395. National Intelligence Estimate1
NIE 36.1–57
THE OUTLOOK FOR EGYPT AND THE NASSER REGIME
The Problem
To estimate: (a) the changes in Egypt’s position since the Suez crisis; (b) the chances for survival of the Nasser government; and (c) probable future developments in Egypt’s internal situation, and its regional and international position.
Summary
- 1.
- Nasser has achieved a position of virtually unchallenged authority in Egypt. Foreign policy and events have served both as a distraction and an excuse for the regime’s failures to fulfill its promises of social and economic reform. Although it is almost certain that the regime will be unable to make appreciable progress in solving Egypt’s staggering economic problems, it is unlikely that the regime will be overthrown in the next few years.
- 2.
- Nasser has wide popular support throughout the Arab world as the symbol of the resistance of radical Pan-Arab nationalism to Israel and to Western “imperialism.” This enables him to exert heavy pressures upon the conservative Arab governments through their own peoples. Nasser, however, may be concerned that the role of the Soviets in Syria and the independent policy of the Syrian government will prejudice his position as leader of the Arab world. It is almost certain that Nasser will not acquiesce in an over-all settlement which Israel would be willing to accept. On the other hand, he is unlikely during the next year or so deliberately to initiate a war with Israel.
- 3.
- Nasser’s position has been strengthened and his objectives have been advanced by his association with the Soviet Bloc. Nevertheless, he has stopped short of political alliance and, although he has accepted heavy economic obligations, he has sought to offset economic dependence upon the Bloc with revived and increased trade relations with Western and other Free World states. However, Egypt is likely to become more dependent upon the Bloc over the next few years if the demand for Egyptian cotton in the non-Communist world continues to be low. Egypt’s determination to maintain access to a source of arms which would be open in the event of war with Israel will also tie it to the Bloc. Furthermore, political and psychological pressures favor closer relations with the Bloc because it appears to be championing the Arab point of view.
- 4.
- Nasser is convinced that the US desires his downfall. He believes that the US hopes to combat Soviet influence and advance its own interests by exercising dominant influence over the area states and that it is unlikely to accept and deal with him as a neutral. Nasser may hint of a desire for US moves toward reconciliation, but he is likely to concentrate on improving relations with other Free World and neutral states. However, he is unlikely to make any significant changes in his neutralist policy in order to improve relations with the US or other Free World states.
[Here follows a detailed eight-page discussion of the points in the summary. The discussion is divided into three major subdivisions: Egypt’s internal affairs, its armed forces, and its external relations.]
Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret.
According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 12, 1957. “Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the LAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.”
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