Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/120
IC–176E
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s Residence, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, April 25, 1919, at 5:30 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- President Wilson.
- Admiral Benson.
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- Bear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- Admiral de Bon.
- Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. Secretary
- Professor P. J. Mantoux Interpreter.
- United States of America
Kiel canal The Supreme Council had before it the draft of articles concerning the Kiel Canal for insertion in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace with Germany. (Appendix.)
Article 8 Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the French and Italian delegates had put forward a proposal for the destruction of the fortifications of the Kiel Canal. Pie understood that the subject of fortifications was dealt with in the Naval Terms, which only permitted Germany to retain works of a defensive nature. The result of the application of this principle was that no works of defence would be allowed at the Kiel end of the Canal, because these would have an offensive character since they would threaten the entrances to the Baltic.
Admiral Benson said that the object in prohibiting these defensive works at the Kiel end was not connected with the Kiel Canal at all, but was to prevent interference with the natural waterway into the Baltic.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that against the proposal to destroy the defensive measures at the Elbe end of the Canal was the argument that in 15 minutes the Canal could be rendered unnavigable by dropping mines in it.
Admiral de Bon said the reason for which the French and Italian Admirals had proposed the destruction of the defences at the Elbe end of the Canal was because, if the navigation of the Kiel Canal was to be free at all, it must be absolutely free. As regards the argument that the Canal could be rendered unnavigable by laying [Page 236] mines, he pointed out that by doing so the Germans would deprive themselves of the use of the Canal. Nothing could suit us better than that. The Kiel Canal doubled the efficiency of the German Fleet, and if they deprived themselves of it, nothing could be better. From a commercial point of view, the traffic through the Kiel Canal might become very important. It was capable of carrying 11,000,000 tons a year, and might become as important a waterway as the Belts. As regards the argument which had been used in informal conversation while the Council was assembling, that fortifications could be rapidly improvised, this was equally true as regards the Belts. Fortifications could be improvised here also. Hence, there was no argument in regard to the Belts that could not be equally applied to the Elbe.
Mr. Lloyd George said that in the Naval Terms it had been decided that Germany should be in a position to defend her ports against the enemy. We could not deprive the Kiel Canal of its fortifications without leaving the Elbe unfortified.
Admiral Benson raised the question of the removal of the fortifications at the Kiel end. He was inclined to question whether we were not going too far. This would leave a large part of the Baltic coast totally undefended. The British representative had suggested that Germany might be allowed some fortification at the Kiel end of the Canal. The general principles to which we were working was that natural waterways should not be fortified. There should be free communication through them both in Peace and in War. It had been decided to remove the defences at the Kiel end because the range of modern guns placed to command the approaches to the Belts happened to take in the Kiel Canal and Baltic Coast of Germany.
Mr. Lloyd George said he hoped the French Delegation would not press for the inclusion of this Article.
President Wilson said that as a matter of fact the provisions it was proposed to impose for the Kiel Canal were practically identical with the United States arrangements for the Panama Canal, which had been arranged between the United States of America and Great Britain. These provisions were based on the principle of the Canal being available for use on the same terms by ships of all countries, except in time of war. The Panama Canal, however, was very vulnerable to attack, and provision had had to be made for its defence. Consequently, it had been very heavily fortified.
M. Clemenceau pointed out that the Suez Canal had no fortifications, and these were prohibited.
Admiral Hope pointed out that we could not use the Canal if we were at war with Germany.
[Page 237]Admiral Benson said that nothing could suit the enemy better than to get ships into the Canal in the event of war, and then to block them in there.
M. Clemenceau said that Admiral De Bon’s point was that such arrangements ought to be made that if we could not use the Kiel Canal in time of war, neither should Germany be able to.
President Wilson pointed out that the Kiel Canal was entirely within German territory and sovereignty. This was not true of the Suez Canal, which was not in the body of any single country.
Admiral Benson said that his feeling was very strong that it was a mistake to touch the Kiel Canal at all. It established a precedent of a very dubious character. If it was regarded as a purely punitive measure, then he would have nothing to say. But to go into a country and make special provision for a Canal was very similar to going in and taking its railways. The Kiel Canal had been a German national enterprise, and was no concern of the outside world.
