Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

391. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 31, 1957¹

Washington, October 31, 1957

SUBJECT

• Israel’s Need for Security Guarantees

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Yaacov Herzog, Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy of Israel
• Mr. Stuart Rockwell, NE
• Miss Elizabeth A. Brown, UNP

At the outset the Secretary expressed his personal shock and regret at the bomb incident in the Israeli Parliament and gratification that members of the Government, including the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, had escaped serious injury. Ambassador Eban replied that the Prime Minister wished him to convey Israel’s appreciation to both the President and the Secretary for their messages on this matter.

Ambassador Eban presented a letter from Prime Minister Ben-Gurion replying to the Secretary’s letter of October 23.² After reading the letter the Secretary commented it was a very interesting, important communication.

The Ambassador then turned to the specific matters covered in the correspondence.

Referring to the tree planting, he remarked that Jordan had made a “great fuss about nothing” and was not really entitled to request suspension. The United Nations representative, Colonel Leary, he said, supported the Israeli position on many points of principle but did suggest a two month suspension.³ The Prime Minister had informed Mr. Baxter⁴ that, in line with the Leary report, Israel was disposed to suspend the tree planting until the end of November and would perhaps be willing to extend the period to the middle of December. However, Ambassador Eban emphasized that it was a deliberate, voluntary suspension without prejudice to Israel’s basic rights.

The Ambassador continued that Israel would accept the Jordanian proposal on Mount Scopus if Jordan, for its part, would carry out its obligations under the 1948 agreement and Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement. The Prime Minister expected to see Colonel Leary within the next few days to discuss this matter further.

Next Ambassador Eban referred to the airplane incident, on which Israel was awaiting the report of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Prime Minister had informed Mr. Baxter that every effort would be made to avoid a repetition of such incidents. The Secretary inquired whether the fact of over-flight of Israel had been established. The Ambassador replied that this was Israel’s contention, which it believed the MAC report would elucidate. In fact, the plane had circled for twenty minutes over Israeli territory.

The Ambassador turned to three specific conclusions in the Prime Minister’s letter. Israel believed the Soviet Union had encountered a setback in the U.N. debate on Syria, even among the Arab States who were somewhat embarrassed by the effects of the Soviet embrace. The way the Soviet campaign had subsided was also noteworthy. While this tactical development was favorable, it did not of course affect the circumstances of continued Soviet penetration of the Middle East.

The most urgent matter, the Ambassador said, was the necessity for achieving greater precision in warning the Soviet Union against the danger of any attack on Israel. Despite their tactical setback in the United Nations the Soviets clearly intended to continue to seek the support of Arab nationalists. While it was difficult to unite the Arab world against Turkey, a Moslem state, it might well be easier to unite it in a similar war of nerves against Israel. In this connection, he noted Gromyko’s marginal remarks on Israel which might in the future become more central to the Soviet campaign. A specific U.S. warning to the Soviet Union was particularly important for Israel, which was without formal contracts for mutual defense with other states.

The Secretary asked whether Israel was really concerned over the possibility of a Soviet attack. Ambassador Eban replied that Soviet statements, plus its arming of Syria and Egypt, plus rocket rattling, made his Government believe that a danger existed, at least to the same extent as any danger to Turkey existed. He referred also to a previous comment of the Secretary in an earlier conversation that there was danger of Soviet-inspired frontier provocation of Israel. The Secretary responded that he believed he had said danger might come from an effort to unite the Arab world by a sort of feint against Israel to draw it into attacking Syria. However, he gathered the Ambassador had been speaking of the Soviet Union itself. The Ambassador replied affirmatively, saying he had in mind a direct attack by air or by inciting Syria to attack Israel. Either could produce far graver consequences in what would otherwise be a local conflict.

Returning to the subject of a security guarantee, the Ambassador observed that general statements previously made by the United States might be said to cover Israel fully. Israel was of course aware of United States policy regarding support for Israel and for Israeli independence. All that having been said, however, there was now a new context, having regard to the tactical objectives of the Soviet Union and the impulsive character of Mr. Khrushchev borne out by the current hysteria regarding Turkey. That door should also be closed. He expressed the hope that the United States could find a suitable occasion to make a public statement to the effect that if Israel were attacked there would be immediate American reaction. He recognized that such a statement could only be made in appropriate circumstances. Consequently, until such time as there was a clear context to justify such a statement, his Government wondered whether through diplomatic channels the United States could not inform the Soviet Union that an attack by it on Israel would involve immediate American reaction under existing commitments. Such action would be most reassuring. The context for the other type of statement would have to be looked for in the future. He referred to what the Under Secretary had told him concerning the Secretary’s conversation with Gromyko, which had also been helpful in this regard.

