SPA Files: Lot 55 D 323
Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Blaisdell) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)
U.S. Leadership in Negotiation of Special Agreements Under Article 43 of the Charter
In the light of the breakdown of the recent Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the receipt of the Military Staff Committee Report1 by the Security Council raises the question of the [Page 469] adequacy of the schedule of making forces available to the Security Council, as envisaged by the United States.
In his Report to the Nation on April 29 [28],2 Secretary Marshall stated that “agreement was made impossible at Moscow, because in our view, the Soviet Union insisted upon proposals” regarding Germany which “could result only in a deteriorating economic life in Germany and Europe and the inevitable emergence of dictatorship und strife.” It is questionable whether the Soviets really desired agreement on Germany at this time. Their political strategy appears to be to keep the world upset so that economic depression and the passage of time will make communist infiltration easier in non-communist dominated areas. If so, the United States should examine its relations with the Soviet Union and adapt them so as to offset Soviet tactics. The Secretary recognized this in his speech where he hinted we could not afford to wait indefinitely to conclude peace with Germany. Can we afford to wait indefinitely to have the security articles of the United Nations Charter implemented?
If the Security Council accepts our suggestion to set up a Committee to review the Military Staff Committee’s recommended basic principles and to recommend further steps for accelerating the conclusion of the Article 43 agreements, the United States could propose in that Committee that the Security Council offer forthwith to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of such an agreement with any Member which expresses its readiness to do so. Simultaneously, the United States could offer to undertake such negotiations with the Security Council. Such a proposal should be made as soon as it becomes clear that the Soviets are insisting on a distorted reading of the Charter and as a consequence are continuing their delaying tactics.
Numerous reasons in support of this suggestion can be advanced. First and foremost, it would confront the Soviets with the possibility that their tactics of delay, in order to allow communist infiltration in Central and Western Europe, might be partly offset by the United Nations having armed forces made available to it. Regardless of the military value of this possibility, there can be little doubt that psychologically and politically it would assist the Governments of countries now open to communist infiltration.
Additional reasons are as follows:
It would improve the public acceptability of our position on the regulation of conventional armaments, progress on which we have made contingent on progress on making armed forces available to the Security Council.
It would provide the opportunity for necessary analysis of the situation which might be created by the Balkan Investigating Commission [Page 470] or the Palestine Commission of Inquiry making recommendations involving the use of United Nations Armed Forces.
It would provide concrete evidence that the United States supports the United Nations with all its resources, as stated by the President.
Pending a thorough analysis of this idea, it is difficult to conclude whether it has sufficient merit to warrant its adoption, and if so, whether the present or the near future is the proper time to propose it. In any event, I suggest the desirability of undertaking such an analysis and I will take the necessary steps to get it under way.