Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

top secret
urgent

[New York,] June 11, 1947.

Dear Joe: I enclose a copy of a summary and explanation of the report from Sir John Anderson’s Committee,¹ brought to the U.K. Delegation in this country by Sir George P. Thomson, whose position here now corresponds to that of U.K. Deputy to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sir George has told us he had the major share in preparing this plan and that this is the plan now being put up to Bevin for approval. It is to be presumed that if Bevin approves, the British Delegation would then be instructed to submit it to the Atomic Energy Commission, but they have not made a direct statement on this.

We have just received this paper and are sending you a copy, as we believe Mr. Acheson should see it at once. Even without our comments you will note the rather shocking resemblance to the Russian proposals, and the complete inadequacy and many gaps in control, which we feel certain would make this plan wholly unacceptable to any thoughtful person who considered it carefully. We feel certain that that is the position that will be taken by the Canadian Delegation and the Brazilian Delegation, and we believe that the Belgians, the French and the Chinese will feel as we do about it. We are not so sure about the Australians, who are now considerably under the influence of a scientist named Briggs, recently returned as their atomic representative, and whose views are academic to an extent only matched by their persistence.

We have received copies of your cable and will be in constant touch with you.

For your information, our preliminary assessment of Gromyko’s speech of today is that it offers practically nothing new, and is simply a restatement of the same position the Russians have held from the start.

Yours sincerely,

Frederick Osborn

[Enclosure]

The Deputy United Kingdom Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Thomson) to the Deputy United States Representative on That Commission (Osborn)

New York, 11 June, 1947.

Dear Mr. Osborn: Sir Alexander has asked me to send you the enclosed summary and explanation of the Report from Sir John Anderson’s Committee, which has been sent out to us. In making the summary we have tried to deal in greater detail with those features of the Report which differ from the papers now before Committee 2.

Yours sincerely,

G. P. Thomson

[Subenclosure]

The Constitution, Powers and Functions of an International Atomic Development Authority

Powers of International Authority.

(1) These are for two purposes—control and development. For control the Authority is to be given powers of two general kinds:—

(a) power to control the distribution of source materials and their derivatives so as to prevent the accumulation in any country of excessive stocks either of source materials or fissile materials;

(b) powers of inspection and management to guard against clandestine operation and diversion.

(2) Taking (b) first, powers for inspection include:

(i) the right to send its employees freely anywhere in the territories of the governments in question;

(ii) the right to call for a return of all uranium and thorium mines and such other metalliferous mines as the Authority may specify;

(iii) the right of aerial survey;

(iv) the right to have resident inspectors of mines, refineries and chemical plants with suitable powers;

(v) power to inspect all new establishments while they are being built; and the right to be shown, and consulted on, plans for such establishments;

(vi) management of plants for the separation of fissile isotopes, and plants for the chemical treatment of material from piles;

(vii) management of piles themselves and all other plants using uranium, thorium or plutonium, except where those piles or other plants have been constructed in accordance with a design approved by the Authority. In this case the Authority will inspect them only.

(viii) powers of inspection of any building suspected of containing a clandestine plant subject to some not yet specified right of appeal.

(3) The control of distribution starts from the mines which are worked by their owners subject to inspection. No sale, transfer or export of source material, or its derivatives, can take place except under license granted with the approval of the Authority. Governments in whose territory sources are being worked must dispose of all material obtained from those sources as the Authority may direct, except for any part which the Authority may allow it to retain for its own use subject to the control of the Authority. The Authority will allocate the material to countries applying for it in accordance with a plan agreed upon when the Authority is constituted, and subject to revision from time to time. The present report makes no attempt to suggest numerical quotas, though such would be necessary. It does however make it clear that, even if abundant supplies are available, no country will be allowed to receive more than is required to meet its needs for peaceful purposes without excessive stockpiling. If too much material is being produced the Authority can shut down on production. It can also do so on any particular mine where the amount of ore or concentrates, or both, held in stock exceeds a figure to be agreed and published in advance. There is no power given to force production.

The Authority is given power to keep an accurate and up-to-date record of all uranium and thorium products sent from one establishment to another in the territory of each government or exported to some other territory, and as stated above any such transfer will require the Authority’s license.

