407. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
(Villard) to the Secretary of State1
Washington, November 21,
1957.
SUBJECT
- Palestine Refugee Problem
Discussion
As a result of my study of the Palestine refugee problem and in light of
conditions now prevailing in the Near East, I have come to the
conclusion that the IO–NEA recommendations of July 2, 1957 (Tab
IV) should be re-examined.2
I believe it is generally agreed that political developments in the area
have made it impractical at this time to attempt the direct solution of
the refugee question recommended in the IO–NEA memorandum. It does
not seem possible to predict when the time may be opportune to do so.
Meanwhile, we have to deal with the predicament of UNRWA and the fact that even the minimum
amount of funds for our contribution may not be forthcoming unless some
progress is made toward a refugee solution.
Basically, I feel that the refugee question represents an integral part
of an over-all Palestine settlement and that the one cannot be treated
separately from the other. I therefore welcome the possibility that the
Palestine issue may be explored with the Norwegians3
or another third party, such as Secretary-General Hammarskjold. The results would be
helpful in determining our approach to the specific problem of the
refugees.
While it does not appear advisable to make an all-out attempt to solve
the refugee problem until the climate is more favorable, I think we
should in the meanwhile do everything we can to melt down the mass of
refugees by encouraging the natural process of attrition which, for the
first time, has begun to be noticeable. This would involve the
implementation of part of the IO–NEA recommendations, directed primarily at
providing bilateral assistance to friendly host governments. It is the
purpose of the attached memorandum (Tab II)4 to analyze the present situation as I see it and to
suggest, as a start, the desirability of focusing our attention on
reducing the refugee camps in
[Page 808]
Jordan. This in itself will not produce a dramatic or overnight break in
the longstanding deadlock, but would help to promote the ultimate
liquidation of the problem without waiting for political negotiations or
compromise.
The memorandum was prepared after discussions with Mr. Harry
Labouisse, Director of UNRWA, with the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
and with Mr. Eric Johnston. It
must be added that Mr. Johnston
did not subscribe to the thesis that political conditions were
unfavorable for seeking a direct solution at this time. NEA, which has seen the memorandum, agrees
with the conclusion that present circumstances are unfavorable and that
the IO–NEA proposals would not succeed at the present time. NEA recommends that these proposals be held
in abeyance but that we should be alert for opportunities to put them
into operation. NEA also suggests that
as part of our effort to improve the present atmosphere, we should
encourage quiet exploration by other parties of the possibilities of
progress toward a Palestine settlement.5
I have also discussed this paper with IO,
which is submitting its comments separately (Tab III),6 and with Mr. Elbert Matthews of S/P, who is in general agreement with the
contents.
Recommendations
- 1.
- That the IO–NEA recommendations for a direct solution remain in
abeyance for the time being, but that the refugee problem be
explored with the Norwegians or other third parties in the context
of an overall Palestine settlement.
- 2.
- That consideration be given to implementing the IO-NEA
proposals in regard to UNRWA and
bilateral assistance programs (Tab I).7
- 3.
- That you call a meeting at a date convenient to yourself, attended
by IO and NEA, for further discussion of the problem in the light
of current political developments.
[Page 809]
[Tab II]
PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM
I
- 1.
- Political developments in the Middle East over the last few
months, beginning with the Syrian crisis, have prevented the
implementation of the IO–NEA recommendations of July 2, 1957
on the Palestine refugee problem. Those recommendations were
based on the assumption that conditions were favorable for
making a constructive move in regard to the refugees. It is now
generally believed that the contrary is the case and that it
would be a mistake to press for a solution to this delicate and
long-standing problem at the present time.
- 2.
- The IO–NEA recommendations were further based on the
assumption that the refugee question could best be solved by
isolating it from the main body of unresolved Palestine issues
and attacking it as a thing in itself. Public opinion, as well
as the sentiment of Congress and area leaders, was believed to
favor this position rather than inclusion of the refugee problem
in the context of a general Arab-Israeli settlement. However,
there seem to be no grounds for the belief that the former
approach offers more hope at present than the latter. In the
words of the Director of UNRWA, the refugee problem is “inextricably linked” to
the political background of the Palestine problem. Consideration
of the one without relation to the other is an
impracticability.
