Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

292. Memorandum for the Record by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)¹

Washington, April 19, 1957.

SUBJ

• Conversation held between the Secretary of State (Dulles), the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), the Assistant Secretary of State for NEA (Mr. William M. Rountree), and myself on the general subject of the activities of the U.S. naval patrol in the Red Sea

1. For background in this memorandum, I wish to note that since about the middle of February of this year two of the four destroyers of the Navy’s Middle East Force have been operating in the Red Sea for surveillance of shipping and to otherwise show the flag. They have based on Massawa and have not utilized ports in the northern section of the Red Sea. The northern limit of the patrol was established as Latitude 29, and although I do not believe specific orders were given with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba, I believe they have not traversed the Straits of Tiran within the past two months.

2. About two or three weeks ago, the U.S. flag oil tanker Kern Hills, under charter to the Israeli Government, entered the Gulf of Aqaba through the Straits of Tiran and discharged a cargo of oil at the port of Elath. At the time of her arrival, the Israeli Government gave considerable publicity to the effect that the SSKern Hills had passed a U.S. destroyer in the Red Sea and that the destroyer wished them “good luck”. The very evident desire of the Israeli Government in putting out this publicity was to indicate that the United States Government, if not officially taking cognizance of the activities of the Kern Hills, was unofficially keeping an eye on this ship. The world at large might generally assume from this incident that the U.S. Navy was prepared to back up official United States Government statements, made at the time of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Sharm El Sheikh, that we (US) regarded the Gulf of Aqaba as international waters.

3. This conference with the Secretary of State on the subject of the activities of this naval patrol in the Red Sea was brought about by my desire to make certain that the Secretary of State understood fully what the patrol was doing and what the U.S. Navy assumed its responsibilities to be. The Navy feels they should at least be ready to save American lives in case of an incident during the next passage of the SSKern Hills or other American flag vessels through the Straits of Tiran. It was not clear to me just what the State Department’s desires were in this regard so this conference was held.

4. After I had outlined the present orders to the Red Sea Patrol, Secretary Dulles stated that he felt that the northern limits of the patrol should be established as approximately 100 miles south of the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, and I was instructed by Mr. Wilson to so inform the Chief of Naval Operations. I asked the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense if I could confer with Admiral Burke before issuing such orders because I was of the opinion that perhaps it would be better to withdraw the patrol completely from the Red Sea. In my opinion, to establish such a northern limit might later result in the accusation that this arbitrary northern limit prevented the U.S. Navy from protecting American shipping using the Straits of Tiran. The Secretary of State said he would have no objection to withdrawing the Red Sea Patrol completely, and I told him I would discuss that possible action with Admiral Burke.

5. It was quite evident from the discussion with the Secretary of State that in so far as he is concerned, it is not desired at this time to escort or otherwise protect American flag merchant vessels who proceed into the Gulf of Aqaba. It is apparently the intention of the State Department to protest to the UN any interference with the right of this passage. I felt, and so informed the Secretary of State, that the owners of American flag shipping should be informed to that effect, but he did not feel that this was necessary.

6. Upon my return to the Pentagon, I talked to Admiral Burke and told him in general of the conference as outlined above. I told him, at Mr. Wilson’s direction, to issue orders withdrawing the Red Sea Patrol. He will prepare for my information a study which will indicate what, if any, statutory responsibilities the Navy has in regard to the protection of U.S. shipping on the high seas. It is my impression that there are laws which require the United States Government to extend protection to U.S. flag merchant vessels if they so request and it is feasible for the Navy to give that protection.

1. Source: Radford Papers, Memos for the Record.