Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

252. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 28, 1957—5 p.m.

691. Re Hammarskjold-Nasser discussions.² This morning I had an hour and a half meeting with Hammarskjold immediately upon his return from Egypt.³ A summary of his comment follows (documents which he gave me in the course of his account are included in subsequent separate telegrams):

To some extent he had taken a new road in his conversations with Nasser and Fawzi in that he had accepted nothing, but had negotiated as an ambassador would up to what he considered the maximum result obtainable by his efforts at this time, reserving approval of these results to governments. “Nothing is agreed with me on Gaza or the Suez”, he said.

1. Gaza.

With respect to Gaza, he said that he had proceeded on the basis of his conviction that it was necessary to get away from talking about general principles and get down to hard facts. He had told General Burns that he should write out everything that Burns, as the commander, felt he needed to put a stop to infiltration and to maintain order. He had told Burns not to talk about principles at all but about practical arrangements and that he would transmit his requests to the Egyptians and to the Advisory Committee. This Burns had done and the Egyptians had accepted Burns’ paper and agreed to his requests, although without signing it. The paper did in fact represent an agreement with Egypt (Burns’ memorandum as accepted by Egypt contained in immediately following telegram, mytel 692).⁴Hammarskjold emphasized again, however, that this did not represent an agreement with him and that it was his intention to put it before the Advisory Committee.

The Egyptians had made definite undertaking in their discussions with him that no Egyptian troops would move into Gaza. He said that the Egyptians regarded this as a moral commitment to the SYG, and it was agreeable to the Egyptians that he should use it as such with Israel and in his discussions with the U.S.

Egypt had not made deployment of UNEF on Israel’s side of the armistice lines a condition to their agreements on UNEF’s functions or to the continuance of UNEF in Gaza, with one exception. That exception was that UNEF’s right to shoot Egyptians crossing the armistice lines must be made conditional on a similar right to shoot Israelis. This point related to paragraph 5 of the Burns-Egyptian memorandum. Egypt was agreeable to UNEF’s having the authority to fire at infiltrators refusing to halt when challenged in the zone in which movement is prohibited provided Israel on its side also accepts such authority of UNEF to fire. Alternatively, Egypt would consider giving this authority to UNEF on its side if UNEF were joined in its patrols by Palestinian police.

General Burns considered the points of agreement on UNEF’s functions concrete arrangements which are to him satisfactory although they did not constitute a UNEF administration of Gaza. In fact, however, UNEF was all over the place, but not running things except through what UNRWA was doing.

Hammarskjold said, going back to his statement to the General Assembly on February 22 on what it was understood would be done in Gaza, that (1) the initial “take-over” had gone by, (2) the helpful arrangements contemplated with UNEF now exist. UNEF headquarters are within Gaza and not just on the demarcation line and UNEF has freedom of movement. While there were situations which, if they arose, would make the Egyptians want to get rid of UNEF in Gaza, the Egyptians in fact very much wanted to avoid this. They knew that if Fedayeen raids started again it would be the end of UNEF. The SYG had told them that if the raids started he would withdraw the force but, aside from his own position, the hard facts were that the governments making up UNEF would also withdraw their forces if the raids started.

He said that we would be amused and surprised at how hard he had been on Nasser on this as well as on other points. The main political fact with respect to Gaza, he said, was that “the Egyptians are working with us to prevent raids.” He had not realized before his talks that he could play the withdrawal of UNEF so hard and get away with it.

He was happy to see that Secretary Dulles had reaffirmed the U.S. position on the desirability of UNEF on both sides of the lines.⁵ He intended to take up this question with the Advisory Committee. He had not dwelt on it before until he was sure that UNEF was secure on the Egyptian side regardless of whether it was on the Israeli side or not. Now, with that assurance, the question of having it on the Israeli side would be dealt with on its own merits. He wanted, he said, to have the Advisory Committee take the decision itself to put the question up to Israel, although he had authority of course to do so. By having the Advisory Committee do it, it would help to avoid the Israeli charge that it was simply Nasser’s idea.

In addition to movement of UNEF’s functions which Egypt had accepted, Hammarskjold gave me a second note from Burns to the SYG on the subject of UNEF action in the event armed forces, as opposed to infiltrators, crossed the armistice demarcation line. (Note contained in immediately following telegram, mytel 692).⁶ The problem here involved what action UNEF could take if Israel resorted again to raids into Egyptian territory through armed attack. Hammarskjold said that when this question had arisen in the Advisory Committee previously, both Canada and Norway had said that the UNEF could not shoot. This they considered beyond the original concept of UNEF. Burns had been considerably upset by this reaction and believed that if the ordinary Israeli type raid, for example a raid by a battalion, took place, that UNEF should be empowered to shoot. On the other hand, Burns realized that if a real Israeli invasion took place, UNEF was in no position to resist. Hammarskjold intended to deal with this question in the Advisory Committee and pointed out it involved no agreement or disagreement with Egypt.

