Department of State Atomic Energy Files
The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)
Dear Lew: This letter will be brought to you by Mr. Gordon Arneson, a member of the staff of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
During the war Mr. Arneson was brought back from overseas with the rank of Captain to serve as one of the assistants in Mr. Stimson’s1 office, and continued there after Bob Patterson became Secretary. He was brought to this job by Mr. Baruch at the time of Mr. Baruch’s appointment.
When I came in to take Mr. Baruch’s place, I was advised by Mr. Baruch, by Senator Austin, and also by members of the staff, that Mr. Arneson was the most competent of the group. Bob Patterson gave me a similarly unqualified endorsement based on a close personal experience with his work. Mr. Arneson knows the whole course of the atomic energy negotiations in the United Nations, from his intimate daily experience there from the beginning to date. In addition, he is quite thoroughly informed on many aspects of the international relationships of the United States in this field. My own experience in the past four months confirms everything said about Mr. Arneson by Mr. Baruch and Bob Patterson. You may place the most complete confidence not only in his knowledge of what is going on and his ability to give this knowledge lucid expression, but also in his judgment.
The United Nations Commission has suffered considerably in its work because in too many instances the qualifications of the personnel of the various Delegations are not fully appropriate to the development and understanding of plans which have now gone quite beyond the scientific stage and require a combination of political and business judgment. The Commission has also been handicapped by constant changes in the personnel of the Delegations. These criticisms apply to several of the Delegations, including the British. Sir Alexander2 has been too much engaged in other heavy duties to be fully apprised of what was going on in atomic energy. Much of the responsibility for their work has fallen on Sir George Thomson when he was here last fall, and then during his long absence on Sir Charles Darwin who took his place, and now again by Sir George, who has returned and has not yet readjusted his thinking to a new, quite different situation [Page 504] from that in which he found himself last fall. Moreover, I think it is fair to say that both Sir Charles and Sir George would view any matter of this sort from what you or I, as practical men, would call a very academic standpoint. They keep thinking of this proposal in terms of what would be a nice set-up for the scientists, rather than what would be an effective control, or what would be the alternatives if we failed in providing for effective control.
As a result of these difficulties, I know from my conversations with the British Delegation that they have not sent home a really clear picture of what was going on here. In the first place, they have felt that the present work on a treaty which would only go into effect if all nations accepted it, is in some way related to the interim arrangements which may be made with the British if the Russians delay their acceptance too long. Arneson will explain to you that this is not the case. My instructions have been to help work out a report to the Security Council covering a treaty which would only become effective if all nations accepted it. I have been told expressly that such a treaty would have no relation to any interim arrangements, and that interim arrangements would be handled by quite another group.
In the second place, the working papers covering the more specific development of the Commission’s report of December 31, 1946, are not “U.S. proposals,” but tentative papers prepared by cooperative effort of all Delegations except the Russians, for the purpose of providing a useful base for discussion and, if necessary, amendment, in preparation for the submission of a new and more detailed report.
Finally, the British have consistently misunderstood certain aspects of these working papers, notwithstanding that Sir Charles Darwin was present and, to some extent, took part in their formulation. We felt certain that this misunderstanding persisted, because of what Darwin himself said while he was here. The misunderstanding is now confirmed by your cable, where it says that Mr. Bevin had “heard that a ‘U.S. proposal’ covering the control and use of atomic energy for purely commercial purposes might have the effect of denying to this (British) government development of such energy for industrial purposes.”3 When I found that Sir Charles Darwin could not understand the purpose of the papers in this respect, I made a careful and detailed explanation to Sir Alexander Cadogan, showing him the first draft of clauses specifically designed to protect the British and other governments in this respect, but apparently in the press of other business he did not fully understand or sufficiently transmit this information.
These are misunderstandings which it should be possible to clarify, and with respect of which Mr. Arneson is not only informed, but highly qualified to help with.
[Page 505]We believe that there is also another difference between our points of view which is much harder to handle. Apparently the British, perhaps because the wish is father to the thought, are much more hopeful of the near possibilities of atomic power than either the United States scientists or the members of the U.S. Commission. This may make a difference in their point of view.
My own feeling, which I believe is shared by both the State Department and by Congress, is that unless a treaty can be arrived at which gives promise of effectively preventing national rivalries in atomic weapons, and clandestine developments, it would be better to have no treaty at all. Any loose or weak treaty would inevitably react to the benefit of the totalitarian state and to the danger of all countries with a free press and a public opinion.
No one better than you knows the need for a united front. At this stage, it seems to me that these matters should be in the hands of statesmen rather than in the hands of academicians.
I can’t tell you, Lew, what it means to all of us back here that so difficult and vital a job is in your hands.
Good luck and God bless you.
Sincerely yours,