45. Memorandum of a Conversation, The White House, Washington, January 27, 1955, 12:30 p.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- The President, Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary Robertson, Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Cutler, Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, and the Chairman and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 1.
The President read a statement2 which he was about to make public after the Secretary of State had read it to Senator George. It [Page 141] concerned the deployment by the United States of air and naval forces in the Formosa area and stated: “The President made it clear that these forces were designed purely for defensive purposes and that any decision to use U.S. forces other than in immediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would be a decision which he would take and the responsibility for which he has not delegated”. (This language should be checked to published text.)3 He pointed out that the Message to Congress already covered the possibility of using our armed forces to aid the Chinese Nationalists to deploy from the Tachens, and that the statement he was now making was supplementary to existing policy and to the positions stated in the Message.
- 2.
- The President said that the United States was not seeking a war, and that this point of view should guide all our actions.
- 3.
- The President pointed out the necessity of keeping the Department of State in constant touch with all military actions and developments. He referred to the references in the earlier meeting of the Council, where the delicacy of the present operations had been mentioned and where it had been pointed out that actions which the Chincoms or the Soviets might take had political as well as military implications. The President suggested that he would like to have the Department of Defense keep in daily touch with the Department of State, using for convenience the State Department Counselor, Mr. MacArthur.
- 4.
The Secretary of State again referred to the delicacy of the present operations; that the viciousness of the Chincoms had forced the United States to take a strong position which we wished to maintain without becoming involved in war, and to the political repercussions [Page 142] in Europe of all actions that were being and would be taken in the area. The Secretary said that it would be very helpful if the State Department could see the traffic in messages and the planned military steps before such steps were taken. He said that there had been excellent cooperation so far and it was especially important that such cooperation continue as matters developed.4
- 5.
- The Secretary of Defense said that he would arrange for a daily clearing in the morning with Mr. MacArthur through Admiral Carney’s operational setup. At the same time, the Admiral could advise him and Admiral Radford of developments.5
- 6.
- The President said that if it was likely that action might have to be taken beyond policy already cleared, the question should be at once brought to him. He said we would not get much out of fighting, but that if we had to fight to defend our vital interests, of course, we would.
- 7.
- The President asked Admiral Radford to give him certain figures as to deployment and possible further deployment. Admiral Radford said he would bring these figures over later in the day.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5411/1–2755. Top Secret. Drafted by Cutler,↩
Drafted by Dulles, according to Hagerty’s diary entry for January 27, which reads in part as follows:
“Dulles came in to see me in the morning during the NSC meeting to say that in his opinion he thought it was necessary for the President to put out a statement saying he had not delegated his authority and would not delegate it as far as ordering the United States troops anyplace in the Formosa area. Some Senators on the Hill and other people have expressed considerable concern that the forces which are moving into that area would be subject to the direction of Chiang Kai-shek or the military on the scene. Others like [Senator Wayne L.] Morse [of Oregon], with his talk of preventive war, were causing a great deal of disturbance in the minds of even those who were supporting our position. Dulles and I talked about this for a short time and then Dulles dictated a short statement which read as follows:
“Following the meeting with the National Security Council the President met with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries and the Chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They discussed the deployment of United States air and naval forces in the Formosa area. The President made it clear that these forces were designed purely for defensive purposes and that any decision to use United States forces other than in immediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would be a decision which he would take and the responsibility for which he has not delegated.” (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers)
↩- Parenthetical comment in the source text. The text of the statement issued by Hagerty on January 27, which is identical with that of the draft statement in footnote 2 above, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1955, pp. 213–214.↩
An account of the meeting in Hagerty’s January 27 diary entry records Dulles’ remarks as follows:
“Dulles pointed out that while he was not criticizing at all the sending of sabre jets to Formosa moves like that should be made known to the State Department so that everyone could work together as a team and so that we could keep our allies informed as to every move.”
↩- On January 28 and irregularly during the next 2 weeks, MacArthur met with Rear Admiral Howard E. Orem, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy, and Rear Admiral George W. Anderson of Admiral Radford’s staff to exchange information; a file of MacArthur’s memoranda of the conversations is in Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