263. Paper Prepared by the Assistant White House Staff Secretary (Eisenhower)1
SYNOPSIS OF STATE AND INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT
[Here follows information unrelated to Laos.]
Laos
Our Ambassador in Laos has considered it imperative to send U.S. observers to forward areas to confirm the gravity of the situation. He feels such action is necessary to provide maximum assurance that the serious steps now in process and contemplated are justified.2
State Department has informed Smith that they consider it unwise to risk sending U.S. observers into forward areas of Laos at this time. This is based primarily on the risk of capture. State further feels that the presence of U.S. observers might come to the attention of the UN and the press and compromise our whole position.3
The matter of appeal to SEATO is also a live issue. Pote Sarasin has informed us that no direct request has been given to the Thai government for intervention.4
Phoui has been convinced that he should defer an appeal to SEATO, according to Smith, but Phoui has informed us that the Crown Prince does not agree and wishes an appeal to be made at [Page 608] once.5 The USSR is of course in favor of reactivation of the ICC rather than dispatch of UN observers.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.↩
- Reported in telegrams 581 and 591 from Vientiane, both September 8. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–859; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Telegram 450 to Vientiane, September 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–859; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Reported in telegram 610 from Bangkok, September 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–559; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Reported in telegram 585 from Vientiane, September 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–859; included in the microfiche supplement)↩