The Ambassador referred next to Israel’s extreme vulnerability to submarine blockade, emphasizing that no other country in the world had more fragile communications lines. Turkey had informed his Government that Latakia⁵ was being transformed into a formidable submarine base. In these circumstances, Israel needed means to protect its commercial and naval communications. It was also extremely vulnerable to aerial attack. There were both financial and defensive aspects to both matters which assumed increased importance in the light of Soviet irresponsibility in arming Egypt and Syria.

Ambassador Eban referred finally to NATO’s preoccupation with defense, observing that by its concentration on Europe, NATO was becoming a kind of Maginot Line since its strength could be rendered nugatory in the event the Middle East was overrun by communism. In Israel’s view Europe and the Middle East must be considered together. It believed that the NATO commitment should be extended to the Middle East. His government had some more concrete ideas on this matter which would be put in writing. Meantime, it wished to urge the need for a Western policy for the defense and protection of the Middle East against communist domination. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion especially wished to know whether the United States regarded this subject as one of growing urgency.

The Secretary began by saying that the tree-planting, Mount Scopus, and plane over-flight involved technical aspects on which he was not sufficiently informed to comment on what the Ambassador had said other than to make certain general observations. This was a time when the Soviets were attempting to capitalize as much as they could on the close relations that exist between Israel and the United States, and on the support which in one form or another is received from both government and private sources here. At a time when the Soviets were attempting to make these facts seem to the Arabs to be their great danger, coupled with general Soviet policy, he was concerned that Israel should be proceeding with the policy of accepting all the Jews who wished to come to Israel. This might well create an explosive situation. The point to be remembered was that this was a time when the Soviets, in order to create a smoke-screen, were trying in every way possible to make the danger from Israel seem the most important and to arouse the Arab states against that danger.

The Secretary added that of course the Ambassador and he both knew that the Soviet Union was the real danger to the area. However, when he talked, as he had done recently, with important Arab leaders and sought to emphasize this point, they replied that perhaps communism was a danger but it was remote, and the real danger was Israel in their midst. They had drawn an analogy to the effect that if a dangerous gunman was in the room with you, that was a more immediate worry than what might be happening farther away in Moscow.

At the same time, the Secretary continued, we were going through a period where the Arab states were gradually becoming educated to the fact that the Soviets, operating through communist parties, subversion and infiltration, were a real present danger in the area. What had happened in Syria, unhappy as it was, had at least served to bring to many important Arabs a realization that what we had been saying was not false but a real present danger. The way in which the Soviets had dictated to Syria and the way Gromyko had pounded the table in dealing with the Arabs in New York had clearly created a bad impression. At the end of this period there might be increased feeling in influential Arab quarters that Soviet communism presents more of a danger to the Arab world than Israel, which would be a desirable outcome if not at too great a price.

The Secretary therefore wished to suggest to the Israeli Government that during this period when we were trying to allay Arab fears about Israel and drive home to the Arabs the realization that the real danger comes from the Soviet Union, Israel should try hard, as he thought it was doing, to avoid any actions tending to revive Arab fears of Israel or bringing the Arab-Israeli problem to the forefront. We wished the Arabs to forget the problem of Israel. If this eventuated, we might be able to turn things around in a way to our mutual advantage. The Secretary hoped strongly Israel would take into account the new formative development in the area, namely recognition that the Soviet Union is really the force to be feared rather than Israel. If that sentiment took hold in the Arab world, its significance would be tremendous.

Our great problem, the Secretary said, was that we were tagged as supporters of Israel and Zionism, while the Soviet Union claimed to be against them. This was a liability for us to carry in the Arab world. The way to escape it was to make the Arabs see that the Soviet Union was a greater danger than Israel.

The Ambassador replied that he thought his Government would be congenial to this general approach, noting that recent Israeli activities, including agreement to suspension of tree-planting, fortified this. He commented also on Israel’s general policy of non-involvement, emphasizing that in the U.N. debate on Syria the Israeli Delegation had not answered provocative charges in the hope that the debate would foster this new understanding. Moreover, Israel was vigilant to maintain tranquillity on its frontiers.

