Department of State Disarmament Files
The Secretary of War (Patterson) and the
Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State
secret
Washington, June 5,
1947.
Dear Mr. Secretary: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
requested that their views on the military aspects of the regulation of
armaments be transmitted for your information, so that you may be advised of
the military thinking upon this problem. Accordingly, enclosed herewith is a
study, the work of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which has been
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and which may be considered as
accurately reflecting their views.1
Sincerely yours,
Forrestal
Robert P. Patterson
[Page 485]
[Enclosure]
Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee
secret
JCS 1731/22
Guidance for Discussions on the Military Aspects of
Regulation of Armaments
[Here follows a statement of the problem and discussion.]
conclusions
12. The following preamble and principles regarding the military aspects
of the problem of regulation and reduction of armaments are basic to the
security interests of the United States:
Preamble
Armaments do not cause war. They result, rather, from the causes
of war. Disarmament in itself will neither remove the causes of
war nor prevent war. War and armaments can only be eliminated
when the ideological, political, economic and other causes of
war are exorcised. Concurrently with all disarmament
negotiations, supreme effort must be continued to eliminate
these causes. A highly important feature of this effort is the
codification and establishment of a complete body of
international law as envisaged by Article 13 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
Principles
-
a.
- There should be no unilateral disarmament by the United
States by international agreement, nor should there be a
unilateral reduction of armaments, by any means, which
jeopardized the military security of the United
States.
-
b.
- In any program, commitment or schedule for abolition or
regulation and reduction of armaments, the establishment of
effective safeguards, including international inspections
and punishments, against violation and evasion of agreements
is an essential prelude to the implementation of each step
in the agreed program.
-
c.
- Once agreements on safeguards are reached, evasion will
still be feasible unless the veto is eliminated in so far as
these specific agreements are concerned. It follows that
this possibility must be obviated to satisfy our military
security interests.
-
d.
- Commitments or agreements regarding abolition or
regulation and reduction of any armaments should neither
become effective nor be rigidly cast until after the peace
treaties have been consummated and the collective security
forces contemplated by Article 43 of the United Nations
Charter have been effectively established to preserve
international security.
-
e.
- The first step to be accomplished in the control of
armaments is the establishment of an effective system for
the international control of atomic energy (U.S.
[Baruch]2 Proposal).
-
f.
- The next step is the establishment of an effective system
for the international control of other major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction.
-
g.
- Until the above principles are established and implemented
the United States cannot determine its military needs for
self-preservation as recognized by Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter.
-
h.
- Pending establishment and implementation of the principles
enumerated above, discussions regarding regulation and
reduction of conventional armaments should be directed
toward solution of the questions of how and when rather than
what elements of armaments should be regulated and
reduced.
-
i.
- Undue reduction of the mechanical weapons in which we
excel, such as long-range bombers, naval forces and
mechanized ground forces, would jeopardize the power of
self-preservation of the United States.
-
j.
- All moves toward regulation and reduction of armaments
which accomplish merely the abolition or limitation of
destructive and complicated weapons operate to the advantage
of nations primarily superior in manpower and to the
disadvantage of nations superior in technology and
industrial capacity.
-
k.
- The armament requirements for self-preservation of the
United States will increase greatly if we fail to retain and
to acquire by negotiation the advanced bases needed for our
own use and if we neglect to deny them to potential
enemies.
-
l.
- Until an effective system of international security is
established, our own requirements in armaments for security
will be greater than those of an aggressor nation.
-
m.
- The extensive and general reduction that we have already
made since V–J Day in our own armaments should be an
important consideration in arriving at the terms of any
future program for regulation or reduction of
armaments.
-
n.
- Any attempt again to resolve the problem of regulation and
reduction of conventional armaments on the basis of a
differentiation between offensive and defensive weapons, or
other comparative formulae, will be impractical, unrealistic
and contrary to the interests of the United States.
recommendations
13. It is recommended that:
-
a.
- The memorandum in Appendix “A”3 be forwarded to the
Secretaries of War and the Navy.
-
b.
- The memorandum in Appendix “B”3 be forwarded to the
Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military
Staff Committee, United Nations.