2. Sharm el-Sheikh. Hammarskjold said that in the case of Sharm el-Sheikh the Egyptians had made clear to him that they had no intention to move in or to ask UNEF to leave. They were in fact closing their eyes to the Aqaba situation. When a question had been put to Fawzi in Hammarskjold’s presence as to what Egypt would do if Israeli ships proceeded through the Straits of Tiran, Fawzi had said “please forget you asked that question.” Hammarskjold said he recognized, however, that aside from the Egyptians there was a problem with Saudi Arabia, who might well cause difficulties.

3. Suez. When Hammarskjold arrived in Cairo, Krishna Menon was already there and it was obvious that he was there only with respect to the Suez. It was also obvious that Egypt’s memorandum (Cairo telegram 3032),⁷ following up the March 18 memorandum was a fait accompli. It was soon clear to him that all of the points contained in the memorandum were closed doors and that he could not “negotiate” on them.

He therefore concentrated his attack on the fact that Egypt must consult the interested governments about the memorandum before going further. In this he had succeeded. Nasser had agreed to consult governments and to consider the memorandum as a draft.

Hammarskjold had insisted in connection with consultations with governments that there should be arrangements included for organized cooperation with the users. Hammarskjold had pointed out that the Egyptian memorandum did not meet the six principles in either of these respects and that Egypt must do so.

As a result of his insistence, they had agreed to receive comments from governments and had also agreed that he was free to use the information he had gathered from his talks with them in any way he saw fit. This had been confirmed in a formal letter from Fawzi to the SYG which SYG had replied to in letter, copy of which Hammarskjold gave me (text contained mytel 693).⁸ In this letter, Hammarskjold again had emphasized the importance of consulting with interested countries, pointing out his regret that exchanges of views between Egypt and the interested countries, which had been expected, had not taken place. He pointed out also in his letter the importance of organized cooperation with the users. Hammarskjold felt it most important that the users, particularly the U.S., should follow up now by conveying to Egypt their comments on Egyptian memorandum.

Hammarskjold said that as he analyzed the Egyptian memorandum he considered that the Egyptians had dealt with all of the arbitration points contained in the six principles of the SC.

• Secondly, the Egyptians had, at Hammarskjold’s insistence, designated the Bank of International Settlement for the receipt of tolls, which he considered as good as the IBRD.
• Thirdly, on the funding provisions, he had pressed the Egyptians for a larger percentage to be set aside but had been unable to budge them. They had contended that in the old company, more than 50 percent of the income from tolls was set aside for salaries, pensions, administrative expenses, etc., and additional amounts were paid to shareholders and in royalties. It would not be practically possible to take out of the operating income for development funds as much as 50 percent of the total, and a 25 percent fund would in fact put aside for development considerably more than the old company had done or could have done under the prevailing financial arrangements.
• Fourth, in Articles 8 and 11(d), the Egyptians had left the door open to arrangements for cooperation with the users. He had succeeded in getting the Egyptians to include the second sentence of Article 8 and the provisions of Article 11(d). Beyond these matters, he had not been able to move the Egyptians on the provisions of their memorandum.

He said that the Egyptians would not consult with England and France although they took for granted that the U.S. would do so and they left it open to him to do so. Likewise he had received no objections from them to his discussing the Egyptian position with Italy and Norway.

The fact, however, that he had agreed to nothing himself provided added pressure on Egypt. In his opinion they were very anxious to cooperate with the UN and this was one of the reasons he had asked for McCloy to go and talk blunt economic facts to Egypt. When Nasser, he said, had asked him what really was the matter with the Egyptian memorandum, the SYG had told Nasser: “The trouble is that people don’t trust you.” He said that to the extent that it was possible to do, he believed he had brought Nasser down to earth and in this respect, while it would have been, in his opinion, a mistake to have presented the Secretary’s letter to Nasser, the Egyptians knew that if he spoke with as great assurances as he did, he was covered by U.S. backing. He had not advocated use of Dulles’ letter to Nasser because Dulles’ language weaker than that which Hammarskjold had used.

After hearing foregoing, I read to Hammarskjold the Department’s reactions.⁹Hammarskjold said that the U.S. reaction and his own were identical. I then read the Department’s questions.

