proclamations should be.

M. Benes said that he thought M. Tittoni’s proposals were based on wrong premises. From information he had received, the Hungarian Officers, though not sharing Bela Kun’s opinions were loyal to him, because they thought the Communist Government would give them means of fighting their neighbours. All of them were passionately attached to the integrity of Hungary. They would like to win back for it Transylvania, Croatia, and Slovakia. There was no hope of seducing these Officers. As to the civilians, no doubt the bourgeoisie parties would like to be rid of Bela Kun, but they would not co-operate with the neighbouring nations to that end. If the Powers began to negotiate with the Magyars, they must count with the suspicions and mistrust of the Roumanians, of the Yugo-Slavs and of the Czechoslovaks. The Magyars did not admit their defeat. They remained Imperialist in spirit and they would use any conversation they might have with the Great Powers to turn the tables on their neighbours. He thought for these reasons that there were strong objections to the course of negotiating with any Hungarian Party.

M. Clemenceau asked M. Benes whether he agreed to Marshal Foch’s plan?

M. Benes said that he did but not to M. Tittoni’s.

M. Kramarcz said that the armies must march under the banner of “Respect for the Armistice”. The existence of a Hungarian army forced the neighbouring countries to remain armed. They were anxious to disarm and demobilise. Enforcement of the Armistice Conditions was a complete and sufficient justification for action, and it would serve as an answer to criticism. He had the same fears and interests as M. Tittoni, but he was convinced that there should be no talk with any Hungarian parties, as this would only revive Hungarian nationalist ambition. Action should be taken on military grounds if only to uphold the decrees of the Conference.

M. Vaida-Voevod said that he agreed with M. Kramarcz and M. Benes. He thought it was necessary not to give Bela Kun a pretext for posing as a defender of his country. The majority of the Hungarian population wished to remain quiet and to be ruled neither by a communist nor by a re-actionary government. When the Allied armies had taken Buda-pest, they might proclaim to the people that it was open to them to choose their own Government. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, however, should consult non-Magyar elements as well. There were Roumanians, Serbs and Slovaks of Hungary who knew the devices of the parties and who could help the Commander-in-Chief.

General Bliss said that the general purpose aimed at was one he would gladly see carried out, but only the Head of his Government could decide on any action in this respect. In spite of all disguises it was manifest that what was proposed was a renewal of war on Hungary with the object of destroying its present Government. If action was to be based on the pretext of a breach of the Armistice by Hungary, the Allies must be quite clear that the fault was entirely on the side of the Hungarians. In the Armistice arranged by General Franchet d’Esperey on the 13th. November at Belgrade,³ a certain line had been fixed by Article I. North and west of this line the Serbians and Roumanians respectively were not to advance. The second Article required the demobilisation of the Hungarian Army down to six Infantry Divisions and two Cavalry Divisions. It was alleged that the Hungarians had broken Article II.

Mr. Balfour asked whether there was anything in Clause I forbidding the Serbians and Roumanians to cross the line.

General Buss said that the Roumanians should not have crossed west of the line. When they had been relieved of German domination,—they had crossed the line in spite of General Franchet d’Esperey. He had then tried to stop them on another line further west, but without avail. The matter had been discussed in Paris and the discussions had lead to the establishment of a neutral zone approximately representing the line fixed in the Treaty of 1916.⁴ Even this, however, had not stopped the Roumanian advance. At a Meeting held by the Military Representatives at Versailles on the 25th. February, 1919, General Charpy, Chief of Staff to General Franchet d’Esperey had given the following evidence:—

On November 7th, 1918, General Franchet d’Esperey and Count Karolyi had met at Belgrade to sign a supplementary armistice with Hungary on the same lines as General Diaz had signed with Austria. At that time Roumania was still under German domination and therefore only French, Serbian and Hungarian representatives were present at Belgrade. They all knew the terms of the Hungarian armistice. A certain zone was to be definitely occupied and further zones could be occupied for strategic reasons. The armistice was signed on November 13th, and the Hungarians had made no difficulties and had carried out all the conditions. The French and Serbians advanced as agreed. The only difficulties occurred with Roumania.

