245. Memorandum by the Scientific Representative of the Atomic Energy Commission at the Embassy in France (Bishop)1
SUBJECT
- Discussion of a Joint Cooperative Program with EURATOM
The present memo constitutes a very brief summary of the topics covered in discussions held in Luxembourg on Saturday and Sunday, November 23–24. Those present were:
- Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth
- Louis Boochever
- Max Kohnstamm
- Campbell Secord
- Rudolf Regul
- Allen J. Vander Weyden
- Amasa S. Bishop
The informal sessions were held in the home of Ambassador Butterworth.
Purpose of Meeting
The meeting was held at the request of Kohnstamm in order to discuss to what extent and in what way it might be possible, after the formation of EURATOM, to initiate a joint program of cooperation between the U.S. and EURATOM for speeding the development of nuclear power in Europe. Kohnstamm is anxious to ensure that EURATOM gets off to a flying start and does not become bogged down at its inception by numerous organizational and legal problems. Furthermore, he is concerned that, without outside stimulus from the U.S. there will be relatively few U.S.-type reactors constructed in Europe and the trend will be strongly toward the natural uranium-graphite type of reactor. He feels that, from the point of view both of diversification and of rapid development, it is critically important that there be a comparable development of water-type reactors in Europe. With this in mind, Kohnstamm has in recent weeks been forwarding the concept of a “joint demonstration program” whereby EURATOM and the United States might perhaps share (on a roughly equal basis) in the costs required to construct, say, four “demonstration power reactors” at the earliest possible date. The suggested reactors would include one of each of the major types of interest: i.e., a pressurized-water reactor, a boiling water reactor, a [Page 567] heavy-water natural-uranium reactor, and a gas-cooled natural-uranium reactor.
It was a concept of this type which Kohnstamm wished to consider at the Luxembourg meeting, and he brought to the meeting an agenda of discussion topics based around this idea.
In the discussions which ensued, there was general agreement on the basic principles—i.e., that the EURATOM programs get off to a strong start and that it have a diversified program. However, the method forwarded by Kohnstamm for achieving these goals was challenged from the outset.
The view was forwarded, particularly by Ambassador Butterworth, that the prime mover in the EURATOM program must be Europe itself, and that while the United States was ready and willing to assist and speed its development in every reasonable way, it was not appropriate to consider the United States as one of its two legs. Rather, the EURATOM program must stand on its own feet and develop its own program, albeit with the assurance of strong cooperation and assistance from the United States (and hopefully also from Great Britain and Canada).
In addition, as pointed out by Vander Weyden and Ambassador Butterworth, it is not reasonable to anticipate that the United States would be willing to provide substantial financial support toward the construction in Europe of “demonstration reactors” involving types not under active development in the U.S. In particular, it seems difficult to believe the U.S. would contribute substantial amounts to the construction in Europe of a British-type reactor, particularly if the British themselves are not sharing in the costs.
An intensive discussion then ensued, in an attempt to formulate a more suitable solution to this problem. Among others, the following topics were considered in some detail:
- 1.
- The fact that, in the case of British reactors, fuel elements costs and buy-back prices are underwritten by their government, with the result that reactor operating costs can be estimated with reasonable accuracy from the outset.
- 2.
- The rising capital costs of reactors in the United States.
- 3.
- The lack of adequate developmental work in the U.S. on fuel element fabrication and the consequent inability of industry to provide firm prices for this critically important component; the consequent inability of European groups to estimate operating costs of U.S.-type nuclear reactors.
- 4.
- As a result of the above points, the strong trend in Europe at the present time [is] in favor of the British-type reactors; the added incentive of being much more independent of the United States with regard to enriched uranium.
- 5.
- The desirability, both to Europe and the U.S., to see the initiative from the very outset of a diversified reactor program which would include the construction of a number of water-type reactors.
- 6.
- The strong probability that, without extensive and active participation on the part of the U.S., such a program will not develop; the benefits to be gained from a cooperative program of some sort toward this goal.
- 7.
- The recognition that any extensive program of cooperation would require the negotiation of a treaty and bilateral agreement with EURATOM and the appropriation by Congress of suitable funds for this purpose; the delays which these actions would involve.
- 8.
- The advantage, in order to get off to a rapid start, of reaching what might be called “agreement in principle” with the U.S. regarding the desirability of undertaking an active cooperative program of appreciable scope, subject to the passage of suitable legislation and the availability of adequate funds.
- 9.
- The convictions that U.S. assistance would necessarily have to be limited to those reactor types in which the U.S. is actively interested.
- 10.
- The type of assistance which the U.S. might be in a position
to offer in the interim period without
the need of any change in legislation, e.g.:
- a.
- Availability of loans from the Export-Import Bank to cover capital costs and the sale of nuclear fuel (obtainable on an interim basis only through the bilateral agreements with individual EURATOM countries).
- b.
- Training of students in U.S. schools, AEC laboratories, and possibly at some of the nuclear reactor sites.
- c.
- Providing detailed information on reactor types of interest which have been developed by the AEC.
- d.
- Technical assistance on the construction of a European chemical separation plant.
- e.
- Technical guidance on such problems as reactor hazards, insurance and third-party liability problems, raw materials exploration, etc.
- 11.
- The type of assistance which the U.S. might later be in a
position to offer if suitable legislation
is passed, e.g.:
- a.
- An “open-end” agreement to provide to EURATOM at a fixed price2 an amount of fuel adequate to meet its peacetime requirements over a period of, say, twenty years, perhaps without the necessity of prior commitment as to the type of peacetime projects to be undertaken. (This material would presumably be made available only a sale basis and with assurance that it would be taken if it is requested.)
- b.
- An agreement to repurchase, subject to the availability of funds, plutonium at a fixed price over a 7-year period.
- 12.
- The question as to whether it might in some way be possible for the U.S. to underwrite the cost of fabrication of fuel elements for a limited number of reactors, so that utility companies in Europe could be assured of operating costs in a predetermined range. (It is recognized that while such action would be highly desirable in order to place the U.S. on equal footing with the British, it is also exceedingly [Page 569] difficult, particularly since the U.S. does not do this even for U.S. companies.)
- 13.
- The impact of active cooperation of the above type on those projects which are already well along in the stage of negotiation (e.g., the Italian projects of Edison Volta, SIMEA, and—to a lesser extent—SENN).
As a result of the discussion of these and many other points, it was generally concluded that it would be inappropriate for EURATOM, in its initial overtures to the U.S. for a cooperative program, to make any detailed proposal of the way in which the U.S. participation might occur. Rather, it would be better simply to stress the critical need for—and the joint benefits of—a cooperative program for the rather extensive development of U.S.-type reactors in Europe and to attempt to obtain “agreement in principle” of United States participation in such a program subject to the passage of suitable legislation and the availability of funds.
The question of the most appropriate method of participation in this effort (which might leave as a goal the immediate construction of, say, a million kilowatts of electrical power with U.S.-type reactors) could then be relegated to a joint AEC–EURATOM committee which would study the matter and make recommendations at an early date to both groups.
Kohnstamm stated that he would attempt the first draft of a formal proposal, based on the above ideas, which might eventually be transmitted from EURATOM to the Department of State. Simultaneously, Vander Weyden and Ambassador Butterworth indicated a willingness to explore the U.S. reaction to these ideas.