Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

276. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 30, 1959—8 p.m.

393, For Secretary and Wilcox from Wadsworth. Re: Laos. As arrangements were being made with SYG today, in accordance Deptel 297,² Hammarskjold sent me 5-page letter addressed to you on this very subject.³ In light of this, we have delayed complying with instructions pending your consideration of his letter and further word from Department. Letter being pouched Secretary tonight.

Feel it important to make certain comments on SYG’s text in hope these comments will facilitate consideration his ideas and any response thereto.

First, general comment re letter as whole: SYG makes legal argument and presents ultimate political proposal both of which in our view are fairly sound. However, he intersperses his legal argumentation and his political presentation with material which is obviously emotional and which seems to stem from preconceived ideas and prejudices, as well as misunderstanding of our position, basis for which it is difficult ascertain.

Hammarskjold gives impression that from outset our proposal to create subcomite whose establishment could avoid veto was basically sharp practice; that all along it was intended, under guise of procedural actions, to take substantive step whose real character would only gradually be revealed with passage of time. It is in this sense he refers to possibility subcomite coming up with report which is not clearcut. He seems to assume there is conspiracy to avoid having SC meet within reasonable time to consider it and somehow or other to slip into semipermanent establishment of UN presence in area by retention for indefinite time of subcomite. In this same sense he speaks of majority undermining UN by flouting rules. He refers to repeated assurances (by sponsors) this action was procedural as if it were really conceived to be substantive. He imputes such fears to Latin Americans and Afro-Asians in bottom their hearts.

Despite all this, SYG does, however, believe that, within carefully defined limits, action taken by SC under Art 29 even as modified, he states, by Art 24, is “formally correct”. He seeks emphasize procedural character of this action by injecting note of substance into new SC consideration which he feels would draw clear contrast with previous procedural phase. It is apparently for this reason that he proposes, upon receipt of a report not warranting drastic action but justifying continued UN presence, Council be convened, inscribe “question of Laos” on agenda “as substantive item” and seek adopt proposal establishing UN presence. SYG volunteers to try to sell such idea to Russians without hoping very much for success and in fact anticipating veto. He thinks vetoed res which is properly drafted will carry the day easily in GA in minimum period of time. Such action, he contends, would not detract from but actually consolidate value and validity of SC’s procedures on Labor Day.

SYG then gets to nub of what he regards as real problem, namely, difficulty of UN operation without clear lines of authority and directional responsibility, further weakened by fact it is committee rather than single individual. He would set up operation very similar to Spinelli mission in Amman. This would be clearly under his direction—he alleges he would be “useful buffer”—saying that, after all, real work has got to be done anyway by Secretariat which does not have direct authority. It is clear that SYG has in mind in this letter what we have understood from various sources he has had in mind for some time, namely, establishment of his personal representative not simply for Laos but for entire Southeast Asian area. This would be in line with his idea of having network of UN representation in danger spots of world.

In concluding paras SYG reiterates his willingness not to rush into creation of his type “UN presence”, nor prematurely end subcomite. In fact he willing see elements subcomite remain on between time of new SC consideration and arrival of new presence. In essence he is not so much in hurry to make some kind of change as he is anxious, within reasonable time, to get what he wants. His views on timing are not far from what we would suggest, i.e., in about month report comes to SC and we move into his type “UN presence.” His ultimate conclusion certainly is not too far from our position and indicates constructive movement on his part.

We believe SYG’s letter should be answered by Secretary weaving such of points from Depcirtel 387⁴ and Deptel 297 into it as possible but also emphatically setting forth basic US position regarding subcomite’s operations in order to remove what still seems to be considerable misunderstanding. If we can achieve latter objective, we should be able to get SYG to deal with practical problems of current subcomite operations realistically.

Wadsworth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–3059. Secret; Priority.
2. In telegram 297, September 29, the Department of State instructed the Mission in New York to encourage Hammarskjöld to leave some elements of the subcommittee behind in Laos; discourage his hope that the Soviet Union would agree to a Security Council decision establishing a U.N. presence in Laos; enlist his support in obtaining maximum assistance from the U.N. Secretariat staff for the subcommittee; and get him to discourage the staff from unduly restraining the subcommittee. (ibid., 751J.00/9–2959; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Letter from Hammarskjöld to Herter, September 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2959; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. In circular telegram 387, September 26, the Department of State provided appropriate posts with a brief summary of the U.S. attitude toward Laos U.N. subcommittee and subsequent U.N. action. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2659; included in the microfiche supplement)