419. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 5, 19571
SUBJECT
- Arab-Israel Dispute
PARTICIPANTS
- His Excellency Nuri Pasha al-Said, Iraqi Senator and Former Prime Minister
- Mr. Saleh Mahdi, Iraqi Chargé d’Affaires
- The Secretary
- NEA—William M. Rountree
- NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
- NE—David D. Newsom
Nuri Pasha recalled his meeting with the Secretary in Baghdad in 1953.2 He said that, at that time, they had discussed the Arab-Israel problem and had agreed that time and patience were required in approaching the problem. People in the Arab world, Nuri said, had been losing their patience over this matter and it was becoming each year more difficult to find a solution. Now, however, there was some hope since he understood that the NATO powers would actively seek a Middle Eastern settlement in their forthcoming meeting in Paris.
The Secretary expressed some surprise at this, stating that, as far as the United States was concerned, there were no plans to raise this issue at NATO. On the contrary, the Secretary said, he had real doubt as to whether it would be wise to do so. He said he would appreciate Nuri’s views on this.
Nuri replied that where one part of the world’s defense was weak, the whole was weakened. The Arab world is weakened by the continuation of the Arab-Israel dispute. It would, therefore, be logical for the NATO powers, concerned with defense against the Soviet Union, to consider what might be done to settle this issue.
The Secretary remarked that he did not believe the possibility of a settlement would be improved by a discussion in NATO. The result, he said, might be merely to bring more nations into the matter and to tie the hands of the United States.
Nuri stressed that Iraq was in the front line of defense against Communism and that the NATO powers should assist Iraq by seeking a settlement of the area’s principal problem. The Secretary replied that the United States wished to discuss such matters with Iraq and other states directly interested—not with nations in NATO not directly concerned. The United States is prepared to move forward on this matter [Page 842] and on the whole question of the current tensions in the Arab world, but it needs help. The Secretary stressed that Iraqi support for Jordan, for example, was particularly important.
Expressing agreement, Nuri commented that King Faisal and King Saud during their meeting in Riyadh3 were considering whether there could not be improved coordination between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq and, in turn, greater coordination between this group and the Baghdad Pact nations. It was important, however, for the United States to strengthen the prestige of these nations with the public. The only way, he said, to do this, is to help in settling the Palestine issue. The leaders of these nations, he said, are weak against the officers in Egypt and Syria. Given a Palestine settlement under the UN resolutions, however, the pro-Western nations would be strong and could shift public opinion to their side. Without a Palestine settlement, it will be very difficult to do so.
Referring to his talk with Ambassador Richards in April,4 Nuri said he had stressed that the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in 1946–47 had come up with a majority report by five of its members and a minority report by three.5 Neither report was adopted, he said, and the UN resolutions which followed have not been carried out. Ten years have passed since this and nothing has happened. Only the Russians benefit from this situation.
The attempt to maintain an arms balance, Nuri said, has been equally wrong. The West has attempted to balance 200,000,000 Arabs (sic)6 against 1,500,000 Jews and, meanwhile, Russia sends arms indiscriminately into the area. Is Ben Gurion to prevail at great harm to your friends?
Russia does not want a settlement of the Palestine issue, Nuri added, because, with a settlement, Russia loses one of her principal assets. Nasser doesn’t want a settlement because the Russians will not permit it. Nuri said he had written some time ago to President Quwwatli of Syria suggesting a move toward a settlement, but the “Red” officers around Quwwatli would not permit such a step.
The Secretary asked how Nuri would go about negotiating a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. Nuri replied that he would ask [Page 843] the UN to implement the resolutions of 1947.7 The Secretary commented that the UN could not merely attempt to implement these resolutions; there would have to be negotiations since there were new problems.
The only basis for negotiation, Nuri said, would be the resolutions of 1947. The Secretary pointed out that not all the Arab nations accepted the provisions of these resolutions; Egypt, for example, wanted a corridor across the Negev. Under the resolutions Israel would get control of the Jordan water. There were many things, he repeated, that required negotiation. He suggested that the end result might be something between the present armistice and the 1947 resolutions.
