Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

501/9–1947

Memorandum by the United States Army Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee (Ridgway) to the United States Army Chief of Staff (Eisenhower)¹

secret

[New York,] 19 September 1947.

Proposed U.S. Contribution to the United Nations Security Forces

1. Secretary Marshall has asked the U.S. Military Representatives:

a. For reasons supporting the proposed U.S. contribution to the United Nations’ armed forces to be made available to the Security Council on its call.

b. For the relation which the strength of our proposed contribution bears to total U.S. armed forces.

2. Reasons given should so support proposed strengths in Army, Navy and Air categories as to convince U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly that these proposals are reasonable, in accord with spirit of the Charter, and will justify its giving them its full U.S. support before General Assembly.

3. Confining myself to the proposed U.S. Army contribution as approved by the J.C.S., I have spoken to Secretary Marshall substantially as given in paragraph 4 herein.

4. a. Reasons supporting proposed U.S. Army Contributions

(1) The force should be the smallest Army unit of sufficient size to accord with U.S. power and prestige, to be capable of effective sustained combat for considerable periods, and to include such supporting services as the American people demands for its troops.

(2) The Corps of two Divisions is the smallest Army unit which can meet these requirements; can provide and administer proper evacuation and hospitalization services for sick and wounded, adequate postal and information services, and recreational and other facilities which American standards recognize as essential. A single division can not do this.

(3) Further, the question of command is of very great importance. A Corps will have a senior commander of great experience, chosen for his mature and sound judgment in the difficult post he will occupy, as well as for strength of character and proven combat capacity. It is expected that all U.S. Army forces of our contribution would be under his command, and that he would be responsible directly to our Government, subject only to operational control of an Allied Commander-in-Chief. Any smaller U.S. Army contingent, such as a single Division, would almost certainly have at least one other commander of a different nationality intermediate between him and the Commander-in-Chief. If such a commander were a Russian, the U.S. force could expect to be employed in accordance with Russian standards, with a brutal disregard for the value of American lives and of the persons and property of civilians in the combat area. In such a case, U.S. public opinion might well compel withdrawal of the U.S. contingent, and in turn bring about collapse of the operation and UN failure.

b. Relation of the strength of this contingent to anticipated U.S. Army strength:

(1) U.S. Army missions assigned by law will require principal categories as follows:

(a) Occupation forces.

(b) General Reserve (including our mobile striking force).

(c) UN Security Forces.

(d) Zone of Interior services to support the above.

(e) Cadres for training civilian components and with which to handle mobilization.

(2) It is to our advantage to keep category (c)—UN Security Forces—as small, compared to our total forces, as the foregoing reasons dictate. Moreover, once Congress approves this contingent, and the Security Council calls it into service, it could be committed anywhere in the world, and would then be beyond our power to employ elsewhere, even though National interests might so require. We would have to write it off from the total of our then available armed forces.

5. a. The relation of the strength of this contingent to the U.S. Naval and Air contingents, and to the total anticipated U.S. armed force strength can be stated when and only when this Nation’s Army, Navy and Air requirements have been determined by joint Army-Navy-Air Force study.

b. This determination, a command decision on the highest governmental level and based upon a dispassionate objective analysis, should bring our armed force requirements into proper balance in the light of the best judgment available to the American people. Such an analysis and decision are, in my opinion, urgently required as an element essential to our security.

6. For these reasons, the U.S. Army contingent is recommended to be a Corps of two Divisions, with an approximate overall strength of from fifty to sixty thousand.

M. B. Ridgway

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

1. Carbon copies were addressed to the Secretary of State; Chief of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (Austin); the U.S. Air Force Representative, MSC (McNarney); and the U.S. Naval Representative, MSC (Hewitt). The following notation appears at the top of the source text: “19 Sept 47 Read by Secstate this afternoon.”