Without informing General Franchet d’Esperey, the Roumanians had advanced, especially in the region of Klausenburg. The Hungarians at once protested that this was a breach of the armistice conditions. The Roumanians replied that they were in agreement with the Hungarians. This was not correct, but eventually an agreement was reached. The Roumanians were allowed to advance up to a line well in advance of the armistice line. This was reported to the Allied Governments.

Unfortunately, the Roumanians advanced still further with the result that certain incidents took place; the Roumanians oppressed the local population and the Hungarians became incensed. Up to that time the position had not become serious, however.

The Roumanians stated that they feared an attack by Hungarian armies; that was absolutely impossible. Hungary had no organised troops, whereas the Roumanian army was well organised. Naturally there was much unrest in Hungary and some Bolshevism, but nothing important, and Bolshevism in Transylvania was not apparent. The Roumanians had for some time tried to advance to the Treaty line, but General Franchet d’Esperey had refused so far though he had sent a mission to make enquiries into alleged atrocities. The information received was that the local situation was quite quiet.

Taking these facts into consideration the Roumanians should remain on their present line as all the trouble had been caused by their advance. It was not for him to give advice on a political question, but the Roumanians should not be allowed to cross the line Arad–Grosswardein–Szatmar–Nemeti and it would be preferable to send Allied troops there; a neutral zone would be of no advantage as there were not sufficient Allied troops to guard it.

To maintain order it would be sufficient to garrison Grosswardein and Stulimar [Szatmair?] with Allied troops; there were already some at Arad.

In spite of this the neutral zone had been accepted. The Roumanians had advanced to the Eastern limit of this zone and finding it empty had proceeded as far as the Theiss. An American observer had informed him that as soon as the Hungarians came to know of the decision taken on March 12th, the Karolyi Government would go. He had written a letter to this effect to the Council. The Hungarian Government had only received information on the 19th. On that very date the Karolyi Government resigned and handed over its powers to Bela Kun. Bela Kun had succeeded in raising an Army solely to repel the unwarranted invasion of the Roumanians. The violation of the armistice was first made by the Roumanians in spite of the Powers and at a time when the Hungarian Army had gone to pieces. If the Council meant to take action on the ground that the Armistice had been violated, it should examine carefully at what date the Hungarian Army had been re-constituted. He was confident that it would be found that this had taken place after the violation of the armistice by the Roumanians.

Mr. Balfour said that he had three observations to make on General Bliss’s very important statement. In the first place he agreed with him that the American delegates and he himself as British representative could not initiate a considerable military policy without consulting the Governments at home. He personally could not authorise a new war, or the resumption of an old war, without reference to London. In the second place he begged to dissent entirely, as far as he was concerned, from the allegation made by General Bliss that the breach of the armistice was merely alleged as a pretext for attacking the Communist Government of Hungary. He wished it to be understood that he was not animated by any consideration of Hungarian internal politics, little though he might approve of Bela Kun. He agreed with M. Kramarcz that it was intolerable to allow the Hungarian State to become a military stronghold, from which economic and political disturbances radiated over Central Europe. When he insisted on the disarmament of Hungary by reason of her breach of the armistice, he was not disguising his intention, but stating exactly what he wished. Without the disarmament of Hungary, there could be no peace or settlement of frontiers in Central Europe. On the third point he spoke with more diffidence. General Bliss’ argument was based on the view that the Allied Powers were precluded from sending troops across the line beyond which the Hungarians were not to advance, according to Article I of the Armistice. He was surprised at this view. The Article forbade the Hungarians to go beyond the line, but did not explicitly forbid the Allies to cross it. Clause III moreover gave the Allies the “right of occupying all places and strategic points which may be permanently fixed by the general Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.” It was difficult to reconcile this with General Bliss’ interpretation of Article I. (For the military Convention see Appendix C.) There was another small point on which he did not wish to rely, namely, that when the Convention was signed, Roumania was not a belligerent. He would like to be told by experts in military jurisprudence whether the Roumanian advance, regrettable though it might have been, amounted to a breach of the Armistice in the same sense as the obvious and important breach made by Hungarians.