- 3.
- There have been indications recently that the time may be near
when it will be possible to undertake quiet explorations looking
toward a general Palestine settlement. The Secretary-General of
the United Nations has expressed his intention to survey the
situation with Fawzi of
Egypt. Charles Malik of
Lebanon is actively concerned with the problem. The interest of
Norway has been made clear. In each case, the importance of an
over-all settlement is recognized, although a separate approach
on the refugee aspect is not ruled out.
- 4.
- Despite regional rivalries which divide the Arabs, there is
complete unity among them on the question of the Palestine
refugees. While some Arab leaders may privately profess a desire
for the solution of this question, none would dare move openly
toward that end unless it were the policy of the Arab League to
do so. Cairo’s vicious campaign against Jordan on the subject is
a warning what to expect if one country should get out of line.
Again to quote the Director of UNRWA, the refugee problem represents for all the
Arab governments “a burning issue of internal and foreign
policy.” So far, there has been no indication that any Arab
country or group of countries would agree to a refugee
settlement in the absence of an over-all Palestine
solution.
- 5.
- Arab antagonism for Israel is, if anything, on the increase.
It is certainly not being weakened by the increased flow of arms
to Arab countries from abroad and by the military confidence
which this engenders among the Arabs. Furthermore, the Arab
sense of unity has been reinforced by the public reaction of
their governments to the question of communist activities in
Syria. In Arab eyes the spectre of Zionism is still the major
threat. An attempt to detach and solve the sensitive problem of
the refugees in this charged atmosphere, without reference to
such fundamental political factors as boundary adjustments and
Israel’s unrestricted immigration policy, would not seem to hold
much prospect of success.
- 6.
- Success of the IO–NEA plan depends on acceptance by
Israel of the principle of repatriation and the establishment of
an international loan to enable Israel to pay refugees opting
for compensation in lieu of repatriation. To date, there is
nothing to indicate that Israel would be willing to accommodate
itself to the Arab point of view represented by acceptance of
the repatriation principle. Unless Israel receives what it
considers to be an adequate quid pro quo, in the form of as yet
unspecified financial assistance from the United States, it will
in all probability decline to accept even a few thousand
refugees on a quota basis, the admission of which would have no
appreciable effect in reducing the total number of refugees in
the host countries.
- 7.
- The principle of repatriation, to be acceptable to the Arabs,
must be unconditional. Refugee sentiment, whipped up by
agitators, has hitherto been united and adamant on this score.
Owing to its current policy of unrestricted immigration, as well
as the financial difficulties besetting that country, it is
highly unlikely that Israel would agree to a repatriation plan
without limitations and safeguards which in turn would cause its
rejection by the Arabs. There is a danger that rejection of such
a plan by the Arabs might relieve Israel, in its view, of any
further responsibility, and the problem of resettling the
refugees would be no nearer solution. If the United States were
associated with a plan turned down by the Arabs, the United
States would be charged—at least in Cairo and Damascus—with
having been the author of a “Zionist imperialist plot.”
- 8.
- While there are a number of organizations which purport to
speak in their behalf, none can be said to represent the
refugees either officially or unofficially. The same is true of
the self-appointed personalities associated with the camps or
with the refugee body as a whole who seek to interpret refugee
attitudes and objectives. These so-called leaders have a stake
in the situation only because of the property or its equivalent
which they hope to recover from Israel. The Palestine
Conciliation Commission, which is engaged in evaluating the
property of all Arab refugees in Israel, estimates the total
value of such property at $460,000,000. The political pressures
in the refugee problem would
[Page 811]
tend to disappear if the principal
agitators were silenced by compensation for their losses and if
opportunities for permanent resettlement outside of Palestine
were provided for the rank and file of the rest.
- 9.
