425. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Herter) to the Secretary of State of a Meeting Held in New York, December 16, 19571
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Dag Hammarskjold on Monday evening, December 16, 1957
I met with Cabot Lodge and Dag Hammarskjold for dinner at the former’s residence primarily to get Mr. Hammarskjold’s reactions to his recent quick visit to Jordan and Israel,2 and likewise to ascertain if possible just what matters he planned to take up in Cairo on his forthcoming trip.3
During dinner Mr. Hammarskjold gave a very detailed account of his discussions with Rifai and King Hussein in Jordan and Ben Gurion and Mrs. Meir in Israel. He said that when he had first gone over on a hurried trip to try to adjust the Mt. Scopus difficulty he had had very little hope of success, but a determination that this somewhat minor issue had to be settled unless serious troubles were to break out in the Middle East. After hearing the Jordanian case, he had gone to Ben Gurion and Mrs. Meir and found them completely unaware of the explosive danger involved in the issue. However, he was able to persuade Ben Gurion that a compromise had to be reached and was successful in doing so only after pointing out in no uncertain terms that, without a compromise, action by Jordan was inevitable. The question of a convoy going to Mt. Scopus was finally adjusted by allowing it to include enough gasoline for one generator, and this specific amount would be permitted to be included in future convoys. The amount was just about half of what Israel had been insisting upon. …Hammarskjold expressed a hope that the sending of Mr. Urrutia to the area to endeavor to set up an agreed arrangement for the corridor and passage through the corridor might lead to resolution of this long unresolved problem in the near future.
Two comments made by Mr. Hammarskjold during his description of his negotiations are of particular interest: (1) that Rifai had indicated to him that Nasser should now be strengthened in his obvious [Page 858] desire to effect some reconciliation with the West; and (2) that Ben Gurion was an individual who could be talked to with respect to the whole Middle East picture since he knew what the score was . . . .
After dinner I asked Mr. Hammarskjold whether or not he planned to discuss Israeli-Arab relationships with Nasser on his forthcoming visit to Cairo. His answer was a categorical “no”. He stated that his visit was prompted largely by Fawzi and that he hoped to discuss Suez Canal settlements as well as the possibility of setting up some type of Arab Bank or Arab Middle East Development Corporation. While Hammarskjold appeared somewhat vague with regard to the latter possibility, it was nevertheless obvious that he was pinning great hopes on the organization of some kind of development fund under Arab or Arab League auspices. While his views were vague, I nevertheless gathered that what he had in mind was that the Arab Nations, particularly those with oil or mineral resources, would agree to pledge a portion of the proceeds of these resources to such a development fund which, in turn, might be able to capitalize this pledge in terms of some large loan from the World Bank or some international consortium. He likewise felt that the newly enlarged technical development fund of the U.N. could be drawn on for the necessary technical help in working out such a project.
With respect to the refugee problem, Hammarskjold stated that he was in complete agreement with Labouisse as well as Engen of Norway that the problem could not be resolved by referring to it as a refugee problem since the mere use of that phrase brought up insuperable political difficulties. He felt that only through a large economic development fund could the gradual absorption of these refugees be effected without bringing in the political implications that a settlement of the refugee problem was the principal reason for the establishment of such a fund.
I asked him specifically if he felt an Israeli offer of a return of some of the refugees to Israel as well as the payment for resettlement purposes would be helpful at this time. He stated that he did not think it would be helpful since he was certain that no Arab response was possible as of now to such an offer. However, he thought that it should continue to be explored so that when the proper time came Israel would be willing to do something effective. As he put it, this was a problem where both sides would have to take the first step at the same time, but that the moment had not yet arrived for this first step.
I got the strong impression from Hammarskjold that the U.N. machinery was the best adapted to work out an eventual settlement but that efforts for the present should be concentrated on two things: (1) sufficient funds to carry through UNRWA until I960, not alone to keep the refugees alive but also to allow Labouisse to continue his steady and slow progress in resettling or placing in gainful occupations [Page 859] some of the refugees, particularly in Jordan; and (2) the development fund mentioned above. With respect to that fund, Hammarskjold felt that Gene Black’s and Jack McCloy’s advice would be very helpful.
It was my impression from this conversation that Hammarskjold is strongly influenced by Fawzi and that the coming discussions with Nasser would indicate whether the latter is thinking in the same terms as Fawzi or not.
Hammarskjold said that he was most anxious to talk to you on his return and hoped that it could be arranged very quietly during the time that you are in New York around New Years.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2257. Secret. Drafted in Washington on December 22. Herter’s handwritten notes of his conversation with Hammarskjöld are attached to a copy of the memorandum in the Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Chron. File.↩
- During the first week of December, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld visited the Middle East in conjunction with the Israeli-Jordanian dispute over Mt. Scopus. While in the area, he visited Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.↩
- Hammarskjöld left New York on December 19 and, after a stop in his native Stockholm, visited with U.N. troops in the Gaza Strip December 23–25, and then stopped in Cairo and Paris before returning to New York on December 29.↩
- The source text also contains a postscript concerning Hammarskjöld’s actions in regard to Hungary, not printed.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