M. de La Valette, so far from appearing to regret the course of recent
events in Germany, takes the position that France is relatively stronger
now, with Germany divided into at least three large and independent
powers, no one of which has a population as large as France, than when
Germany was united in a confederation which represented a population
more than double that of France. He also denounces the narrow and
miserable policy of another age, when the greatness of countries was
maintained by weakening those which surrounded them; and in the name of
the Emperor declares with profound wisdom the true equilibrium of Europe
is to be found in the satisfied wishes of its nations.
The marvellous feature of this paper is, that after interpreting so
sagaciously and correctly, as I think, the bearing of recent events in
Europe upon France, events which rather strengthen than weaken her
position; after proclaiming the incontestable fact that she is menaced
by no one, and the less incontestable fact that she is disposed to
menace no one, and that the peace now making has every element of
durability, the minister proceeds to argue from this state of facts the
necessity of perfecting her military organization without delay. This
paragraph is so perfectly inconsequential that I venture to say that it
will be understood, by all France at least, as an undertaking upon the
part of the Emperor to hold his sword in readiness to aid the
negotiations which he has suspended, but not abandoned, for the
rectification of his northern frontiers. It is difficult to conceive any
other motive for addressing an announcement of such a character to the
representatives of the government abroad, and in continuation of a
statement of facts which logically ought to lead to a reduction rather
than to an increase of military force.
The fact is that France is very imperfectly armed at present, and if ever
so much provoked would seek to avoid war for at least a year, the
shortest time within which she could complete her preparations. It is
also understood that there is a strong party in the government in favor
of making a loan, for which there are abundant pretexts. The government
also expects to be vigorously attacked in the chambers by M. Thiers and
the partisans of weak neighbors, for its neglect to interfere in time to
prevent the unification of Germany under the sceptre of a frontier
state, &c. These reasons may suffice to explain the attachment of
this otherwise most inconsequential tail to M. de La Valette’s kite,
without ascribing it to any graver or more pregnant motive.
[Translation.]
Paris,
September 18, 1866.
The Moniteur publishes the text of the circular addressed by the
Marquis de La Valette to the French diplomatic agents abroad, which
has been for some time past a subject of so much speculation. We
subjoin a translation of that important document; it bears the date
of September 16:
Monsieur: The Emperor’s government can no
longer delay expressing its views on the subject of the events which
are taking place in Germany. The Marquis de Moustier having to
remain absent for some time longer, his Majesty has ordered me to
explain to his diplomatic agents the motives by which his policy is
directed.
The war which broke out in the centre and south of Europe has
destroyed the Germanic confederation, and definitively constitued
Italian nationality. Prussia, whose limits have been extended by
victory, rules on the right bank of the Main. Austria has lost
Venetia, and is separated from Germany.
In presence of these important changes every state in Europe pauses
and reflects how far they affect its responsibility, (se recueillent dans le sentiment de leur
responsabilite;) each inquires what are the consequences of
the peace which has recently intervened, and what will be its
influence on European order, and on the international situation of
each power.
Public opinion in France is excited. It wavers, uncertain between the
joy of seeing the treaties of 1815 destroyed, and the fear that the
power of Prussia may acquire excessive proportions; it oscillates
between the desire for the maintenance of peace, and the hope to
obtain by war a territorial aggrandizement. It applauds the complete
enfranchisement of Italy, but wishes to be reassured against the
dangers by which the Pope may be menaced.
The perplexities by which the public mind is agitated, and which do
not escape observation abroad, impose on the government the
obligation of explaining its ideas in a precise manner.
France cannot pursue a doubtful policy. If her interests and strength
are compromised by the important changes which are taking place in
Germany, she should declare it frankly, and adopt the necessary
measures for guaranteeing her security. If she incurs no loss by the
transformations which are taking place, she should declare it with
sincerity and resist exaggerated apprehensions and ardent
appreciations which, by exciting international jealousy, would turn
her aside from the course she ought to follow.
In order to dissipate that state of uncertainty, and fix the public
convictions, we must view in their aggregate the past as it was, and
the future as it presents itself.