- Establishment of an international loan to enable Israel to pay
refugees opting for compensation has certain drawbacks. While it
is true that we have committed ourselves, in the Secretary’s
speech of August 1955, to a proposal of this nature, there is a
danger that such payments would be interpreted by those desiring
to exploit the situation as a fee to the refugees for the sale
of their birthright. Interminable haggling over any sum that
might be offered, whether to property owners or not, must also
be expected, especially since the refugees have no authorized
spokesman to negotiate in their collective behalf. To avoid such
difficulties it might be better to provide compensation, in the
form of economic aid, to those governments willing to resettle
refugees at so much per head. This in turn would have to be
handled with due regard for the inflationary aspects of large
amounts of money entering a given country at one time.
- 10.
- It is believed that not more than 50,000—or at most
100,000—refugees would be prepared actually to return to the
land of their birth if a plan of repatriation were agreed to by
Israel and accepted by the Arabs. The main problem of
resettlement would remain. A careful survey of the neighboring
territories where resettlement might be possible demonstrates
that only Iraq could absorb or provide employment for a
substantial number of refugees. It is unreasonable to suppose,
however, that Iraq would accept a mass transfer of Palestinians
unless the move were fully in line with Arab policy on the
Palestine question. Furthermore, Iraq has economic and social
problems of its own. Palestinians constitute an alien group, not
too popular with the indigenous population, whose introduction
into the country on a scale that might contribute substantially
to reduction of the refugee total would be a questionable matter
from the political standpoint. While an increasing number of
refugees can be absorbed in the normal fulfillment of economic
opportunities, a large-scale influx for settlement purposes
would be virtually impractical if for no other reason than that
strong opposition would be engendered to Palestinians taking up
traditional and jealously-held tribal lands.
- 11.
- Economic development projects, supported by the United States,
could help to drain off refugee labor and thus reduce the number
of unemployed. However, it is unrealistic to expect such schemes
to bear fruit if they are in any way associated in the Arab mind
with a “plan” or “proposal” for settlement of the refugee
problem. The most promising program for economic development in
the area is the Jordan River Project (the “Johnston Plan”), which would
provide for approximately 175,000 refugees or, in Mr. Johnston’s revised plan,
something over half that number. Because of its political
connotations,
[Page 812]
this
plan is regarded with such suspicion in the area at present that
it would be futile to attempt to put it into effect, at least
under the Johnston
label.
II
- 12.
- Out of a total of 933,556 refugees registered with UNRWA as of June 1957,8 more than
half, or 517,388 are in Jordan. A breakdown shows that 292,330
are fifteen years of age and over, 219,640 are children from one
to fifteen, and the remaining 5,418 are infants under one year.
These represent a total of 99,939 families. They enjoy Jordanian
citizenship and thus represent a politically important segment
of the population. The next largest group, numbering 221,058, is
in the Gaza Strip. Of the remainder, there are 102,586 refugees
in Lebanon and 92,524 in Syria. The figures do not take account
of several thousand Palestinians not on relief rolls who have
found refuge in Jordan and in other Arab countries.
- 13.
- Outside of Jordan, “automatic reintegration” has gone forward
to a considerable degree and may be expected to continue in
Lebanon, despite opposition to the settlement of Arab refugees
on the ground it would upset the delicate Christian–Moslem
balance. In Syria, the process of “automatic reintegration” has
already reached the point where international relief could be
withdrawn without appreciable personal hardship. Gaza presents a
special and difficult situation. The refugees here are without
the prospect of assimilation into the life of the country,
except to a most limited extent, and cannot expect assistance
from an indifferent government in Egypt. It is probable that the
Gaza refugees will have to depend primarily on relief operations
sponsored by the international community for some time to
come.
- 14.
