I have made a very brief account of our meeting at the War Department on
Saturday,1 and I suggest
that it be held in your safe. If you agree I might orally convey the
substance of the meeting to Mr. Hickerson,2 Mr.
Rusk,3 and Mr. Wood4 and of course to Mr.
Armour,5 Mr. Kennan and Mr. Henderson6 when they return. I suggest no
distribution of the memorandum in the Department in order to insure against
any possibility of a leak.
[Annex]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the
Department of State (Bohlen)
top secret
[Washington,] August 30, 1947.
| Present: |
Acting Secretary of State |
|
Mr. Saltzman7
|
|
Mr. Bohlen |
|
Secretary of War8
|
|
Under Secretary of War9
|
|
General Eisenhower10
|
|
General Norstad11
|
|
Admiral Wooldridge12
|
The Acting Secretary of State said that he had suggested the meeting in
order that the top officials of the War Department might be kept up to
the minute on the thinking in the Department of State in regard to the
foreign situation as a whole.
At the Acting Secretary’s request Mr. Bohlen then outlined certain basic
aspects of the present critical world situation along the lines of the
attached paper. The Acting Secretary then related the basic
considerations of the specific case of Western Europe and the
implementation of the Marshall Plan. He pointed out that, in view of the
fact that the world is definitely split in two, we must consider Europe
west of the iron curtain as a whole and that we should apply our
economic assistance to those sections of Western European economy which
offered the best prospect of immediate and effective revival in an
attempt to break the economic bottlenecks which were retarding the
recovery of Western Europe as a whole. We should endeavor to keep in
mind the concept of Western Europe rather than the indidividual
countries and likewise short-term revival as against long-term complete
reconstruction. American assistance carried out with these two main
considerations in view offered the best chance of keeping Western Europe
from economic collapse und starting it on the road to healthy recovery.
In the light of these concepts, the three Western zones of Germany
should be regarded not as part of Germany but as
[Page 763]
part of Western Europe.13 It should be given proper weight as a
factor in the economic recovery of Western Europe as a whole.
Mr. Lovett asked the Secretary of War and General Eisenhower to think
over the views which had been expressed by the State Department
representatives and to let him have any comments which they might have
on the basic views advanced with a view to another meeting at which
their specific application could be more fully discussed.
Both the Secretary of War and General Eisenhower expressed complete
agreement with the general exposition of the situation confronting the
U.S. and the necessity of orienting the thinking of this Government in
conformity with that situation.
On leaving General Norstad expressed to Mr. Bohlen full satisfaction with
the nature of the meeting and said he thought it had been most helpful.
He suggested that another meeting of a similar nature to deal with more
concrete matters should be set up not later than Thursday or Friday of
the coming week.14
[Subannex]
Memorandum by the Consular of the Department of
State (Bohlen)
top secret
[Washington, August 30, 1947.]
The United States is confronted with a condition in the world which is at
direct variance with the assumptions upon which, during and directly
after the war, major United States policies were predicated. Instead of
unity among the great powers on the major issues of world
reconstruction—both political and economic—after the war, there is
complete disunity between the Soviet Union and the satellites on one
side and the rest of the world on the other. There are, in short, two
worlds instead of one. Faced with this disagreeable fact, however much
we may deplore it, the United States in the interest of its own
well-being and security and those of the free non-Soviet world must
re-examine its major policy objectives in the light of this fact.
Failure to do so would mean that we would be pursuing policies based on
the assumptions which no longer exist and would expose us to the serious
danger of falling between two stools. In furtherance of the policy based
on the non-existent thesis of one world, the United States might neglect
to take such measures as would make the non-Soviet world possible of
existence. The full consequences of the existing split in
[Page 764]
the post-war world have
obviously not been fully assimilated by all parts of this Government
involved in foreign affairs nor by all persons even in the State
Department or abroad directly involved in formulation of foreign policy.