General Bliss said that the interpretation of Article I of the Armistice did not require a lawyer. The very word Armistice meant the laying down of arms by both sides on a given line in order that civil plenipotentiaries should negotiate. It could not impose a purely unilateral obligation. As to Article III, giving the Commander-in Chief of the Allied Armies the right to occupy strategic points, no such provision had been made in the Armistice with Germany. But it had been feared that hostilities with Germany might begin again, and when the Armistice Convention with Austria had been negotiated, it had been stipulated that the Allied Armies should have passed through Austrian territory in order to threaten Germany from the South. A similar provision had also been made in the Convention with Hungary. The provision, however, did not mean that any Allied Commander could occupy any point he liked without reference to the Commander-in-Chief. Roumanian action had been taken in defiance of the wishes of General Franchet d’Esperey.

M. Kramarcz said he did not wish to enter into the legal question. Czecho-Slovakia was threatened by the Hungarians. The Army of the Hungarians kept Czecho-Slovakia and other countries armed and mobilised. This was the only question for consideration.

M. Pachitch said he agreed with M. Kramarcz, M. Benes, and M. Vaida. Action ought to be taken to force Bela Kun to fulfil Hungary’s engagements under the Armistice. The Yugo-Slavs had reason to expect that they would be the third victim of Hungary. Hungarians undoubtedly desired to re-establish Hungary in her historic frontiers.

M. Clemenceau said that all concerned had now expressed their views. Two Governments, however, had to be consulted before action could be taken.

Marshal Foch observed that on July 11th,⁵ when he had been asked to study a plan of operations, the principle of action itself had not been in question. If it was questioned now, it would seem that the Council was in contradiction with itself.

Mr. Balfour said that he dissented entirely from what Marshal Foch had just said. He could not consult his Government on the propriety of military operations, unless he knew what their nature was and what chance of success they offered.

Mr. White said that as he understood the case, Marshal Foch had been asked to make a report to send to the Governments. Marshal Foch had made a most able report. He could not commit his Government and even the President would have to be assured that the proposal did not involve a new war before he could assent, without consulting the Senate.

M. Clemenceau said that this was not a subject that could be discussed. Each of the members of the Council was free to consult his Government. Marshal Foch had presented a remarkable report showing that success could be hoped for without a great expenditure of effort. General Bliss had put forward certain questions which deserve close examination. He would remind the Council that Mr. Balfour had lately drafted a telegram in which the Council had informed Bela Kun that it could not hold any conversations with him as long as he did not respect the Armistice. No one had then raised any objection.

Mr. White said that he wished that he had followed his usual method, and asked for time to consider the matter.

M. Clemenceau said that he would like to point out that a state of war with Hungary still existed and there could be no question of a new war.

M. Tittoni asked that the greatest secrecy be observed regarding the discussion.

(It was agreed that the discussion should be resumed on the following day at 10:30 by the Members of the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, July 17, 1919.

Appendix “A” to HD–9

WCP–1147

Supreme Economic Council, Office of the Director General of Relief, July 11, 1919.

revictualling of austria

Report From Mr. Hoover

The Honorable Robert M. Lansing,
Secretary of State,
Hotel de Crillon, Paris.

My Dear Mr. Lansing: As you are aware, we have been for many months providing large food supplies for the State of German-Austria. The financial cycle that we have set up between Allied and Associated Governments for this end will have exhausted itself by the end of August, with the provision of about $80,000,000 of supplies. Austria must receive continuous relief in food thereafter and it must also be provided with raw materials during the whole of next year. The conditions of the Treaty are such that the entire financial resources of Austria are placed at the disposal of the Reparations Commission. It is therefore utterly impossible to arrange any credits or finance to Austria except by the activities of this Commission.

It is also necessary to give some assurance to Austria at the earliest moment that further food is going to be provided or that Government is likely to collapse before the Treaty can be signed. The Supreme Economic Council therefore yesterday directed me to lay before the Council of Five the suggestion that a communication should be given to the Austrian Delegates in Paris to somewhat the following effect:

“In respect to the request laid before the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian Delegates that provision of further food supplies should be immediately undertaken by the Allied and Associated Governments, this request has been laid before the Council of Five and the Council wishes to state that as food and raw materials for Austria during the forthcoming year are fundamental to her recuperation and her ability to make reparation, the method of provision of such food and raw material will be one of the first considerations of the Separations Commission.”

For the information of the Council of Five, I enclose herewith, first, a note from myself on the economic situation of Austria, and, second, copy of the communications to the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian delegates in respect to this matter.