Nuri explained that there were two main aspects to the 1947 resolutions: the boundaries and the refugees. If the frontier is settled along the lines of the resolution, 70 per cent of the Arabs could return to their original homes in the territory allotted to the Arab state. When the Secretary commented that there was now no room for these people, Nuri replied that the armistice line was never intended to be a frontier. He said that President Truman had assured King Abdullah of Jordan on this point at the time of the armistice. Israel, he said, must make the gesture to return to the partition plan; otherwise Russia gains. A million refugees, he said, remain as a “mine” ready to go off and destroy the area.
The Secretary said that he and the President were prepared to go far to find a settlement to this issue, but one had to be realistic. It does not solve problems to create new ones. 500,000 Jewish people could not be driven into the sea. There must be some frontier adjustment and some refugee settlement, but there are now more refugees than left the area in 1947. The Secretary stressed that the clock could not be turned back.8
Nuri acknowledged that there were natural increases in the refugee population, but said that the refugees wanted only to return, with their families, to their old homes. The Arab states cannot absorb them, he said, because they will not go and will not accept citizenship of the other Arab countries.
[Page 844]Israel, Nuri emphasized, had to make the gesture of agreeing to negotiate on the basis of the resolutions in order to establish an atmosphere of peace. If all the sacrifice is to be on the Arab side, the problem cannot be solved. The Israelis are the newcomers; they should make the gesture toward peace.
Nuri stressed again that only Russia gained from the situation. If Russia should gain Syria and Egypt, he said, it would be a great price to pay for neglect of a small problem such as the refugees. If Israel were on Russia’s side and were lost, the results would be much less serious than the loss of these two strategic Arab states. Most Arabs today believe Russia and Nasser are going to save their country from Israel. The only way to reverse this would be by agreeing to negotiate on the basis of the resolutions. Adjustments could come, he said, after this basis for peace was laid.
The Secretary commented that he felt Nuri was oversimplifying the question; he stressed again that people who were now in territory originally allotted to the Arabs could not be thrown out.
Nuri repeated that the resolutions provided the only base on which to establish an atmosphere of peace. The Arabs, he said, could be deprived of their rights by force, but they would never give their friendship under such circumstances.
Mr. Rockwell asked if Nuri envisioned another Arab state in Palestine as the 1947 resolution had proposed. Nuri said he was prepared to take all the provisions of the resolutions, but added that the state might become part of Jordan.
To Mr. Rockwell’s suggestion that new resolutions might be needed, Nuri retorted that this was only because of Ben Gurion and the anti-Arab propaganda in the United States. He said that President Truman had assured King Abdullah that the armistice lines were only temporary and that the frontier would be finally established along the lines of the UN resolutions. The armistice, the President had said, was solely for the purpose of maintaining the peace and order.
The Secretary said he appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with Nuri and hoped to see him again before he left Washington.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–557. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.↩
- For documentation on Dulles’ trip to the Middle East, May 9–29, 1953, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.↩
- On December 3, King Faisal of Iraq had arrived in Riyadh for a 6-day visit with King Saud.↩
- Richards’ telegraphic reports of the conversations are not printed. (Telegrams 1660 and 1667, April 8 and 9, both from Baghdad; Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-857 and 120.1580/4–957, respectively)↩
- United Nations Special Committee on Palestine—Report to the General Assembly (U.N. doc. A/364).↩
- As on the source text.↩
- Reference is to the U.N. General Assembly resolution concerning the future Government of Palestine which provided for a plan of partition with economic union, adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. For text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Resolutions, 16 September-29 November 1947.↩
- In a November 28 letter to Eisenhower, King Saud commented that he had “no proposal other than return to the UN partition resolution of 1947–48, together with return to refugees of their homes and possessions and compensation for their losses in wealth and properties.” In a memorandum to Dulles, Eisenhower interpreted Saud’s letter as indicating that the King had one “simple” and “unrealistic solution to the Mid East problem” and that was the destruction of Israel. Ambassador Wadsworth, however, viewed Saud’s statement positively. (Despatch 74 from Dhahran, December 15; Department of State, Central Files, 648A.86/12–1557)↩