The Secretary said that efforts would be made by others to try to prevent Israel from following through in this way. The going would be tough, especially if the Soviets pushed the Syrians into provocative activity along the Israeli border. Ambassador Eban interjected that additional U.N. observers were helpful in this regard. The Secretary agreed that the more Israel could get U.N. officers to protect it, the better off we would all be. The Ambassador said Israel did need help when the other side became most provocative and referred to Egypt’s holding of an Israeli fishing vessel the past six weeks. He expressed the hope that the United States would also use its influence on others to keep such things from erupting. The Secretary assured him that we would do so.

The Ambassador referred to the Secretary’s view that immigration equalled expansion, which in Israel’s view was not well-founded. He promised to submit a note on the matter. The Secretary responded that we would very much like reassurance on this point.

The Secretary informed the Ambassador that we would consider whether, perhaps through diplomatic channels, we could make our concern known to the Soviet Union. As for air and submarine defenses, he had never really seen how Israel could expect to develop adequate air defenses to protect against a well-planned strike; he just did not think there was any way. He noted that at the National Security Council this morning there had been discussion of some of our own problems in this regard; it got down to the question of minutes even here where enemy planes would have to traverse thousands of miles. The geographical situation of Israel was such that it was going to have to depend largely upon the security it might obtain from the consequences of an attack upon it. In this connection he referred to the Eisenhower-Macmillan communiqué⁶ which underscored the impossibility of any nation achieving security by itself. This concept of interdependence applied to a very great degree to Israel. He hoped that Israel would not find it necessary to expend a great deal of its resources on military efforts which to some extent would be futile.

Ambassador Eban replied that Israel’s security concern was to maintain a prudent level of national arms to provide capability to respond in the first instance to any attack. The Secretary said of course no country should be totally denuded of defensive ability. It was virtually a sine qua non for people to be willing to fight for themselves; for example, Denmark’s take-over by the Nazis without resistance had a marked effect upon international support for that country. He was not suggesting total demilitarization but rather, in George Washington’s words, “a respectable defensive posture.”

Ambassador Eban rejoined that the United States rested largely on its retaliatory power. The Secretary observed, however, that retaliatory power against an enemy set to attack you first might not be enough. He continued that we were thinking a lot about the question of interdependence. The first move to develop our thinking would be the NATO December meeting. He did not want to build exaggerated hopes or expectations, but out of the new thinking something more might emerge.

The Secretary drew the Ambassador’s attention to the following language in the Eisenhower-Macmillan communiqué: “All members of this community, and other friendly nations which so desire, should possess more knowledge of the total capabilities of security that are in being and in prospect. There should also be provided greater opportunity to assure that this power will in fact be available in case of need for their common security, and that it will not be misused by any nation for purposes other than individual and collective self-defense, as authorized by the Charter of the United Nations.” Ambassador Eban said that his Government had noted this passage as significant.

The Secretary continued that he did not regard our security treaties as treaties of alliance at all. What we were trying to do was to advance the society of nations, or that part of it which is friendly, toward the kind of collective defense system which nations have domestically. He had tried as far as he could to impart that character to these arrangements and to build toward a system developing capability for the defense of all against any attack and of protection against its abuse. If the world could move forward in that direction, even though down a fairly long road, everybody would benefit. This was a sound philosophy, in his judgment, applicable to present circumstances.

Ambassador Eban said this philosophy was very relevant to his country. If Israel knew there were plans of other organizations and powers, it would have a great effect; it would not then aspire to reach military autarchy. The more Israel knew about concrete plans to resist aggression, the more its arms problem would fade, and in time arms might even lose their obsession for the Arabs. The Secretary commented that the Arabs loved arms, just as, once, crowns and diadems were treasured by kings and queens.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A/10–3157. Secret. Drafted by Brown.
2. Ben Gurion’s letter to Dulles, October 31, is not printed. (Ibid., 784A.00/10–3157) Dulles’ message to Ben Gurion, October 23, is Document 388.
3. Reference is to Leary’s report of September 23; see Document 369.
4. Baxter transmitted a report on the conversation in telegram 408 from Tel Aviv, October 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/10–2957)
5. A seaport in northwest Syria.
6. Reference is to the “Declaration of Common Purpose” released upon the conclusion of Macmillan’s visit to Washington on October 25; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1957, pp. 739–741. Documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.