Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

209. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 20, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Korea

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
• General Charles H. Bonesteel, CINCUNC/COMUSFK/CG 8th Army, Korea
• Henry Bardach, Country Officer for Korea

1. General Bonesteel desired to discuss a number of subjects prior to his departure on vacation at Cape Cod. The following are the salient points of the discussion:

MAP Level

2. General Bonesteel expressed concern about the inadequate level of this year’s MAP, and felt we might face a crisis of confidence with the ROKs despite the fact that such a crisis is not warranted. Ambassador Brown said that the change of administration might probably provide an opportunity for raising this subject with the new Secretary of State. It could, for example, be included in a “first ninety-days” issues paper. General Bonesteel responded that he thought the Pentagon would go along with raising this subject with the new administration. General Bonesteel continued that he had given considerable thought to various ways of filling the gaps. With the bombing halt, he felt that there might be a possibility to transfer Viet Nam weapons for use by the Homeland Reserve forces in the ROK. Two of his men were exploring this in Saigon at the present. Another idea would be to get some US destroyers to patrol the south coast. He said that he had a gut feeling that the other 16 nations who participated in the Korean War might be able to help, for example Australia and New Zealand could send ships. However he was not advocating this very strongly. Ambassador Brown responded that we would have to move cautiously on involving the Australians in the Korean military assistance picture.

3. Asked about the effect of this year’s MAP reduction General Bonesteel said it would probably affect the supply of 20 light helicopters and cut off half a squadron of F–5’s. Ambassador Brown asked whether the ROKs might be willing to cut out some of the F–4’s. General Bone-steel said he had discussed this possibility with Mr. Warnke but that they had not reached a definite conclusion. Ambassador Brown felt that an approach to the ROKs on the F–4’s would be a question of timing.

4. General Bonesteel mentioned the high annual maintenance costs as being central to the MAP problem. He thought that the Pentagon would support a restoration of this year’s cut in next year’s program. If such a restoration could be achieved, General Bonesteel would give priority to replacing old artillery with new pieces. He would also fill out the F–5’s that have been programmed for this year.

5. General Bonesteel said he could use our support in pushing on the MAP pipeline for Korea which he said amounted to about $200 million. In particular he wants trucks moved more rapidly to the ROK.

MAP Transfer

6. General Bonesteel said we should get the MAP Transfer Program back on the track. He recognized that our commitment to the Koreans made this difficult but that we might raise with them the possibility of transferring certain selected items to the Korean budget. There were a number of items such as cement on which there might be as much as a 60 to 75 percent savings in costs.

7. After a brief discussion of the current status of our PL 480 local currency generations, General Bonesteel said that there should be closer coordination between consideration of economic development and defense requirements in the ROK. Ambassador Brown agreed that we should take a close look at the local currency generations for military budget support.

Retaliation

8. General Bonesteel said that he had just received a cable from General Friedman reporting continued high level concern in the ROKG on why they (the ROKs) have to sit back and take all the North Korean provocations. General Bonesteel felt that although President Park won’t march to the Yalu, there was a continuing feeling in the ROK that the punishment should fit the crime; he believes this issue needs to be given further attention. General Bonesteel said that he continues to feel that there is a potential of carefully directed retaliatory actions by the ROKs as a means to allow them to let off steam.

9. Ambassador Brown replied that we had discussed this subject with General Depuy, who had not been encouraging. General Bonesteel responded that the General had never been in Korea.

10. (We showed General Bonesteel the Embassy’s cable reporting President Park’s conversation with Codel Roybal in which Park had taken a more relaxed attitude about the North Korean harassment and ROK retaliation).²

North Korean Provocations and ROK Counter-Infiltration Effort

11. General Bonesteel said his fundamental assessment of the North Korean threat remains the same, that North Korean aggressiveness is increasing, and that Kim Il-sung is making North Korea an armed sanctuary. He feels that there is a danger of miscalculation on both sides and that the North Korean efforts are oriented to provoking the ROKs into retaliation. Such a situation could lead to more substantial moves on either side and blow up into major hostilities. General Bonesteel said that he had been trying to be “ahead of the curve” of the increased North Korean hostile actions with the limited resources available to him. He feels that 1969 will be a period of decision for us to reverse the curve. General Bonesteel is concerned about an arms race between the North and the South and feels that the best way to deal with the situation is to be effective at the DMZ and effective in countering infiltration in the interior.

