Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

154. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 11, 1972.

SUBJECT

• South Korean Concern About Japan’s Contacts with Pyongyang, and Desire to Have the Issue Raised at the Honolulu Summit

In a recent conversation with Ambassador Habib to brief him on the progress of the North-South talks, ROK CIA Director Yi Hu-rak also expressed the view that “Japan is moving too quickly in expanding its relations with North Korea and is proceeding at a tempo disadvantageous to preservation of stability in the area.”²

Yi then requested that President Nixon raise the ROK concern with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka at the Honolulu summit. Presumably the ROKs would like us to add our weight to the view that Japan should move cautiously in its contacts with Pyongyang, perhaps coordinating its actions with the ROK, or at least keeping them fully informed of their anticipated moves.

We are not sure whether Yi is exaggerating for effect, or whether he has a different understanding of the pace at which Japan plans to expand its relations with North Korea. The Tanaka Government has made quite clear in the past month that it intends to proceed fairly slowly and cautiously in developing relations with Pyongyang. While, for example, it plans to expand cultural, academic, sports, and technical exchanges with the DPRK, it will not allow political exchanges. And even as regards technical exchanges, it will not admit North Korean technicians in connection with projects that might involve Japanese Exim Bank financing. The prospects for any rapid expansion of trade are small, constrained by the North Korean inability to finance it at this point. Equally important, the Tanaka Government has made clear it does not intend any substantial departures in its bilateral relations with Seoul.

You may wish to consider this ROK request in planning for the Honolulu meetings.³

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Froebe also initialed the memorandum. Initialed by Kissinger.
2. Telegram 4639 from Seoul, August 9, reported that Lee Hu Rak informed Ambassador Habib on August 9 that agreement had been reached for ROK and North Korean representatives to talk at a first plenary Red Cross meeting to be held in Pyongyang on August 30 and a second plenary meeting to be held in Seoul on September 13. Habib also reported Lee’s assertion that Japan was moving too quickly in expanding its relations with North Korea. “Yi said that he had a favor to ask.” “He hoped that that this problem could be touched on in meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Tanaka. I assured Yi that I would convey his concern. At same time, I pointed out that ROK has excellent channels of influence to Japanese and should make maximum effort of its own.” (Ibid.)
3. Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka met for wide-ranging summit talks on September 1 in the Kuilima Hotel in Hawaii. Nixon explained that the U.S. position “is to welcome the ROK talks with North Korea, but it would be premature for us to talk to North Korea.” He added that “the security of the ROK is essential to the maintenance of the security of Japan.” Tanaka responded that “this reflected a correct understanding of both Koreas.” He seconded Nixon’s belief that the development of talks between North and South Korea would not “reduce tensions as much as anticipated.” Tanaka seemingly acquiesced to a role of following South Korea’s lead when he stated, “Japan also is watching developments carefully in terms of working out its own contacts with North Korea gradually, in humanitarian and academic exchanges.” (Memorandum of conversation, September 1; ibid., Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii), August 31–September 1, 1972 [1 of 4])