Faithfully yours,

Herbert Hoover

[Enclosure 1]

July 11, 1919.

Austria

It is obvious to the most superficial observer that the present economic resources of the State of German-Austria are incapable of supporting the population of seven and one-half million people for at least another year. A large part of this population has for generations lived on the empire with its centralization of political life, finance, economic and educational institutions, and a population has been thereby created totally incapable of supporting itself when denuded of its hinterland. Its future, lies not only in full production of such resources as exist but also in the establishment of an economic equilibrium by migration. To restart the established industries involves credits, reorganized currency, raw material, etc. The establishment of such equilibrium cannot take place for a year at least, and the very insistent fact stands out that to prevent sheer starvation the population will need to be fed and furnished raw materials on credit continuously. The food production of this year’s harvest in Austria would not, even if it could be uniformly distributed, last the population more than three months. As the peasant population will undoubtedly retain its twelve months’ supply, it means that the probable food intake to the city population from the state itself does not exceed six or eight weeks. With the completion of the present relief programme, at the first of September, foodstuffs will have been furnished to Austria, since the Armistice, aggregating a total value of nearly 80 millions of dollars. The programme for the next twelve months will cost probably 150 million dollars, and even this would be insufficient to maintain order unless raw material can also be found and as much of the population as possible returned to production. Without this assistance the ultimate payment of reparation by Austria does not seem to be very probable.

It is necessary, therefore, to give some consideration at an early moment to the fate of these people, and if any reparation is to be expected their economic situation must be taken in hand at an early date with the hope that it can be ultimately built up to a point where their surplus production may yield something for indemnities. The economic rehabilitation of Austria cannot be effected without establishing equitable relationship between Austria and the surrounding states as to communications and customs union.

If this problem is to be accomplished there must be some central authority whose position is such that it can enforce its economic will not only in Austria but in the surrounding states and who can secure for Austria the necessary credits for raw material, food, etc. Under the terms of the treaty, this authority not only exists in the Reparation Commission but it would be impossible for any form of organization to operate outside of the Commission. It is therefore of acute importance that as quickly as the Austrian Treaty is signed the Reparation Commission should be set up so that it may secure the initiation of the necessary measures.

The matter is one of extreme urgency as all of the funds available for Austrian relief will have been expended by the first of September, and there will scarcely be more than the sequent month to make arrangements for further supplies if collapse in this state is to be prevented.

Herbert Hoover

[Enclosure 2]

[Note From the President of the Austrian Delegation (Renner)]

St. Germain-en-Laye [, undated]

To the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, Paris

Sir: The enclosed Bills concerning the securities for the credits for provisions were passed by the German Austrian National Assembly on the 8th. July. They will immediately be executed; the foreign securities and gold coins of private individuals will be requisitioned and the list of the requisitioned values will be submitted as soon as possible to the Supreme Economic Council. The proceeds of the exportation of timber will be delivered to the Central Office for the Supervision of Exchange (Divisenzentrals) and will by the latter be forwarded to whatever place shall be indicated to us.

Since, in conformity with the request of the Supreme Economic Council, we have put at the disposal of the latter all foreign securities in the inland as well as in neutral countries, while our foreign securities available in the Allied and Associated States are under sequestration, we are at present totally unable to procure for ourselves in good time, from another source, credits for the purchase of foodstuffs. The credits granted us by the Supreme Economic Council are being quickly exhausted. Even at the present moment we only obtain grain and flour, while the provisioning with meat, fats, rice and condensed milk has ceased. Our alimentation position has therefore become considerably worse again and is already now very critical. In the month of August the credits for grain and flour will be exhausted. If in consequence the imports should cease, a large portion of our population, especially the population of Vienna and the industrial centres would be exposed to starvation. The new crop can only cover one-fourth of our requirements; moreover, since with us small holdings prevail, it will only be available in the course of a few months. Even with the greatest efforts it will not be possible to raise in the inland even the small rations on which the population of Vienna is living at present. We further absolutely need meat, fats, rice and condensed milk from abroad. If the supplies on the part of the Allied Great Powers cease, the famine, which for a time was mitigated by these supplies, would fall upon us again with full vigour, and it would be impossible to maintain social order.