- It is clear that Jordan, where the problem is greatest
numerically, constitutes the heart of the refugee question, and
that because of its serious economic and political aspects, a
solution is more urgent here than anywhere else. If,
irrespective of political arrangements that might be concluded
with Israel and the Arab governments at some future date, a
start could be made to provide permanent settlement and an
economic future for as many as possible of the 100,000 refugee
families now encamped within the Kingdom of Jordan, the whole
problem would receive an impetus toward eventual solution. This
could best be accomplished through bilateral agreements between
the United States and Jordan for a program of vocational
training and projects for self-support, as outlined in the
NEA–IO memorandum of July 2. Such a program would
provide a sound foundation for the gradual whittling down of the
mass of refugees and their absorption in the economy of Jordan
and other Arab countries. It should not, of
[Page 813]
course, be labeled a “plan” for a
refugee “settlement”, but represented as United States financial
assistance to enable Jordan to take over and to continue some of
the responsibilities which UNRWA, with its depleted finances, is no longer in
a position to discharge.
- 15.
- There is a steadily growing feeling among responsible
Jordanians … that resettlement of the refugees should not be
attempted by political negotiations but by gradually melting the
refugee concentrations away. Foreign Minister Samir Rifai is convinced that
a conference table approach would be doomed to failure. Rifai is
known to be privately concerned over the large camps in the
immediate vicinity of political centers like Amman and Zorka,
and to favor breaking them down into smaller units which might
facilitate integration of the refugees into the community life
of scattered towns and villages. Likewise, he feels that
relocating some of the refugees in Jordan would not only help to
diminish political opposition to the idea of resettlement but,
by converting idle refugees into productive citizens, would
benefit the Jordanian economy.
- 16.
Encouragement is lent to the economic, rather than the
political, approach to the refugee problem by a significant
change in the attitude of the refugees themselves. Hitherto,
most of them have been opposed to self-support projects
because these have been linked in the refugee mind with
permanent resettlement and the abandonment of hopes of
repatriation. This year the Director of UNRWA reports for the first
time a desire on the part of the refugees for self-support
and rehabilitation, looking toward an improvement in their
conditions of life and prospects for the future. The 1957
UNRWA Report states
that:
“This shift is noticeable not only in the increased
demands for assistance in individual self-support
projects, but also in the substantial rise in
interest in vocational training of all types, and
even in the frequent requests for more and better
housing.”
This trend has been consciously under-played
in the Report, because of the Director’s feeling that to
emphasize such a development might have political
consequences. It has, however, been noted by other qualified
observers who see the possibility that some of the refugees
are beginning to be reconciled to the permanent loss of
their homes in Palestine. This is particularly true of the
younger element who remember few ties with the mother
country, who are increasingly impatient with their present
static lot, and who in many instances have emphasized their
preference for rehabilitation instead of relief.
- 17.
- Through its individual grants program (agriculture, commercial
and industrial), UNRWA has
rehabilitated 5,400 refugees in Jordan at a cost of
approximately $400 per person. When this activity, which only
began in 1955, was suspended owing to lack of funds it had a
backlog of 1,600 applicants, each representing a family, all
members of
[Page 814]
which would
have benefited from the grant and become self-supporting. (In
Syria 1,800 refugees were rehabilitated.) Moreover, hundreds of
additional applications continued to pour in afterwards. A
modest program of this type must be regarded as offset by the
number of births among refugee families each year, but it
indicates one of the paths to resettlement and rehabilitation on
a larger scale if facilities were expanded and if adequate funds
were provided through bilateral assistance programs.
- 18.
- The UNRWA report suggests
other ways in which the refugee problem may, with proper
assistance, tend ultimately to solve itself. As a result of
increased demands from governments and private industry, many
refugees have been able to find jobs in the expanding economy of
the Middle East; some have been assisted in emigrating to the
United States or elsewhere. As an indication of the training
provided for them in Middle East institutions, scholarships have
been awarded in agriculture, arts, commerce, dentistry,
education, engineering, medicine, pharmacy, science and
veterinary. The services of refugee school teachers have been
widely requested. Existing facilities for vocational training
have been quite inadequate to cope with the growing demand for
trained personnel in the host countries as well as in the
neighboring Arab states. There seems to be no reason why an
expanded and adequately financed program for vocational training
could not, in time, settle in permanent homes a considerable
number of refugees outside the old borders of Palestine. In
addition, there are, of course, the approximately 5,000 refugees
who find their way into the labor market of Iraq each year. This
drift may be expected to continue, whether the refugees have
special qualifications or not.
