Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

308. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs (Kohler) and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, February 10, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Approach to French on Algerian Negotiations

Discussion:

With the quelling of the French settler insurgency in Algiers, thought naturally turns to the search for possibilities of ending the Algerian war. It has occurred to us that we might consider approaching the French with a proposal as to means which we might be able to use, if they concurred in such a project, with the FLN to get them to the negotiating table with the French. It would of course be understood that we were not attempting to modify French policy on Algeria but merely to recommend strongly to the FLN through the various avenues of approach which we have that they should accept the De Gaulle September 16 proposal as a basis for entering into negotiations. We should avoid any “good offices” connotation and make clear to the French, and later to the FLN, that we are not in any way underwriting the outcome of such negotiations, offering any guarantees, etc. Our role would be exclusively introductory and merely to serve as a catalyst.

We believe now is a desirable time to make such a proposition to the French because it is far from the date of a U.N. session with its resultant pressures. Furthermore, De Gaulle, although beset with problems still as a result of the recent uprising in Algiers, nevertheless, has as free a hand as he will ever have. In addition there seems a need for some catalyst because the De Gaulle offer which we supported as a basis for ending the war, is over four months old. It is possible that the FLN regrets it did not accept the offer sooner but now certain conditions have been posed and moves made (i.e., the appointment of five inmates of French jails as the official “FLN negotiators”) which have greatly limited the FLN freedom of maneuver. The FLN doubtless needs some encouragement from a power such as the U.S. in order to move.

Therefore, we could propose to the French that they consider if they agree with us that it would be useful for us to approach the FLN with the recommendation that they should negotiate on the terms of the September 16 proposal. It could be mentioned that the alternatives seem potentially very bleak to us, especially in the U.N. It is conceivable the French Government would accept our thought but want some time to think it over, and formulate its next steps in the light of the ending of the uprising, the voting of decree powers, etc. This would be acceptable to us but we do not think we should wait too long because of the kinetic nature of the Algerian situation. Recent press reports of possible French thinking of a partition plan for example threaten to cause difficulty and make it harder for the FLN to begin negotiations.

If the French Government takes a favorable view of our proposed initiative, we envisage instructing our Ambassadors in Rabat and Tunis to approach King Mohamed V and President Bourguiba on the matter. The Ambassadors would be instructed to say that the U.S. Government is aware of their desire to see the Algerian conflict brought to an end on reasonable terms, that De Gaulle’s declaration of September 16 was in our view couched in such terms; and that the U.S. Government feels that the time has come when an effort should be made to convince the PAG to send emissaries to Paris for discussions. The Ambassadors would be instructed to express our hope that the Moroccan Sovereign and the Tunisian President would agree to bring their great influence to bear directly on the leaders of the MAG, perhaps in private audiences for that purpose or in any other way which might make it clear that the King of Morocco and the President of Tunisia attach great personal importance to such a decision by the PAG in the immediate future. The Ambassadors would also be instructed to add, for the confidential information of King Mohamed V and President Bourguiba that U.S. Government representatives will also approach the leadership of the PAG at about the same time and express similar views.

Our own approach to the PAG would be at a low level and through existing channels in Tunis, and possibly New York, though it would be particularly effective if Yazid could be called to the Department to hear our views in the matter. Even at such a level, an official U.S. viewpoint would command considerable attention among the PAG leaders, especially if it coincided with Moroccan and Tunisian pressures.

Recommendation:

That you call in Ambassador Alphand at your fairly early convenience and speak along the above lines to him.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2–1160. Secret. Drafted by Porter and McBride and sent to Merchant through S/S.
2. Merchant initialed his approval on February 11. The source text also bears Merchant’s handwritten notation: “But the time element makes it impossible to do myself before departure on leave. See my memo to S/S. LTM 2/11/60”. His February 11 memorandum to Calhoun endorsed Kohler’s and Satterthwaite’s suggestion and recommended that Herter or Dillon speak with Alphand. (Ibid.) Herter suggested to Alphand on February 16 that the United States contact the FLN through Tunisia or Morocco to suggest it begin negotiations with France. Alphand stated he doubted the Tunisian-Moroccan channels would be useful, but agreed to forward Herter’s inquiry to Paris. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 751S.00/2–1660) On March 11, Alphand informed Herter France would be happy to receive U.S. assistance, publicly or indirectly, toward an Algerian settlement. Herter replied the United States would avoid details and would merely state the FLN should enter into negotiations on the basis of De Gaulle’s September 16 proposals. (Telegram 3821 to Paris; ibid., 751S.00/3–1160)