Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

115. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 23, 1983

SUBJECT

• Soviet Officials Criticize Military over KAL: Divisions Within the Ranks or Good PR Strategy?

In recent days a number of mid-level Soviet officials have voiced “unofficial” criticisms to Westerners and Western media about the way in which the Soviet military handled the Korean Airlines incident. Thus far we have noted three instances in which Soviet officials have criticized their military before Westerners, and sought to excuse in some manner the political leadership for what happened.

On September 17, London Times correspondent Richard Owens reported from Moscow that “according to well-informed sources” Yuriy Andropov had been taking a rest cure in the Northern Caucasus at the time the KAL plane was shot down. He was “appalled” when he heard the news and rushed back to Moscow to handle the situation. “The Soviet leader was acutely aware of the long term impact on Soviet relations with the West, . . . . but had been obliged to support the military actions.”

On September 18, Pravda’s Chief Editor Viktor Afanasyev told BBC in London that while he believed the KAL plane was on a spy mission and that the Soviet pilots were not at fault for being unable to distinguish between an RC–135 and a 747, he deeply regretted the fact that innocent people had died, and thought that Soviet “military people [were] guilty” for not admitting immediately that they had shot down the KAL plane. Afanasyev also noted that Andropov had been on holiday at the time of the incident (Tab A).

Finally, on September 21, Viktor Linnik of the Central Committee’s International Information Department told BBC TV in Edinburgh that Soviet pilots had made a mistake in downing the South Korean airliner. He admitted that there was strong evidence that the KAL plane was not on a spy mission, but said Soviet pilots were “trigger happy” because “U.S. reconnaissance planes were flying over the area all the time.” Subsequently, on September 22, Mr. Linnik reversed himself in an interview with Independent Television News (Tab B). On this occasion, he said that there was strong evidence the plane was spying, and that he had not meant to say the reverse in the previous interview but had been trapped into it by BBC’s line of questioning and his own unfamiliarity with the English language. (It should be noted that Linnik’s English is so good that according to Embassy Moscow “in a non-Russian setting, one would not know that he is a Russian.” However, the manner in which the questions were posed could have confused him and caused him to answer wrongly.)

Conclusions

From these three episodes, we see emerging a general “unofficial” line which deviates from the official Soviet line in significant respects and makes the Soviet position somewhat more palatable to Western listeners. The “unofficial” line is as follows: the KAL plane was probably on a spy mission, although there is no absolute certainty of this; the Soviet pilots, if they had identified the plane as civilian, wouldn’t have shot it down; the decision to shoot the plane down was a local one—Andropov wasn’t involved; and the Soviet military should have come clean sooner with the news that they had shot down the plane.

These “unofficial” criticisms could conceivably reflect real divisions within the Soviet leadership. However, the consensus of opinion among CIA, EUR/SOV, INR and Embassy Moscow is that they do not. While it is likely that there are some tensions over aspects of the military’s performance, the “unofficial” criticisms of the military by Soviet officials probably are part of an orchestrated campaign designed to confuse the Western public about Soviet behavior and intentions. The purpose of such a campaign would be to induce receptive Westerners to rationalize Soviet behavior (“if Andropov had only known,” etc.) and therefore to excuse it as an aberration. This in turn would blunt international outrage at Soviet actions, while allowing them to hold the same official policy line.

Other Lines

This “unofficial” position contrasts rather interestingly with what the Soviets are telling “captive” audiences. [3½ lines not declassified] 1) the Soviet Union had shot down the plane with the full knowledge that it was a passenger plane; 2) the decision to shoot down the plane was not given from the Kremlin but based on standing orders; and, 3) the pilot of the SU–15 which downed the aircraft would have been court-martialed if he had refused to shoot down the plane. No mention was made of the spy plane excuse, though [less than 1 line not declassified] did express regret for the loss of 269 lives.

The “unofficial” line also contrasts interestingly with the views expressed by one [less than 1 line not declassified] official. [2 lines not declassified] the Soviet destruction of KAL 007 was a “horrendous mistake” on the part of the local Soviet military commander. He said there was no reasonable excuse that could be offered for the incident, criticized the manner in which the Soviet Government had initially handled the affair, and expressed concern about the effect the destruction of the Korean airliner would have on U.S.-Soviet relations. Perhaps here we have one genuine dissenting voice.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1–8 1983. Secret; Wnintel; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by James F. Schumaker (EUR/SOV); cleared by Simons, Kelly, Vershbow, Donald Graves (INR/SEE), and in substance by [name not declassified] (CIA/SOVA; J. Beyerly (Emb Moscow). Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 23. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Brackets are in the original. All tabs are attached but not printed.