Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

800.4016 DP/6–747: Telegram

Joseph N. Greene, Jr., Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

top secret

Leghorn, June 7, 1947—9 a. m.

89. I have discussed Fan 757¹ with SACMED’s staff, my British colleague and Gen. McLean [Maclean], SAC will report to CCS in next few days but meanwhile I should be grateful for Dept’s comments on following aspects of problem of Allied handling DP’s as soon as possible. If Dept is not able to comment on all points in one message I believe individual comments as available would be of assistance here. (re mytel 72, May 8):²

1. Time factor seems to be of paramount importance especially as R–Day approaches and with it disappearance of SAC his political advisors and presumably Joint Screening Board and its head appointed by him. G–5 has reported to War Office and AFHQ that about six weeks will elapse from date Military Screening Board provided for in Fan 757 actually begins work and date it could submit recommendations to SAC Review Committee.

2. Understand IGCR has already begun screening of camps to determine inmates prima facie eligible for IGCR–IRO assistance. It is now planned that in practice only those inmates of camps not acceptable to IGCR will be actually screened by Joint Screening teams. Such ineligibles estimated at between 500 and 1000 although this estimate made with all reserves.

3. American contribution of personnel to Joint Screening teams on hand and ready to work. As result of strong representations to Foreign Office by my British colleague McLean has now been asked by Foreign Secretary to make available British personnel. His offer to SACMED which he has reported to Foreign Office is 3 or 4 qualified screeners. McLean realizes he not going to be appointed head of Joint Screening operation and is unwilling to release his Deputy who acceptable to all here. Military authorities now screening rolls for possible candidates.

4. McLean and his mission have since their arrival set up screening machinery and possess central records and personnel who know them. Understand that without the info available from these records SACMED’s Joint Screening team would be severely handicapped if not completely unable to function pending accumulation of similar records. Gen. McLean has agreed to provide Joint Screening team with any info they may request from these records but insists the records themselves and personnel having immediate access to them must remain under his control since he will also be using them for his work in connection with Yugos who have been transferred to Germany. This appears to be only practicable plan of procedure and although it will associate McLean with Joint Team as consultant, and provider of info I hope Dept will agree that we should accept it.

5. Understand that as result of Dept’s 785 May 28² (see Embtel 1400, June 4²) IGCR screeners will notify Vatican names and particulars of unacceptables as they appear. It seems possible that this arrangement may result in out shipment to Argentina of many of individuals with whom Joint Screening Board and subsequently Review Committee contemplated in Fan 757 would have to deal. To avoid possible misunderstanding and confusion I believe it should be clearly stated whether unacceptables must all be screened by Joint Team or whether only those Argentines refuse accept will be so screened. Latter alternative would presumably greatly reduce work of Joint Team and of Review Committee and would solve before it began problem confronting military authorities of how to dispose of Greys (see paragraph No. 4 Fan 757³). I assume that in any case persons under consideration by Review Committee would be handled by military in same manner as Greys until decision re forcible repatriation rendered by Dept and Foreign Office.

6. I should be grateful for Dept’s precise instructions to participate in SAC Review Committee. Such instructions should I believe include indication whether I am to be guided by criteria given SAC in paragraph number 1 of Fan 757⁴ and should clarify whether Review Committee will merely act as post office for forwarding screening reports to Foreign Office and State Dept or whether committee has authority to reject reports from head of Joint Screening team which do not establish in individual cases presumption of guilt and consequent inability to forcible repatriation. Please instruct also whether every case should be referred to Dept and Foreign Office or whether those in which Dept and Foreign Office have agreed to hand over in course of past 18 months and on which I have been informed by Dept of such agreement may be forcibly repatriated without reference to two govts (see for example Deptels 54 February 14, 1946, 109, April 5, 1946, 166, June 20, 1946, 167, June 21, 1946 and 227, October 18, 1946 all to Caserta⁵).

7. There is good reason to believe that in practice very few of the inmates of DP camps which may be reviewed by IGCR will screen black since any individual who might be black can hardly be expected to remain in an Allied camp and await screening. [Apparent garble] once a potential black leaves the [allied camp?] he is of course covered by Fan 758⁶ and falls under jurisdiction of Italian authorities who to date have not been informed of contents of either Fan 757 or Fan 758 in absence of instructions to Embassy at Rome.

Repeated Rome 39, Belgrade 15.

Green

1. Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 805.
2. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. The paragraph of Fan 757 under reference here provided that persons currently considered the joint responsibility of the U.S. and U.K. who were not eligible for care by the IGCR, who were not liable for involuntary repatriation, and who were not willing to accept voluntary repatriation (in effect, the “greys”), would be reported one-half each to the U.S. and U.K. commanding generals in Italy for disposition in accordance with instructions which would be issued unilaterally by their respective governments.
4. The criteria under reference here are those cited in footnote 4, p. 805.
5. None printed.
6. Not printed; in it the CCS issued instructions relieving SACMED of all responsibility for the apprehension and handover of alleged Yugoslav quislings except those currently in military custody.