284. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
3213. Reference Embassy telegram 3204.2 … Nasser feels has made maximum concession and believes that, if US serious in negotiations, agreement can be worked out on basis April 10th talks. After meeting Fawzi is reported to have told Nasser that latter had gone further than he expected and that “now we are going to get somewhere”… . Nasser unwilling put into declaration any mention of outside technical advisors but intends ask General Wheeler to form team of 3 or 4 experts who will be given 5 or 10 year contract.
My own estimate is that, whereas some of concessions made by Fawzi were regarded by GOE as going considerably beyond mere drafting changes, his role had been largely one of presenting as convincingly as possible reasons why GOE found itself unable to accept our specific suggestions reference 6 principles, user organization and adherence but at same time not to close door to alternative suggestions. Impression was given however that GOE had no new ideas to put forward and that they relied on persuasiveness of their arguments to convince US either to accept their position or to suggest compromise.
This, in fact, was mood in which conversation with Nasser began. For instance when, at outset of talk, I mentioned failure find common ground with Fawzi on 3 main issues, he recalled he had indicated in our conversation on April 3rd this would be probable outcome. However, as conversation developed there was noticeable change in his attitude and I believe he felt we went quite far in suggesting alternatives reference 6 principles and user organization, was also hopeful that purported arrangement with Hammarskjold would solve problem of legal status of declaration. In circumstances, my impression is that Nasser feels he has made effort to be a good boy (this metaphor deliberate because dealing with him does have “dead-end kid” overtones), and I feel that, in any action we may contemplate taking, we should bear this in mind.
Specifically, I would suggest (as indeed I understand is thought of Department) that in event of reference to Security Council we would take note of disposition of GOE to discuss problem frankly and thoroughly; of actual progress made in improving draft declaration; and of possibility of further improvement. To take contrary condemnatory line would probably only result in loss of such modest gains as attained [Page 542] and block way to tenable negotiated agreement. If this course adopted, hard line would be reserved for use in event that moderate approach fails.
With reference proposed submission this matter to S.C., I do not wish seem be back-seat driving but wonder if thought may have been given to cutting off our bilateral conversations at early stage and suggesting that Hammarskjold carry on from where we leave off in same way we carried on from where he left off. I may be very wrong but somehow I have impression that we are gradually getting back to something approaching situation of mid-October last year and that, difficult as canal problem is, there is glimmer of hope for settlement. Unfortunately, there are also other similarities to October situation in form of rumors of resort to force but difficult determine from here whether these actually have foundation; reference present case of April jitters; or constitute war of nerves.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1257. Secret. Received at 3:23 p.m., April 13.↩
- Document 281.↩