Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969-1972

155. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, South Asia, United States Information Agency (Squires) to the Deputy Director (Loomis)¹

Washington, December 20, 1971

SUBJECT

• The 14-Day Indo-Pakistan War

SUMMARY

The undeclared 1971 war between India and Pakistan began with full-scale hostilities on both East and West fronts on December 3.² Two short weeks later following a desultory defense at best, the Pakistani army in the East surrendered, and Yahya Khan accepted an Indian ceasefire offer in the West.³

The fighting which was mercifully short, ended in the birth of a new nation, Bangla Desh. By any measure the immediate prospects of the new nation of 75 million people are anything but bright. It is doubtful that the new nation can survive without substantial humanitarian and economic assistance for some time to come. With the fate of Sheikh Mujib unknown, the political viability and stability of Bangla Desh is equally questionable. The new Bengal Nation necessarily will be heavily dependent upon India involving some form of protectorate status, and that relationship, given the essential differences between the two, contains the seeds of further dissension and strife. An independent Bangla Desh, therefore, probably represents a short-term solution rather than a permanent arrangement.⁴ The intermediate prospects would appear to suggest continued instability on the subcontinent. In any case, a united Pakistan lasted less than 25 years, there are now three nations where there were two and India emerges as the dominant power in South Asia.

Traditionally, South Asia has been an area of major power rivalry and confrontation, and there is no reason to assume this will not continue to be the case. Soviet backing of India’s cause unquestionably has provided the USSR with an immediate policy gain. In the process, however, the USSR may have become more enmeshed in South Asia than she might have preferred.⁵ China’s support for Pakistan represented little real commitment beyond diplomatic maneuver and propaganda. U.S. diplomatic efforts failed to halt the developing crisis and have succeeded in gaining India’s animosity and condemnation in the process.⁶

India’s dramatic victory has confirmed Madame Gandhi’s political leadership and placed it beyond challenge.⁷ The nation is perhaps more united and euphoric in victory than at any time since independence. Pakistan, on the other hand, is a badly defeated and divided nation. Yahya Khan is being forced to resign in favor of a civilian coalition, and the public mood in Pakistan is one of angry humiliation.

The conflict underlined the international ramifications of local wars and the contradictions they produce. The United Nations demonstrated its inability to cope with local wars involving client states of the major powers.⁸ The USSR employed three vetos in the Security Council to block a ceasefire-withdrawal until India could achieve her primary military objective. The vote in the General Assembly, while overwhelmingly supporting a ceasefire resolution, could not be translated into effective action.⁹

PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS

Bangla Desh. The extent to which USIS is permitted to continue operations, if at all, will depend in the long run on the U.S. attitude toward diplomatic recognition of an independent Bangla Desh.¹⁰ BPAO George Henry remains in Dacca and has been operating out of the ConGen since the bombing of our library. For the time being, preservation and utilization of our facilities will depend on informal arrangements and personal contacts with Indian and Bangla Desh authorities.

Pakistan. The U.S. complement is essentially intact, including both personnel and property.¹¹ Rawalpindi is carrying on at one-third normal activity. Lahore and Karachi are operating with reduced staffs and schedules, but activity will pick up as personnel returns to duty. Lahore suffered moderate damage in an attack December 19 by demonstrators angered by lack of U.S. support in Pakistan’s hour of trial. On the other hand, there was a pro-U.S. demonstration at the Peshawar Center. The Hyderabad and Peshawar centers have not been damaged and should be back in operation this week.

India. The USIS program in India has been shaken by the war and accompanying Indian hostility against the U.S. There have been demonstrations at U.S. official and private facilities. The post has postponed Duke Ellington’s India tour, suspended the “in-houser” program temporarily, and cancelled “package programs” through January. The present wave of anti-Americanism should recede with the victorious end of the war, however, and we expect program activities to resume a more normal pattern over the coming months. Thereafter, we should seek opportunities to work toward restoration of Indo-American relations to a more cordial level.¹²

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 22, FPD—South Asia (ISA) 1971. Limited Official Use. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum twice.
2. For information about the outbreak of hostilities on December 3, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 215.
3. Pakistani forces surrendered on December 16. The Indian Government also announced a cease-fire to take effect on December 17. See ibid., Document 320. For the President’s and Kissinger’s responses to the cease-fire announcement, see ibid., vol. E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 191.
4. Loomis underlined the portion of the paragraph beginning with “With” and ending with “arrangement.”
5. Loomis underlined the portion of the paragraph beginning with “Soviet” and ending with “preferred.”
6. Loomis underlined this sentence.
7. Loomis underlined this sentence.
8. Loomis underlined this sentence.
9. In a December 8 memorandum to the President, Kissinger reported that on December 7, the UN General Assembly had “approved a resolution on the Indo-Pak war essentially the same as that vetoed in the Security Council by the Soviets. The vote was 104 in favor (including the U.S.), 11 against (Soviet bloc minus Romania, plus Bhutan and India) and 10 abstentions, most notable of which were the UK, France and Denmark. The resolution specifically calls for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, creation of necessary conditions for a voluntary return of refugees and urges protection of civilians in the area.” (Ibid., vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 247)
10. Loomis underlined this sentence.
11. Loomis underlined this sentence.
12. Loomis underlined the last two sentences of this paragraph.