On question 1—Hammarskjold said that he had raised this very question with the Egyptians who had argued that the difficulty they saw was finding the proper form for a binding international obligation. They said that they could not negotiate with SCUA because they regarded it as not truly representative of all the users. They could not see how they could form an agreement with the UN itself which was not a tight contracting party and they could not undertake to have a world conference. Therefore, they argued that it was better, after getting reactions to their position and taking them into account, to commit themselves to the UN by depositing the instrument containing the wording of the last paragraph of their memorandum wherein emphasis is placed on the obligations that they have undertaken.

Question 2—Hammarskjold said that he had no doubt that the Egyptian declaration was intended to cover all user nations and that this included Israel except that Article 10 of the 1888 Convention also applied to Israel.

Hammarskjold said Egyptians argued they were not claiming a right to shoot when they relied on belligerent rights as Israelis insisted they were claiming, but that they were claiming right of self-protection under the Armistice Agreement and Convention. They were thus adamant against permitting Israeli ships to pass through Canal. Hammarskjold said in this connection again we would be surprised how hard he had been on Nasser on this point but it was fact that Israeli attack in October had not improved prospects for Israeli transit. Egyptians regarded their security immediately involved if any ship flying Israeli flag went through Canal.

Hammarskjold had told Nasser that if Egyptian position was legal it was “damned foolish” and undercut Egypt’s moral position throughout world. Hammarskjold said Nasser had replied frankly that he agreed with him but nonetheless no Egyptian Government could let Israeli ships into Port Said and Ismailia and that if it did there would be immediate trouble with danger of sabotage to Canal itself. Hammarskjold said, however, that Egyptians would agree that under article 6 (b) of memorandum any party to Convention of 1888 could take up Israeli case if they so desired and refer it to ICJ. He said it was obvious Egyptians expected reference of question of Israeli transit to Court. In this connection, in discussing with Fawzi ways of taking question to Court, Fawzi had said it was desirable to have question over and done with and he therefore had some misgivings about an advisory opinion being sought by GA since it would only be advisory. In response to question on this point, Hammarskjold said he thought it was entirely possible from Fawzi’s attitude that Egypt was anxious to find way off the hook on question of Israeli transit rights, without themselves taking any initiative, or, of course, without being forced into acceptance of Israeli transit other than by adjudication.

Question 3—this Hammarskjold had previously answered pointing out that Egyptian memorandum’s only provision in respect to organized cooperation with users were references contained in paragraphs 8 and 11 (d).

Question 4—Hammarskjold regarded Egypt as having agreed to compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ under Convention. It was not clear to him, however, whether they had accepted compulsory jurisdiction with respect to disputes arising also out of the new Egyptian memorandum itself.

Question 5—Hammarskjold considered question of whom Egypt would negotiate with was not answered by memorandum but would have to be worked out in same way as question of cooperation with users.

Question 6—Hammarskjold said Egypt had accepted right of individual users to arbitration under Canal Code.

SYG said Egyptians had taken position they would wait until Tuesday, April 2, before finalizing text their memorandum. They intended have text made public 48 hours before opening of Canal which meant therefore they expected Canal to open at earliest on Wednesday, 3rd, or Thursday, 4th.

4. Meeting of GA. Hammarskjold said he had told Nasser moment Egyptians stopped an Israeli ship going through Canal, GA would have to meet. In his opinion GA would in these circumstances have to ask for advisory opinion of ICJ.

5. Israeli request for Egyptian position on belligerency. Hammarskjold said he had submitted in formal letter to Nasser Israeli question, but as yet had received no reply. He had, however, gone further and had put his own questions to Egyptians in letter, copy of which he gave me (contained mytel 694).¹⁰Hammarskjold said despite Mrs. Meir’s contention that Nasser could answer Israeli question by yes or no, it was in fact not that kind of question and he had attempted formulate his own questions in such way as to require yes or no answers. He said he considered he should send similar letter to Israel and intended shortly do so.

Recommended Action:

That you tell Israelis following:

1. That situation they desired to see brought about in Gaza has been brought about. There is solid assurance against raids from Egypt; there is an undertaking against return of Egyptian troops; Burns had been given all undertakings he said were necessary to maintain international order, including placing of part of Palestinian police under his orders; and Egyptians have not pressed their demand to have UNEF deployed in Israel. Situation which Israel desired see in Straits of Tiran is also now in existence. Existence of both these situations confirms Israeli and American expectations.

2. Hammarskjold said to me following this morning’s conversation, in response to my question that Egyptians may allow ships with other than Israeli registry, but carrying Israeli goods to and from Israeli ports, to transit Canal, although this is not yet definite. If true, it is another gain over previous situation and, moreover, is an addition to expectations voiced by Israel prior to her withdrawal.