That we cannot, in spite of all our efforts, hope to get regular supplies from the other States emerged from the former Monarchy, the delegates of the Interallied Commission, who have assisted us in a very much appreciated way, will confirm.

Since we have put at the disposal of the Supreme Economic Council all the realisable assets, we are obliged to make the urgent appeal that further credits be provisionally granted us, at least for the months of August and September. By that time we shall have carried through the demanded requisitioning of foreign values, which proceeding we will expedite with the greatest speed, and the Supreme Economic Council will be in a position to judge what credits it can grant us for the bonds given by us or what bonds it can release for our use elsewhere. As the Supreme Economic Council is well aware, we are, up to that time, unable to help ourselves. The moment, in which the credits granted us will be entirely exhausted is already in dismal proximity. The suspension of the food supply would lead to a catastrophe and would destroy all the effects of the relief action of the Supreme Economic Council. We therefore, beg the Supreme Council once more, to be kind enough to take immediate steps that the food supply be for the present continued.

Awaiting your favourable reply, I am [etc.]

Renner

Appendix B to HD–9

[Translation⁶]

July 17, 1919.

Note on Possible Action in Hungary

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided, July 11, that Marshal Foch, “after consulting the authorities of the several interested governments, should formulate the plan of operations against Hungary and report progress to the Council in a week’s time.”

To execute this decision:

• General Pellé, for the Czecho-Slovak Army,
• General Pechitch, for the Serbian Army,
• General Prezan, for the Roumanian Army;

were asked to indicate the forces which the Czecho-Slovak, Serbian, and Roumanian Governments respectively would be able to contribute to the contemplated operation.

For his part, General d’Esperey was requested to indicate the conditions under which he would be able to reinforce the offensive power of the French Army in Hungary.

According to the information already received, the situation appears on July 16th as follows:

Czecho-Slovak Army—M. Masaryk puts at the disposal of the Entente all the armed forces of the Republic, namely:

• 6 divisions of infantry on the front, ready to go into action;
• 2 divisions of infantry forming, ready July 18th.
• Approximate total effective force 100,000 men.

These forces have been reorganized and made up again under the direction of the French Military Mission. They are now in good condition to resume offensive operations.

However, the need for artillery ammunition is urgently felt. The magazines are nearly empty. The production is insignificant.^* Only Austria, is ready with the necessary stocks. It is therefore indispensable and urgent to intervene at Vienna so that the sending of ammunition will begin immediately,^†

Serbian Army—The Serbian Government is able to place, at present, at the disposition of the Entente:

14 battalions	}	equal to 1½ divisions of infantry and 1 division of 12 squadrons of cavalry.
12 squadrons of cavalry
12 batteries

numbering 18 to 20 thousand excellent soldiers who are ready and on a war footing from July 18.

The Serbian Government requests, however, as a condition of its cooperation, the benevolent support of the Entente in order to put an end to all cause of friction with Italy, and to assume the protection of Serbian territory against Bulgarian troops and comitadjis.^‡

Roumanian Army—A definite reply has not yet arrived concerning the possibilities of the Roumanian Government.

It would appear admissible to count, for the present, on the total forces of the Roumanian Army of the West, stationed on the Theiss, namely:

6 divisions of infantry and 1 division of cavalry, representing about 75,000 men.

This force will probably be strengthened so as to place the units completely upon a war footing by drawing upon the depots in the Transylvania region which have about 20,000 men.

The Roumanian Army of the West, after its recent success against the Hungarian Army, is in good physical and moral condition to resume the fight.

It is to be anticipated, however, that Roumania, in order to engage all its forces of the West outside of its frontiers, will want to be prepared to reconstitute new reserves for the interior by mobilizing new divisions. Without doubt, it will then be necessary to furnish them with equipment and clothing for which they have great need.

This material aid could be given them by England and America (whose contingents are not participating in the proposed operation) by continuing the shipments previously sent or still en route.

French Army in Hungary—It is at present free with its two divisions of infantry, its brigade of cavalry, its mechanized parts (3 groups of heavy guns, 2 companies of armored cars, and a small squadron of tanks.)

Effective force 25,000 men, of whom about 20,000 are combatants.

The infantry has its full complement. The artillery and the services are now being refilled with personnel.