III
- 19.
- Assuming that political conditions do not now permit a direct
attack on the refugee problem, and pending consideration of the
problem in the context of an over-all Palestine settlement,
there seem to be several things we could do in the face of the
urgent situation presented by UNRWA’s shortage of funds and its approaching
expiration date in 1960. While it does not appear practicable to
put the NEA–IO proposals into effect at this
time, this does not mean they should be discarded in their
entirety. The recommendations regarding UNRWA and the furnishing of
bilateral assistance to friendly Arab governments (Tab B)9 still appear
valid and should receive early consideration regardless of
political circumstances in the area. In addition, the following
steps could be explored:
[Page 815]
- (a)
- Maximum utilization of UNRWA as a holding operation until 1960.
Study of its possible continuance after that date, or
its possible replacement by an agency—whether or not
under United Nations auspices—primarily designed to
assist the refugees in finding an economic
future.
- (b)
- Promotion through bilateral agreements, the United
Nations, or Middle East development schemes of economic
projects that might attract refugee labor in Jordan,
Lebanon or other Arab countries. Such opportunities
should be advertised as open to all workers, not
specifically to refugees, though the refugee camps might
be notified on a priority basis. There should be no
political implications in such arrangements.
- (c)
- Utilization of the of Title III of Public Law 480,
providing for donations of farm products to non-profit
voluntary agencies for use overseas. The full
possibilities of this section of the law do not seem to
have been taken into account in connection with the
Palestine refugees.
- (d)
- Consultation with United Nations officials on the
possibility of establishing in Gaza, upon the
termination of UNRWA,
a form of trusteeship administered by the United Nations
which would supervise or direct rehabilitation of the
refugees. Egypt might be persuaded to acquiesce in this
arrangement upon realization that the problem of the
Gaza refugees will be on its doorstep when UNRWA ends.
- (e)
- All-out encouragement of private organizations and of
those philanthropic agencies already active in the area
to provide funds and services for rehabilitation
purposes.
- (f)
- An approach to some of the smaller countries which
have manifested an interest in solution of the problem,
with a view to obtaining grants or loans on humanitarian
grounds. The Director of UNRWA has suggested Switzerland as an
example.
- (g)
- Emphasizing to the host governments on every suitable
occasion, through diplomatic channels, the
responsibilities with which they will be faced on the
expiration date of UNRWA and the need for early planning on
their part.
- 20.
- Obviously, it will be necessary to discuss with Congress the
question of funds for the implementation of any future program
for the refugees. This would be true whether we were to ask for
funds to participate in an international loan to Israel for the
purpose of paying compensation to the refugees, to raise our
contribution to UNRWA above
the 70 percent limit as an emergency measure, to finance
economic development projects or to support bilateral assistance
agreements designed to make the refugees self-supporting. Our
specific objective in this instance should be to remove from the
relief rolls as many refugees as possible, particularly in
Jordan. This would not only reduce the proportions of the
problem as a whole over the course of time but would help Jordan
to survive politically and economically. The initial approach
could be made in confidence to selected Congressional leaders,
in order to examine the realities of the situation and its
long-term implications.
- 21.
- While the immediate results to be achieved by economic means
might not be spectacular, this plan of attack coincides
generally with ideas recently put forward by Secretary-General
Hammarskjold, by the
French membership in NATO, and
by Foreign Minister Pella
of Italy. Until the atmosphere for an over-all Palestine
settlement is considered favorable, an attempt to break the back
of the refugee problem by direct political negotiations courts
the risk of failure and the identification of the United States
with that failure. On the other hand, an attempt now to
encourage the process of attrition by establishing the refugees
where they are could serve the ultimate aim of liquidating the
camp concentrations as a source of danger and friction in the
Near East. The main emphasis in such a course of action should
be on the scrupulous avoidance of any semblance of a political
arrangement, the very mention of which might well defeat the
attainment of the objective.