In the past what do we see? After 1815 the Holy Alliance united
against France all the nations from the Ural to the Rhine. The
Germanic confederation comprised, with Prussia and Austria, eighty
millions of inhabitants; it extended from Luxembourg to Trieste, and
from the Baltic to Trent, and surrounded us with a girdle of iron
supported by five strong federal fortresses; our strategical
position was fettered by the most skilful territorial combinations.
The slightest difficulty that might arise between us and Holland
with Prussia on the Rhine, or with Austria in the Tyrol or Fricul,
raised up against us all the united forces of the confederation.
Austrian Germany, impregnable on the Adige, might advance at any
moment to the Alps. Prussian Germany had for her vanguard on the
Rhine all the secondary states, incessantly agitated by desires of
political transformation, and disposed to consider France as an
enemy of their existence and aspirations.
With the exception of Spain we had no possibility of contracting an
alliance on the continent. Italy was divided and powerless, and did
not count as a nation. Prussia was neither sufficiently compact nor
independent to depart from her traditions. Austria was too much
occupied in maintaining her possessions in Italy to be able to form
an intimate connection with us.
No doubt a long period of peace may have caused us to forget the
dangers of these territorial organizations and alliances, for they
only appear formidable when war happens to break out. But France has
sometimes secured that inestimable blessing by the sacrifice of her
position (rôle) in the world. It is
unquestionable that during nearly forty years she has encountered,
erect and opposed to her, the coalition of the three northern
courts, united by the recollection of common defeats and victories,
by analagous principles of government, by solemn treaties, and by
feelings of mistrust towards our liberal and civilizing action.
Now, if we examine the future of Europe, transformed as it has been,
what guarantees does it provide for France and the peace of the
world? The coalition of the three courts of the north is broken up.
The new principle that governs Europe is the liberty of alliances,
All the great powers, without exception, are restored to the
plenitude of their independence—to the regular development of their
destinies.
Prussia, aggrandized, free henceforth from all solidarity, insures
the independence of Germany. This should give no umbrage to France.
Proud of her admirable unity, of her indestructible nationality, she
could not consistently oppose or regret the work of assimilation ,
which has just been accomplished, nor make the principles of
nationality she represents and professes in respect to peoples,
subservient to any feeling of jealousy. The national feeling of
Germany being satisfied, its anxieties are removed and its enmities
extinguished. Germany, in imitating France, has taken a step that
brings her closer to, not that removes her from her.
[Page 355]
In the south, Italy, whose patriotism a long servitude has been
unable to extingush, is put in possession of all the elements of her
national greatness. Her existence profoundly modifies the political
conditions of Europe; but in spite of unreasoning susceptibilities
or transient errors of judgment, her ideas, her principles, her
interests draw her into closer connection with the nation that shed
its blood to aid her in conquering her independence.
The interests of the Pontifical throne are secured by the convention
of September 15. That convention will be honorably executed. In
withdrawing his troops from Rome, the Emperor leaves there as a
guarantee for the security of the Holy Father the protection of
France.
In the Baltic, as in the Mediterranean, secondary navies are
springing up which are favorable to the liberty of the seas.
Austria, relieved from her Italian and German preoccupations, no
longer wasting her strength in barren rivalries, but concentrating
it in the east of Europe, still represents a power of thirty-five
millions of souls, whom no hostile feeling, no interest separates
from France.
By what singular influence of the past on the future can public
opinion discover enemies, instead of allies, of France in these
nations emancipated from a past which was hostile to us, called to a
new life, directed by principles which are our own, animated by the
sentiments of progress which form the pacific bond of modern
societies.
Europe more strongly constituted, rendered more homogeneous by more
precise territorial divisions, is a guarantee for the peace of the
continent, and is neither a danger nor an injury for our nation.
France with Algeria will soon number more than forty millions of
inhabitants; Germany thirty-seven millions—twenty-nine of them in
the northern and eight in the southern confederation; Austria
thirty-five; Italy twenty-six; Spain eighteen. What is there in this
distribution of European forces to cause us any uneasiness?