3. Israel therefore should not introduce Israeli flag vessels moment Canal opens, but should wait and see whether non-Israeli flag vessels carrying Israeli cargo are allowed to pass and also give a chance for test of use of Gulf of Aqaba by Israeli ships now understood to be en route around Cape of Good Hope.

4. Another reason for waiting is that Egyptian motive for stopping Israeli vessels is not primarily a matter of principle, or juridical, or a matter of bargaining, but is due solely to heated state of public opinion which should cool and subside with passage of time, thereby making possible transit of Israeli vessels.

With regard to Egypt I recommend:

1. That all modifications which we favor should be transmitted to Ambassador Hare for transmission by him to Egyptian Government.

2. If, in spite of our representations, Egyptian position still falls short of what we consider satisfactory, recommend that our attitude should be that Egyptian declaration could be all right if Egypt lives up to it in spirit of fair play. But there is a very grave doubt in many people’s minds that Egyptians will live up to it. If they do not live up to it, they will expose themselves to very severe censure, notably by U.S. and other governments and this last should be made clear in public.

Comment: If we state that we expect that they will not live up to it, then it is almost foregone conclusion that they will not. If we imply that we expect them to and that we will be very censorious if they do not, then there is chance that they will. I therefore do not think we should say we are accepting their position under duress. The word “duress” implies that we do not think they will live up to it. It also is somewhat undignified for country as powerful as U.S. to admit that it has been forced into accepting something against its will by being blackmailed by such weak country as Egypt.

3. We should imply that while we could, of course use all kinds of forceful pressure against Egypt, we are continuing to abide by the letter and spirit of the Charter and not taking advantage of our strength to impose our will on it and that we look to Egypt to carry out its international obligations in a spirit of complete justice.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–2857. Secret; Niact. Received at 6:08 p.m.
2. During Hammarskjold’s visit to Egypt, the Embassy in Cairo transmitted to the Department of State several interim reports concerning the progress of the talks, which the Embassy had received from Hammarskjöld and Bunche. Reports concerning the questions of Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba are Ibid., 684A.86; reports concerning the Suez Canal are Ibid., 974.7301. All were repeated to USUN.
3. At 1:45 p.m. on March 28, Lodge reported over the telephone to Dulles the highlights of his conversation with Hammarskjold. A memorandum of the telephone conversation, prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State, is in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5780/3–2857) Among the measures included in the memorandum were: an Egyptian agreement to make known to the refugees and residents of Gaza that it was Egyptian policy to prevent infiltration across the demarcation line; Egyptian regulations against infiltration; assignment of a unit in the Palestinian police force to prevent infiltration; UNEF authority to take infiltrators into custody; and other provisions regarding the functions, rights, and responsibilities of UNEF.
5. Dulles made this statement during a press conference on March 26. For the transcript of the press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, April 15, 1957, pp. 595–601; excerpts are printed in United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–July 1957, pp. 348–353.
6. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5780/3–2857) In the note, Burns sought instructions from Hammarskjöld as to what action UNEF troops deployed along the Armistice demarcation line should take if armed forces attempted to cross. Burns recommended that UNEF should have the right to fire in self-defense and/or under specified circumstances and that an attack on UNEF or an attempt to break through UNEF positions should be an act involving automatic application of sanctions.
7. Document 250.
8. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/3–2857)
9. Contained in telegram 743, supra.
10. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–2857) Hammarskjöld had addressed the following “basic” question to Fawzi: “Is the Government of Egypt willing, “with a view to promoting the return to permanent peace in Palestine and the recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the parties’, to reaffirm its adherence to the principles enunciated in points 1 to 4 of Article 1 of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949?” The Secretary-General then asked Fawzi the following “subsidiary” questions: “In reaffirming its adherence to the aforementioned principles of Article 1, does the Government of Egypt accept an interpretation of that article in line with what was stated in paragraph 15 of my report of 24 January 1957 [U.N. doc. A/ 3512] as supported by the resolution of the Security Council of 1 September 1951 [U.N. doc. S/2322], or does the government refer solely to action directly mentioned in the four principles? Will the government of Egypt, on the basis of a mutual reaffirmation of Article 1, and on conditions of reciprocity, take the steps necessary in order to establish full implementation of the Armistice Agreement, so as to provide for “a return to the state of affairs envisaged in the Armistice Agreement, and avoidance of the state of affairs into which conditions, due to lack of compliance with the agreement progressively deteriorated’ prior to the Israeli military intervention of 29 October 1956?”