In the Soviet world, which means those areas under direct Soviet control
or domination in Europe and the Far East, the Soviet Government is
proceeding on the exact opposite of the one world principle and is
rapidly and, for the present at least, effectively engaged in
consolidating and strengthening those areas under its control. The logic
of the situation is that the non-Soviet world through such measures as
are open to it would draw closer together politically, economically,
financially, and, in the last analysis, militarily in order to be in a
position to deal effectively with the consolidated Soviet area. Only in
this way can a free and non-Soviet world hope to survive in the face of
the centralized and ruthless direction of the Soviet world.
In these circumstances, all American policies should be related to this
central fact. It does not mean that as an eventual objective that the
United States should discard forever a one world objective but rather
bring its policies more into relation with reality as long as the
condition described above continues to exist. Nor does it mean that the
United States should endeavor to hermetically seal one world from the
other. On the contrary, mutually profitable exchange of goods, in an
endeavor to do good, can be carried on between the two worlds. But this
could be done on a basis of equality and profit only if the non-Soviet
world is able to face as a whole the areas dominated by the Soviet Union
rather than as individual weak and disjointed units. The drawing
together and consolidation of the non-Soviet world is obviously a
process that cannot be achieved overnight and should not be attempted by
precipitous action but should be regarded rather as a trend logically
flowing out of the present state of the world. The chief aspects of
United States policy which require re-examination in the light of these
considerations are those relating to economic policy (leaving aside for
the moment the entire question of the United Nations which is a
separately related problem). Such objectives as those embodied in the
ITO, the lowering of customs
barriers on a world-wide scale and general freeing of world commerce
from restriction must either be indefinitely postponed until the
assumption upon which they rested comes into being or consciously and
definitely be restricted to apply to those areas of the world not under
Soviet domination. While the thinking of this Government should be
guided by the above considerations, in application of course the United
States must carefully avoid assuming any responsibility for the division
of the world and should therefore always keep the door open for
participation by the Soviet Union or its satellites in any such
measure.
[Page 765]
In the present state of economic emergency in Europe which has been
highlighted by the continuing British crisis, it is inadvisable for this
Government to continue to press for long-range objectives, however
desirable in themselves, which do not immediately and directly bear upon
the solution of Western European problems. This is especially true when
objectives such as a European Customs Union raise political
complications which retard rather than facilitate the tiding over of the
present crisis and tend to divert the attention and energies of the
European countries concerned from the absolutely essential measures
which must be taken to this end. Internal political factors and
certainly the national sensibilities of the Western European countries
must be taken more fully into consideration except where they have an
immediate and deleterious effect upon measures to be taken in the
present emergency in Western Europe.
On a short-term basis, all indications point towards a major political
showdown crisis between the Soviet and non-Soviet world, which as a
present correlation of forces means between the United States and the
Soviet Union. There is virtually no chance of any of the problems
existing between those worlds being settled until that crisis comes to a
head and is met. Long-range plans of economic rehabilitation of even the
non-Soviet world should not be allowed to obscure that almost inevitable
fact. From present indications, this crisis will mature considerably
earlier than has been expected. It is not a matter of several years in
the future. It is more likely a question of months. No one can in
confidence predict that this crisis, when it arises, will remain
confined to the political field. It obviously will contain in it the
very real danger of outbreak of hostilities. If it is to be solved short
of war, it must result in a radical and basic change in Soviet policies.
There is no sign as yet that any such change is to be anticipated or
even if it is possible in view of the structure and character of the
Soviet state. In anticipation of this global political crisis coming to
a head in the not too distant future, the United States must do
everything in its power to ensure the maximum degree of political
support from the non-Soviet countries of the world. The array of
potential strength which would be lined up against the Soviet Union and
its satellites in any such showdown crisis will in the last analysis
determine whether war will result or whether the Soviet or non-Soviet
world will be able to find a modus vivendi which
will permit some stabilization of the world situation for at least some
period of years.
In relation to the present economic emergency in Europe, the logical
consequence of the present state of the world is that measures of
assistance envisaged by this Government should be consciously limited to
Western Europe, based on the concept of the economic unity of Europe
west of the Stettin-Trieste line.