The material resources would also be augmented by drawing on the surpluses of the Army of the East.^¶

Upon the whole, and with the reservation of confirming the information about the Roumanian Army, the total effectives which would be possible to have on a war footing against Hungary within several days, would add up to:—

Czecho-Slovak Army	8 divisions of infantry		100,000	men
Serhian Army	1½ divisions of infantry	1 division of cavalry	20,000	“
Roumanian Army	6 divisions of infantry	1 division of cavalry	75,000	“
French Army in Hungary	2 divisions of infantry	½ division of cavalry	25,000	“
Total	17½ divisions of infantry	2½ divisions of cavalry	220,000	“

of which about 160,000 are combatant troops.

Against these forces, the Hungarian Army numbers, according to the latest information:

• 8 divisions of infantry
• 3 brigades of infantry
• 4 brigades of frontier guards
• 2 divisions of cavalry (?)

amounting to 10 to 11 divisions of infantry and 2 divisions of cavalry, a total of 150 thousand effectives, about 100 to 120 thousand of which are combatant troops, of an undetermined value.

In the comparison of opposing forces, it appears that the Entente possesses on the spot considerable numerical superiority with reference to Hungary.

Even the disposition of these forces, which encircle the Hungarian forces, constitutes also an advantageous situation for offensive operations.

But it is important to point out at this time that these troops, comprising four different nationalities, can hope for success only if directed by a common command.

It is therefore necessary to place them under one supreme commander accepted by the Roumanian, Serbian, and Czecho-Slovak Governments.

This command will determine the military plan of action.

Now is the time to organize this command and to make the necessary agreements with the general staffs of the several participating armies.

It is to be supposed, moreover, that an Allied operation, arranged in this way, with a joint effort of the Allied Armies resulting from a single command, will bring these Armies within a short time to the gates of Budapest.

In this situation, there will be the question of setting up in Hungary a government of order, with which the Entente will be able to sign a peace corresponding with its intentions. As a consequence, it is necessary now to prepare a program of political action, succeeding the military operation, and stating for the commander the instructions of the Conference for establishing a new Hungarian Government.

Furnished with these instructions the commander will be able to determine the provisional regime for occupation of the country and to arrange to move the Allied troops which have become unnecessary back beyond their respective frontiers.

In conclusion:

The forces which are available for the Entente would appear to be adequate to undertake, within a short time and with chances of success, a military operation against Hungary under the following conditions:

1. A single supreme command for operations is organized;

2. The Conference gives instructions which permit the supreme command to establish a new government agreeing with the views of the Entente; and which determine the conditions of the subsequent occupation of the country;

3. The material resources of the troops are completed by:

Intervention with the government of Vienna, and with its delegation at Saint-Germain, in order to furnish munitions to the Czecho-Slovaks;

The delivery of material, equipment, and clothing to Roumania by the powers of the Entente.

4. Finally, there is considered also the organization of relief for the Hungarian civil population; relief which will be assured and controlled by the English organization placed in charge of operating the line of river communication of the Danube.

Appendix C to HD–9

WCP–441

Text of Military Convention Between the Allies and Hungary, Signed at Belgrade, November 13

[Text of convention is printed in volume II, page 183.]

1. Respectively United States, French, and Italian representatives on the Supreme Economic Council.
2. John H. Gorvin of Great Britain, executive officer in Paris for the Belief Section of the Supreme Economic Council.
3. vol. ii, p. 183.
4. Italy, B. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d’Italia e gli altri stati, vol. 23, p. 412.
5. For the discussion of this subject on July 11, see HD–5, minute 7, p. 103.
6. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
7. Actually four charges a day per cannon, which will be increased to eight about August 15. [Footnote in the original.]
8. For this purpose, ask General Segré and General Hallier to expedite the shipment of orders already placed at Vienna by the Czecho-Slovak Government and not yet delivered. Likewise communicate with the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain in order to demand that they intervene with their Government so that all facilities are provided for these shipments. [Footnote in the original.]
9. The arrival in Bulgaria of the French 30th and 156th Divisions of Infantry coming from the Dniester will make it possible to give this latter guarantee to the Serbian Government (Movements will be completed by the end of July.) [Footnote in the original.]
10. General d’Esperey has not yet answered the inquiry that was sent to him on this subject [Footnote in the original.]