In considering this report, the Department of State will realize that the
Commission is not in a position to determine the maximum technical
contribution which might ultimately be required to effectuate the
creation of the Community. However, the Commission feels that the plan
of assistance outlined in the attached study will offer considerable
encouragement to the creation of the Community and, concerning our
present limitations in plant capacity and availability of U–235 for
power and research reactor programs, may be considered the maximum
feasible at this time. Relative to the availability of U–235, it should
be noted that the recent allocation of 20,000 kg. of U–235 for foreign
use, as well as the Commission’s present planning for further foreign
allocations, is based on optimistic estimates of foreign power growth
and requirements.
As was indicated in the Commission’s conversation with you on January 25,
1956, the attached plan is forwarded as a basis for further AEC–Department of State study and
discussion. It should not be construed as committing the AEC to undertake, prior to further
discussions, the possible measures of assistance outlined.
The attached plan of assistance does not take into account the possible
need for additional legal authority which might be required to implement
the plan. In addition, any assistance offered in this
[Page 424]
connection would necessarily be in
conformance with NSC and other
applicable government policy, (e.g. NSC
5507/2.3).
[Attachment]
ACTION IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO ENCOURAGE INTEGRATION OF
THE COMMUNITY OF SIX
1. By memorandum of January 12, 1956 the President directed the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State to study on an
urgent basis moves which the United States could make in the atomic
energy field to encourage the integration of the Community of Six.
The Community of Six, hereinafter referred to as the “Community”,
would include membership of Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy,
France, and West Germany in an integrated European Atomic Energy
organization, with supranational control over the development of
atomic energy in the six countries.
2. The Secretary of State has asked the AEC to consider the maximum contribution which the U.S.
could make to encourage the creation of an integrated atomic energy
community. Mr. Dulles has
also expressed the hope that the Commission consider all possibilities, leaving for subsequent
AEC–State Department
determination any decision as to which of the possibilities should
be selected as safe, prudent and wise for the United States. In
accordance with the terms of reference, the plan of assistance
presented here was drawn up without regard to limits set by
currently applicable laws or policies.
3. It is felt that the AEC has no
method of determining what contribution may ultimately be required
to effectuate creation of the Community, inasmuch as the exact
details of the Community’s atomic energy project have not yet been
finalized. The AEC, therefore, can
only provide the Department of State with a broad plan of assistance
for the Community, which it believes would be an incentive in the
creation of an integrated European atomic energy industry. Such a
plan would then be used as background for consideration by the
Department of State in any negotiations with the Community.
4. It is assumed that if it is to encourage integration, the United
States must be prepared to show that no individual nation could
[Page 425]
obtain more assistance
from the United States as an individual than as a member of the
Community. The United States must be prepared to extend assistance
and privileges to the Community equal to or greater than that now,
or in the future, to be extended to any one member of the Community
under a bilateral arrangement, with the possible exception of
Belgium, which has a special relation to the U.S.
5. The possible assistance that the United States Government, through
the AEC, can render to encourage
European integration is considered primarily within the framework of
materials, information, services, and special privileges. The
conclusions reached as to assistance which might be provided are
predicated on possibilities within the limitations of present plant
capacity and the present projections as to quantities of U–235 (see
Table I below4),
which may be made available for power and research reactor
programs.
6. In developing the possible methods of assistance the staff has
assumed that this assistance will be tendered under an appropriate
agreement whereby the United States would have access to all
information and data developed by the Community, the consequence of
U.S. assistance rendered. The appropriate standing provisions of
existing bilateral arrangements, as well as the policy of the
National Security Council, will be incorporated in the proposed
agreement as will such other provisions deemed necessary to protect
the interests of the United States with respect to patents, security
inspections, etc.