Admiral Hope pointed out that we had Bismarck’s declaration that the Kiel Canal had been built solely for strategic purposes. It was for this reason that Admiral de Bon went so far as to say it ought to be destroyed. In these provisions, however, Germany had been treated more leniently.
President Wilson said the Canal had some commercial importance.
Admiral Hope said that this was not great. The greatest distance saved between the nearest Dutch port and the nearest Baltic port was only 200 miles as compared with the route through the Belts.
Admiral de Bon pointed out a certain inconsistency between our attitude with regard to the Kiel Canal and the other provisions that had been made for internationalising the course of the Elbe and many other waterways. If these waterways were to be internationalised, why not the Kiel Canal also? Surely it ought to be on the same basis!
(It was decided to omit Article 8.)
Article 7 Mr. Lloyd George asked whether it was worth while setting up an International Commission to control a purely German Canal. This Canal had no very great value from a commercial point of view. Most ships would still prefer to use the Belts, and only a few ships trafficking between Dutch and Baltic ports were likely to use the Canal. The reason for this was that there were no dues in the Belts, and there must be dues in the Canal. He asked if it was worth while to hurt German pride and add to our own difficulties for so small a matter.
M. Clemenceau agreed that it was not, and withdrew the French draft of Article 7.
[Page 238](The British, American, Japanese and Italian proposal for Article 7 (Appendix), was adopted.)
2. Naval. Military and Air Terms. Reserve Clause. Article 25. Shinking of Surface Ships Admiral Hope said that the first question raised was as to whether surface ships enumerated in the Article were to be sunk.1
President Wilson asked whether after these ships of surf ace ships had been handed over, Germany would retain any surface ships.
Admiral Hope replied that they would.
Admiral Benson considered that too much was at stake to settle this Article in a hurry. He pointed out that the ships now lying in the British Port of Scapa Flow had not been surrendered but were merely interned.
Admiral Hope pointed out that by Article 24, the ships interned in compliance with the Armistice were to be definitely surrendered. This Article had already been accepted.
Admiral Benson pressed that the disposal of the surface ships should be definitely dealt with in the Peace Terms. What, he asked, would happen if it had not been decided before the Peace Terms were signed, what should be done with these ships now in German ports. Were the British or French Navies prepared to take them into British and French ports, and look after them? To decide this question now would ease the situation as far as Germany was concerned. To leave it unsettled was to risk misunderstandings.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that no prolonged discussion on this should be embarked on, as there were still many questions to be settled before the Germans arrive at Versailles. A discussion on this point might last a day or two. In the meanwhile, he proposed that the terms should simply state that the ships were to be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers. He was desirous of reaching some arrangement; for example, it might be agreed to sink some of the German ships.
President Wilson suggested that a promise might be given to Germany that a decision would be reached on the subject before the Treaty of Peace was actually signed. The question could be discussed while the Peace Treaty was being examined by the Germans.
Admiral Benson asked what would happen if a decision had not been reached.
President Wilson said his proposal was to say definitely that a decision would be reached, and then it would have to be reached.
Admiral Benson pointed out that any decision, except to sink the ships, meant an increase of armaments.
[Page 239]Mr. Lloyd George said he could give Admiral Benson his proposal for stopping the increase of armaments, and even bring about a decrease, but he doubted if the Admiral would accept it. The British Government did not want these ships and were ready to discuss even the decrease of Navies, provided all would agree. This, however, was a very big question.
President Wilson said he understood the French had made a reservation in regard to this Article. He asked for the reason.
Admiral de Bon said the reason was, first, that by sinking the ships, valuable property would be destroyed, and there would be an increase in the general losses of the war. French public opinion was strongly against this. A more especial reason was, however, that if the ships were divided among the Allied and Associated Powers, it would make a considerable addition, perhaps not of great fighting value, but nevertheless, a useful addition to the peace strength of the French Navy. During five years, owing to the immense efforts of French industries in supplying the armies, it had not been possible to complete any capital ships. These ships would be very useful to show the French flag and spread the national influence in the world. France’s naval strength was greatly reduced, especially as compared with other nations. For no aggressive desires of any kind, France did not want to lose this opportunity for repairing her losses.