12. Asked how he was planning to increase the effectiveness of the DMZ defenses, General Bonesteel said that he was trying out several new ideas for which he hopes to obtain Service funding. He said he had been working on scientific means to beef up the fence and that a joint US–ROK team was at present studying this matter. He mentioned that better lighting of the fence would serve as an effective deterrent and that the Australians had a device that would serve this purpose. General Bonesteel also felt that there should be more US support to deal with the sea infiltration problem but he did not go into details. He did, however, mention his request for additional US security companies—a total of 2,000 men—and said that DOD was reluctant to take action on his request because of US balance of payments considerations. He said that he appreciates the US balance of payments problems, but wondered how super-sensitive this problem really is, observing that there was a limit when such considerations should cease to be an overriding factor.

13. General Bonesteel also felt that it was important to have the Department’s support on getting some more men to the regular US forces in Korea. The four US battalions on the DMZ were having a difficult time and although our record was better than the ROKs in this regard, both he and the ROKs were concerned about this situation. General Bonesteel explained that at present US troops were at 70 percent of strength and the strength of the KATUSA were at 80 percent. It would take 8,500 additional men to bring his forces up to 90 percent of full strength and it would be most useful to effect such an increase in order to deal with the rear area security problem.³ Here too, he felt, balance of payments considerations were inhibiting DOD action. He had discussed the matter with Mr. Nitze who had reacted with expressions of concern about the high cost of maintaining US soldiers abroad. Finally, General Bonesteel said that his fundamental view was that we must build up our forces in the ROK now in order to withdraw them later on.

Evaluation of North Korean Intentions

14. General Bonesteel feels that the intelligence community has not evaluated North Korea on a totally integrated basis and strongly supports a new SNIE.⁴ He added that every time his staff has had a look at the North Korean situation, he has observed that the Russians are doing quite a bit more, notably assistance to North Korean airfields. He had also seen evidence that MIG–17’s were being changed to MIG–21’s.

15. General Bonesteel continues to be concerned about the overall military capability of North Korea. He is also concerned about the congestion at our airfields which makes it difficult to flush out our planes rapidly. According to his calculations all airfields in the ROK, except Taegu, could be reached by the enemy with only 7 minutes notice.⁵

Korean Production of M–16’s

16. General Bonesteel said that the Department of the Army Survey Team had been impressed by the ROK capability to produce M–16’s, that the Koreans could manufacture the rifle for $50 apiece compared to the US cost of about $130 apiece. A Defense Department loan of $40 to $60 million would, however, be necessary to finance a ROK facility. General Bonesteel felt that we should move rapidly on this project and noted that interest in helping the ROKs establish an arms production capability had been expressed by the Israelis.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8 US–KOR S. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Bardach.
2. Not further identified. In early 1969 Pak remarked to Bonesteel and Porter that “his warnings about ROK retaliation were ‘for political purposes.’” Pak stated that minor infiltrations helped “to keep ROK units on their toes,” but admitted that if several actions occurred simultaneously the “matter would become serious nuisance.” (Telegram 44 from Seoul, January 8, 1969; ibid., POL 23–7 KOR S) In a New Year’s statement appearing in the pro-government Kyonghyang Sinmun on January 4, however, the Prime Minister took a very hard line on the question of retaliation and emphasized his belief that the ROK should act against North Korean provocations. (Telegram 18 from Seoul, January 7, 1969; ibid.)
3. The Joint Chiefs requested an additional 8,500 troops for Korea in January, in February, and most recently in October. (Memorandum to McNamara, October 17; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370)
4. SNIE 14.2–69, “Confrontation in Korea,” January 30, 1969, concluded that North Korea did not intend to invade or to provoke major hostilities with South Korea or with the United States. The report maintained that during the next few years South Korea would prove an inhospitable environment for North Korea guerrilla bases and that the North would continue provocations against the South, thus risking retaliation by ROK forces that could potentially lead to the outbreak of general hostilities. The actions of and the situation in both North and South Korea could be influenced by the position of the major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China—as well as by a settlement of the Vietnam conflict. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 14.2–69)
5. In a Top Secret segment of this conversation Bonesteel “agreed that the present location of the nuclear weapons [in South Korea] could create a most serious situation.” But he advocated leaving the weapons in place to avoid sending “the North Koreans the wrong signal and [encouraging] them on new adventures.” (Memorandum of conversation, November 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–2, KOR S)