SPA Files: Lot 55 D 323
Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Special Political Affairs
Action on Implementation of Article 43 of United Nations Charter and Related Matters
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Much emphasis has recently been placed on the importance of implementing Article 43 as one of the prerequisites to the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. That must not lead us to forget that implementation is well worth pushing for other reasons and that it has consistently been the policy of the United States to do so. Despite the severe restrictions imposed by the veto power of the permanent members on the use which it would in practice be possible for the Security Council to make of armed forces placed at its disposal, the completion of arrangements making forces, facilities, and assistance available to it would nevertheless represent an important step toward the provision, within the framework of the United Nations, of effective international means of enforcement action for the maintenance of peace and security, and should have the effect of binding Member States more firmly to the organization. The completion of those arrangements should have the further effect of making it much more difficult than at present for a Member State to take military action outside the framework of the United Nations without openly refusing to permit that organization to act or openly refusing to cooperate with it. The total effect should therefore be to strengthen the Organization [Page 466] materially. While Article 106 makes interim provisions for enforcement action on behalf of the United Nations, it does not give the Organization effective control over that action.
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- There is danger, however, that unless the publicity on the subject is skillfully handled, the conclusion of agreements making armed forces available to the Security Council in accordance with Article 43 would have the undesirable effect of causing the United States public to rely on the United Nations for the maintenance of our national security to a greater degree than is justified by the capabilities of the Organization, and to attach too little importance to the maintenance of an adequate degree of national military strength and readiness. That danger must be kept constantly in mind in connection with our efforts to achieve the implementation of Article 43 and in connection with all other matters relating to the enforcement capabilities of the United Nations.
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- The actions of the Soviet Representatives indicate clearly that the Soviet Government is opposed to the implementation of Article 43 in a manner consistent with the purposes of the Charter but wishes to prevent that fact from being generally understood, because of the unfavorable effect on public sentiment toward the U.S.S.R. which a wide public understanding of it could be expected to have in the United States and elsewhere outside the sphere of Soviet domination. All other governments represented on the Security Council except the Polish Government, have indicated that they favor early implementation, presumably in accordance with the Charter. The British Government has even gone so far as to state that it considers the provision of armed forces in accordance with Article 43 to be a prerequisite to the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. A considerable number of other governments not represented in the Security Council also have indicated that they favor early implementation. The widespread agreement on the desirability of early implementation does not, however, mean that no serious difficulties will be encountered in achieving the areas of agreement among the nations concerned which will be essential for implementation.
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- It seems likely that the Soviet Government believes that if armed forces, assistance, and facilities were available for use by the Security Council as contemplated by the Charter, the U.S.S.R. would more frequently be forced to choose between the alternative of resorting to the outright use of its veto power in the Security Council, which it apparently desires to avoid doing, and the alternative of accepting a curtailment of its ability to exert pressure on some government which it desires to influence or to dominate, accepting the entry into the U.S.S.R. or its area of domination of armed forces of an outside state, or accepting some other breach of the wall which it has built between [Page 467] its area of domination and the rest of the world. The Soviet Government may also fear that the implementation of Article 43 in the manner contemplated by the Charter, by imposing an obligation on the United States or establishing a floor for the strength and readiness of its armed forces, would prevent the degree of unilateral disarmament on the part of this country which might otherwise take place.
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- The apparent objectives of the Soviet Government in relation to the implementation of Article 43 are, therefore, to prevent implementation, except on terms satisfactory to it which differ very widely from those contemplated by the Charter, or failing that to delay implementation and to establish principles and precedents governing the provision by Member States of forces, facilities, and assistance, and the Security Council’s employment of them, which will reduce as much as possible the extent to which implementation might produce the undesirable consequences previously described. Many of the Soviet proposals probably have the dual purpose of helping to prevent or of delaying implementation, if they prove to be unacceptable, or, if they are accepted, of helping to establish the restrictive principles and precedents just mentioned. It is likely that some of the Soviet proposals are related also, or entirely, to still other Soviet objectives, such as the reduction of the U.S. lead in the development of atomic energy for military use or other reductions of the relative military power of the United States.
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- The Soviet Government apparently desires to do what it feels that it can, without too seriously interfering with the accomplishment of its other purposes, to gain for some of its policies the support of public opinion in the United States and in other countries in which a reasonably free flow of information exists and the government and legislature are responsive to the views of pressure groups and of large segments of the public. In view of this and of the unfavorable effect on public sentiment toward the U.S.S.R. which could be expected to result from any reasonably correct and widespread public understanding of the Soviet objectives relating to the implementation of Article 43, it appears that the most promising means of causing the U.S.S.R. to relax its opposition to effective implementation is to have the greatest possible publicity given to the proceedings on the issue in the United Nations. For that purpose much of the substantive action on the issue should be transferred to an organ of the United Nations whose rules of procedure do not, as do those of the Military Staff Committee, severely limit the publicity which can be given to its proceedings.
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