An irresistible power (are we to regret it?) urges populations to
combine together in large agglomerations by causing the secondary
states to disappear. This tendency arises from the desire to insure
more efficacious guarantees for general interests. While the old
populations of the continent in their limited territories increase
only at a slow rate, Russia and the republic of the United States of
America will each, before a century has elapsed, be able to count a
hundred millions of men. Although the progress of these two great
empires is not for us a subject of disquietude, and although, on the
contrary, we applaud their generous efforts in favor of oppressed
races, the interest of the nations of central Europe and their
foresight require them not to remain parcelled out into so many
states without strength and public spirit.
Politics should rise above the narrow and petty prejudices of a
bygone age. The Emperor does not believe that the grandeur of a
country depends on the weakening of the peoples that surround it,
and only sees a real equilibrium in the satisfied wishes of the
nations of Europe. In that he obeys convictions long entertained,
and the traditions of his race. Napoleon I foresaw the changes which
are now occurring on the European continent. He had implanted the
germs of new nationalities in the Italian peninsula in creating the
kingdom of Italy; in Germany by causing the disappearance of two
hundred and fifty-three independent states.
If these considerations be just and true, the Emperor was right in
accepting the task of mediator; to arrest useless and grievous
effusion of blood, to urge moderation on the conqueror by his
amicable intervention, to attenuate the consequences of defeat, to
pursue through so many obstacles the re-establishment of peace—this
was not an inglorious task. He would have, on the contrary,
misunderstood his high responsibility if, violating the neutrality
be had promised and proclaimed, he had thrown himself suddenly into
the risks of a great war, one of those wars which arouse the hatred
of races, and in which whole nations come into collision. What,
indeed, would have been the object of spontaneously initiating a
struggle against Prussia, and necessarily against Italy? Conquest,
territorial aggrandizement. But the imperial government has long
since laid down and even applied its principles as regards the
extension of territory. It can understand, it has understood,
annexations when commanded by absolute necessity in order to unite
to the country populations having the same manners, the same
national instincts as ourselves; it obtained from the free consent
of Savoy and the country of Nice the re-establishment of our natural
frontiers. France can only desire territorial aggrandizements which
do not affect her powerful cohesion; but she must ever labor to
promote her moral or political aggrandizement by using her influence
for the great interests of civilization.
Her part is to cement the accord between all the powers who wish at
the same time to maintain the principle of authority and to favor
progress. That alliance will deprive revolution of the prestige it
derives from extending its patronage to the cause of the freedom of
peoples, and will maintain in the hands of great and enlightened
states the wise direction of the democratic movement which is
manifesting itself throughout Europe.
Nevertheless, in the emotions which have seised upon the country
there exists a legitimate feeling which it is important to recognize
and define with precision. The results of the late war convey a
lesson of grave import and one which has not been purchased at the
expense of the honor of our arms. It indicates the necessity for the
defence of bur territory, of improving our military organization
without delay. The nation will not fail in a
[Page 356]
duty which cannot be a menace for any one. She
is justly proud of the valor of her armies; her susceptibilities
awakened by the remembrance of her military triumphs, by the name
and the deeds of the sovereign who governs her, are only the
expression of her energetic will of maintaining, beyond the reach of
any attack, her lank and influence in the world.
To sum up, from the elevated point of view whence the imperial
government considers the destinies of Europe, the horizon appears to
it free from menacing eventualities. Difficult problems, which
required to be solved, as they could not be suppressed, weighed upon
the destinies of peoples; they might have arisen at more difficult
periods; they have received their natural solution without violent
shocks and without the dangerous assistance of revolutionary
passions. A peace which reposes on such bases will be a durable
one.
As to France, in whatever direction she casts her eye she sees
nothing which can hinder her progress or disturb her prosperity.
Preserving friendly relations with every power, directed by a policy
which exhibits generosity and moderation as evidence of her
strength, supported by her imposing unity, with her genius radiating
on every side, with her treasures and her credit, which fecundate
Europe, with her military forces developed, surrounded henceforth by
independent nations, her greatness appears undiminished, nor will
ever be less respected.
Such is the language which you should use in your relations with the
government to which you are accredited.
Accept, &c.