Materials
7. Under the policy announced by the President on February 22, 1956,
20,000 kg. of U–235 were allocated for foreign power and research
reactor programs. It was recognized that the initial allocation of
material is insufficient to maintain a large-scale power production
program for a long time, but is sufficient to permit the start of
such a program. The Commission recognized that under optimistic
conditions the total amount of allocated material would be in use by
1962 and additional amounts would have to be allocated periodically
thereafter. The predicted range of yearly allocations or
requirements for the free world, as estimated by the Commission, is
listed in Table I, below. As the Community of Six has presently
about half of the installed electrical capacity of the free world
(outside the U.K., and the U.S.), it
is the belief of the AEC staff that
the member countries of the Community will construct well over half
of the nuclear generating capacity installed (outside the U.K., and U.S.) during the next ten
years. As a consequence, the U.S. could agree to allocate to the
Community an initial quantity of at least 5000 kg., but not more
[Page 426]
than half of the amount
presently allocated for foreign distribution. (Of course, the
amounts allocated to member countries under bilateral agreements
must come from the initial allocation that might otherwise be made
available for the Community.) Further, we can guarantee for an
agreed period, after the initial allocation has been delivered,
additional quantities for yearly delivery sufficient to sustain the
installed capacity resulting from the initial allocation. (This goes
one step beyond the Commission’s action on the 20,000 kg. and would
require a new Presidential allocation.) While we cannot now specify
the exact amount we are confident that these yearly quantities will
be substantial. (The staff estimates that a quantity on the order of
1000–2000 kg. per year would be sufficient to maintain the nuclear
generating capacity installed as a consequence of the initial
allocation, and may also permit the installation of a small
additional capacity.)
8. Although U–235 is the material believed to be of greatest interest
to the Community of Six, heavy water may also prove useful. The
United States is in a position to meet any reasonable requirements
the Community might have for heavy water and could offer to supply
this material. The estimated requirements of the Community would
have to be determined by subsequent U.S. discussions with the
Community.
9. Depleted uranium would be useful to the Community as a shielding
material or as fertile material for use in breeder reactors. The
U.S. has available substantial quantities of such material.
Reasonable quantities could therefore be made available to the
Community. The only limitation to such action is the present
classification problem. This matter is presently under study by the
AEC staff and recommendation for
action will be made to the Commission.
10. Quantities of highly enriched U–235, plutonium, and U–233 would
be extremely useful to the Community in many research and
development programs. Agreed quantities of such materials should be
transferred to the Community under appropriate arrangements.
11. It is not expected that the Community will be short of natural
uranium. Both Belgium and metropolitan France have a source of
natural uranium. In view of these sources, and in view of the rather
substantial quantities of U–235 which could be allocated to the
Community, there would not appear to be any great need for an
outside source of natural uranium. The Community could be informed
that if such a need develops the U.S. would consider supplying the
needs to the extent it can. It is, therefore, not believed desirable
to make an offer of any specific quantity of natural uranium at this
time, as such offer might prejudice our relationship with Belgium
and France in the procurement of source materials.
[Page 427]
12. It is not considered worthwhile to offer to the Community other
reactor materials, since such materials for a nuclear industry can
easily be produced in the cooperating countries in accordance with
any goal established for nuclear power capacity. It might be
worthwhile to indicate that, depending upon commercial availability,
other materials can be procured in the U.S. as needed.
Information
13. The following discussion with respect to the information to be
transmitted to the Community is without regard to security
implications. It is doubtful if a satisfactory security system could
be developed to provide assurance that classified information
transmitted to the Community would not be compromised.
14. It is believed that with the guarantees proposed concerning the
availability of enriched uranium, the technical need for early
construction of a gaseous diffusion plant may be deferred. It is not
proposed, therefore, to make any diffusion plant technology
available, since existing legislation does not permit the release of
classified gaseous diffusion technology and the extent of
unclassified information in this field would be of inconsequential
value to the EURATOM Group.