The powers of management of the principal plants and inspection of the rest will enable the Authority to keep track of the extent to which source material has been turned into fissile material, and they have power to keep this in check, even in establishments which they do not manage, by controlling the supply of material to the different establishments and its transfer from one to another.

There is no power to give or withhold permission to a government for the construction of an atomic energy plant.

The Authority is to report to the Security Council on any difficulties or obstacles which it may encounter. Pending decision by the Security Council, the Authority should have discretion to withhold consent to any request by the government concerned that might otherwise be granted, e.g. it might refuse to allow the transfer of source or fissile material.

(4) Powers of development. The Authority is given power

(a) to set up research establishments which would carry out research on fundamental physics and the practical application of atomic energy;

(b) to advise any government on the construction of plants for the use of atomic energy;

(c) to undertake under contract with the government of any country the construction and operation of atomic energy plants in the territory of that country.

Provision (c) is permissive only, except in so far as management is required under 2 (vi) and (vii).

(5) No mention has been made among the powers and functions of the Authority of research on atomic weapons. In the report of the Atomic Energy Commission it was suggested that the international Authority should be given an exclusive right to carry on research of this kind. In our view, however, it would be impracticable to prevent such research being carried out on a national basis, nor do we consider that public opinion would react favourably to an Authority ostensibly concerned primarily with the prevention of the manufacture of atomic weapons, being empowered to conduct research on the development of improved types of weapon. We have, therefore, concluded that the best course is to omit all reference to such research in defining the powers and functions of the Authority.

Composition and Voting Procedure.

(6) It is suggested that the central organisation of the Authority should resemble that of a government department with a body very similar to the Atomic Energy Commission performing the functions of Minister. The composition proposed is one representative for each nation on the Security Council, plus Canada if not otherwise a member. While this will lead to some nations taking part which have no great interest in the development of atomic energy, it has the advantage of being automatic and giving a commission of manageable size. This commission would take all policy decisions of the Authority such as those connected with allocation of materials or the construction of plants. It need not necessarily meet at very frequent intervals.

(7) Below the Commission level the emphasis should be on the administrative and technical aspects of control and development. A Director-General of the highest quality would have to be appointed and would attend all meetings of the Commission and be the head of the Permanent Staff of the Authority. There would be an administrative staff and a complete establishment of research workers, inspectors, engineers and technicians.

Voting Procedure.

(8) The voting procedure will of course have to be laid down in the convention which constitutes the Authority. For most decisions a majority of two-thirds of those present and voting would be required. A question may be raised as to the powers of the Authority in a case in which it is claimed that unanimity of the Five Great Powers is necessary so that a veto could be interposed. The convention should enable the Authority to exercise the powers conferred on it without interference and without the impediment of the veto. Therefore the above voting procedure should apply over the whole range of the activities of the Authority and should enable it to take all decisions relating to the execution of its powers by a two-thirds majority. Any matters which the Security Council are unwilling should be decided on this basis should be referred to that body for decision.

Enforcement.

(9) The resolution of the General Assembly of the 14th December, 1946 contemplates the creation of an international system of controls and assures a relationship between the special organs, such as the Authority we are considering, which are to operate the “system”, and the Security Council. But apart from the fact that this resolution cannot override Article 27 of the Charter it is unfortunately open to different interpretations. It can be read in the sense that these conventions should provide for enforcement measures against a violator in respect of which the right of veto could not be exercised. But while it is probable that this was the intention of the Assembly, the resolution does not make this clear. It may be questioned whether the veto in major matters is as important as appears on the surface. Even if there is no veto, a major Power may refuse to accept punishment when the time comes. Only war can enforce it, and this course is available if a violation is proved, even if a veto is in force.

(10) The United States Government have taken the view that while it is not practicable to amend Article 27 of the Charter, it should be agreed that the veto will not be invoked against a proposal to take enforcement action against a violator of an Atomic Energy Convention. This view has been supported by His Majesty’s Government, and extended to apply to the proposed convention to deal with “conventional” armaments. But in practice the question of the powers considered necessary for an international authority controlling atomic energy and the manner in which they should be exercised can be examined by the Atomic Energy Commission without deciding the question of enforcement. In any case, since the problem does not exclusively affect the Atomic Energy Commission and the Convention which is to be drawn up, it would be preferable to handle it outside the Commission as one of general application.

1. The United Kingdom Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, of which Sir John Anderson was chairman.