Mr. Lloyd George said that Admiral De Bon was also well aware that the French taxpayer would not be content to pay for more ships. He fully agreed that the French position in this matter ought to be considered. His idea was that France should have some of these ships, and sink a corresponding number of old ships, or if unwilling to sink them, she might break them up, which Admiral Hope told him would be a business proposition.
President Wilson proposed that if the German Peace delegates should raise the question, a promise should be given them that the question would be settled for the signing of the Peace Treaty.
Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau agreed in this.
(Article 25 as finally revised is as follows:—
Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the present stipulations, the German surface warships enumerated below will be surrendered to Allied and Associated Governments.
These warships will have been disarmed as provided in Article 23 of the Armistice date[d] the 11th November, 1918. Nevertheless they must have all their guns on board.
Battleships
| Oldenburg | Posen |
| Thüringen | Westfalen |
| Ostfriesland | Rheinland |
| Helgoland | Nassau |
Light Cruisers
| Stettin | Strassburg |
| Danzig | Augsburg |
| München | Kolberg |
| Lübeck | Stuttgart |
and, in addition, forty-two modern destroyers and fifty modern torpedo boats, as chosen by the five Allied and Associated Governments.)
3. Article 28. Destruction of Submarines Admiral Hope said that the reserved portion of this Article related to the question of whether surrendered submarines were to be destroyed and broken up.
Mr. Lloyd George asked what objection there was.
Admiral de Bon said it was the same objection as before, namely, the destruction of material.
Mr. Lloyd George demurred to the idea that any nation should add to its submarines.
President Wilson said that he himself was opposed to submarines altogether, and hoped the time would come when they would be contrary to International Law. In his view, they should be regarded as outlaws.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that many of the submarines that had been handed over by the Germans had been broken up altogether. A decision to this effect had been taken earlier.2
M. Clemenceau said that this had been agreed to, but when he had discovered it, he had intervened.3
President Wilson pointed out that M. Clemenceau’s objection was to the destruction of material. If the submarines were broken up, the material would not be wasted.
M. Clemenceau asked Admiral De Bon what was his policy towards submarines.
Admiral de Bon said that his policy was to keep the German submarines, of which France had received some 50. France had very few of her own.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not think that Navies ought to be strengthened by submarines.
M. Clemenceau said that if ever France had another war with Germany they might be useful, although he hoped long before that they would be obsolete.
Mr. Lloyd George said he would like to destroy all the German submarines.
[Page 241]M. Clemenceau said that France had very few, whereas Great Britain had very many.
Admiral de Bon said the question had never been discussed by experts.
(It was agreed:—
- 1.
- That the words in the second clause of Article 28 “there to be destroyed or broken up” should be struck out.
- 2.
- That the Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers should further consider the question of the disposal of the German submarines.)
4. Article 32. Destruction of War Material Admiral Hope suggested that the following words in Article 32, which had been reserved, “such arms, munitions, and war material will be destroyed or rendered useless” should be omitted as a corresponding article had been inserted in the Military clauses.
(This was agreed to.)
Article 35. Heligoland Admiral Hope pointed out that the question of Heligoland had already been dealt with.
6. Article 38. Kiel Canal This question was dealt with earlier in the meeting.
7. Article 40. Submarine Cables President Wilson said that this was not a matter for the Naval Terms.
Villa Majestic, Paris, 25 April, 1919.
- The draft articles under consideration do not accompany the minutes.↩
- See BC–6, vol. iii, p. 643.↩
- See BC–24, ibid., p. 888.↩
- File copy ends at this point; remainder of this appendix has been supplied from the printed report (Paris Peace Conf. 181.15302/4).↩
- File copy ends at this point; remainder of this appendix has been supplied from the printed report (Paris Peace Conf. 181.15302/4).↩