Political considerations may outweigh technical considerations and
the Community may still propose to construct a gaseous diffusion
plant. It may be that the opportunity to be a part owner in a
gaseous diffusion plant will be a greater incentive to the
integration of the atomic energy effort than any other single
factor. It is, therefore, proposed that the U.S. do nothing which
will prevent the Community from constructing a gaseous diffusion
plant if desired.
15. In a power reactor complex, feed materials production centers,
fuel fabrication plants, and chemical recovery and separation plants
would be necessary. The United States could agree to exchange all
technology, presently classified “confidential”, as well as
unclassified information, covering the design, construction and
operation of such plants except that no data revealing special
nuclear material production rates in the United States would be
exchanged. The U.S. could also permit the Community to reprocess
fuel made available to the Community under a bilateral agreement. It
is felt that the importance of providing chemical separation
technology, as well as permitting the Community to reprocess fuel
elements provided by the U.S. to it and to other European countries
cannot be over-emphasized. This comprises a major part of any
nuclear power complex and would be one of the most important
contributions the U.S. could make to encourage integration of the
Community.
16. The Community proposes the establishment of a common laboratory
and center for basic research, and reactor development. As an
incentive to the establishment of the Community, we could agree
[Page 428]
to permit cooperation and
the exchange of all power reactor technology (classified
“confidential” or less) on all power reactor concepts restricting
however any exchange on military reactor systems.
17. The United States could propose to effectuate this exchange of
information and give assistance in the following manner:
- a.
- Exchange of all reports (classified “confidential” and
unclassified) falling within the area of cooperation.
- b.
- Permit scientists and technicians of the Community to
visit or work at designated AEC or contractor operated facilities.
- c.
- Expand training programs in the U.S. for foreign nationals
and make available to Community representatives a
substantial portion of the accommodations. (Any significant
expansion of the present program will require additional
funds.)
- d.
- Supply an agreed limited number of technical and
administrative people as consultants to the
Community.
- e.
- Permit U.S. industry to assist in the program by
performing such contractual services or supplying under
suitable contractual arrangements, within appropriate
security limitations, such scientific and technical
equipment as may be requested by the Community.
- f.
- Undertake cooperative, joint development programs as
mutually agreed.
Financial Assistance
18. With regard to financial assistance, it is understood that the
member countries of the Community of Six have a sufficient amount of
funds available to initiate the Community program. Further, the
Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and private lending institutions would be in a position
to provide financial assistance to the Community. It is felt that an
offer of financial assistance is outside the purview of the AEC but should be taken into
consideration by the State Department. If the proposed Community
development program is of a quality of sufficient interest to the
United States, this country could agree to contract for the
performance of specific sub-programs or services on our behalf by
the Community.
Special Concessions
19. The policy approved in connection with the allocation of 20,000
kg. of U–235 for foreign distribution makes the following
reservations with respect to the material allocated:
- a.
- Enriched material will not be made available over 20%
U–235 enrichment unless specifically authorized by AEC.
- b.
- No transfers of allocated material will be made to any
country other than recipient.
- c.
- U.S. access to the country is granted for the purpose of
observing compliance with the assurances of no diversion for
military purposes.
- d.
- Irradiated fuel from material furnished by AEC will be reprocessed in
AEC facilities or
facilities designated by AEC.
20. For the purpose of promoting the establishment of the community,
some of the basic conditions indicated above could perhaps be
modified, including making available uranium of a greater enrichment
in the isotope U–235, in accordance with established NSC policy, and perhaps designating the
reprocessing facility to be constructed by the Community as an
approved facility for reprocessing materials supplied by the United
States.
Services
21. A number of services can be offered by the U.S. to the Community.
Among them the following would be perhaps of greatest interest to
the Community:
- a.
- Agree to enrich uranium supplied by the Community. The
amount of ore supply and the amount of product and tails
delivered could be in accordance with an appropriate
formula.
- b.
- Agree to performing for the Community such research and
development work in AEC
facilities as can be mutually agreed.
