Office of the Historian

38. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting1

Washington, March 27, 1979, 3:30–4:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • North Africa (U)

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
    • Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science & Technology
    • Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

  • Treasury

    • John Lange, Director, Office of Trade Finance

  • Defense

    • David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
    • Owen Roberts, Director, Africa Region

  • Commerce

    • Juanita Kreps
    • Abe Katz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policies and Resources

  • ACDA

    • Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

  • JCS

    • LTG William Y. Smith, Assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

  • CIA

    • Robert Bowie, Director National Foreign Assessment Center
    • Robert Ames, NIO Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

  • White House

    • David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

  • NSC

    • William Quandt, Staff Member
    • Jerry Funk, Staff Member

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. CIA’s assessment is that Morocco is facing serious problems, largely because of the stagnating economic situation, the continuing Sahara conflict, and the ineffective leadership. These trends may get worse, with serious consequences for U.S.-Moroccan relations. It was agreed that the U.S. has a serious interest in Morocco and in cooperation with King Hassan. Morocco’s generally moderate stand on Middle East and African issues is a particularly valuable asset. While taking steps [Page 95] to strengthen U.S.-Moroccan relations, however, we should be mindful of our important economic interests in Algeria and of the fluid leadership situation there.

2. The Moroccans have requested $6 million worth of spare parts for the F–5 aircraft. Until now, this package has been held up because of disagreement on the use of the F–5 in the Sahara. All agencies, with the exception of ACDA, now believe we should go forward with this request. ACDA’s dissent is based on the belief that the spare parts will not significantly affect the military situation confronting Morocco and will constitute a technical violation of the U.S.-Moroccan military assistance agreement. Defense and State have determined that the spare parts would not constitute such a violation. Congressional consultations on this case have indicated general support, with the exception of Senator McGovern.

3. Defense and JCS will quietly examine other military items which might be of a particular help to the Moroccans in the present circumstances. Defense believes that inadequate communications equipment and surveillance may be the major problems currently confronting the Moroccan forces. Recommendations should be available within several weeks.

4. All participants felt that the Sahara conflict could not be resolved militarily. At some point, a political settlement will be essential. It is not clear that the time is right for a settlement, nor is there consensus on what possible role the U.S. might play. Consequently, a small study group will be formed to examine diplomatic strategies for beginning the process of accommodation between Morocco and Algeria concerning the Sahara.2 This group will also explore means for channeling more economic assistance to Morocco, and in particular a resumption of assistance from Saudi Arabia.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 098, 3/27/79, North Africa. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the summary of conclusions. The minutes of the meeting were not found.↩
  2. See Document 239.↩