IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/67
Minutes of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the United States Delegation, NewYork, October 7, 1947, 9:15 a.m.
[Here follows list of persons (35) present. After consideration of two agenda items, the discussions proceeded to the question of election of members to the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council. The Delegation was informed by Mr. Sandifer that there was talk among General Assembly delegates of changing Rules 94 and 95 of the General Assembly concerning elections in order to end the impasse. Inconclusive Delegation discussion followed.]
Mr. Dulles said that a prolongation of this deadlock was bad for the prestige of the United Nations. We should decide whether the issue “was vital. If not, then we should not continue the deadlock with the Soviets. If it were vital then, if guidance were given to the Latin Americans, we might break it. To let the deadlock continue to be appraised as unnecessary and useless aggravation of the situation is unwise. If the matter is a vital one, then we should fight it out and win. However, we should not fight the Soviets on non-essentials.
The Secretary asked whether Mr. Dulles had any suggestion. Mr. Dulles replied that it was his personal view that the Ukraines should be allowed to be elected, but he was willing to go along on taking a licking. To defeat the Ukraine looks like a squeeze on the Soviets. It would be bad to have a great mass of little defeats poured on this way. He did not want to see the Soviets get out of the United Nations. It was useful to have them here if for no other reason, because of the contacts. He saw no justification for not being able to make up our mind.
Mr. Stevenson said he favored suspending or adopting new rules. This might open it up to Czechoslovakia. If that can’t be done, he said he had felt all along that we should tell Mrs. Pandit that we were going to vote for the Ukraine and do so.
Mr. Fahy said the situation in India troubled him. He did not think we should let them down because that would have a bad effect on India. So he preferred to vote for India. If there were a deadlock, then he would open the Rules. Mrs. Roosevelt said that she agreed.
[Page 161]The Secretary said that he agreed with Mr. Dulles. This was not a great issue. He was opposed to fighting the Russians on small things. This was not related to a great issue, and he did not want to press the Latin Americans on small things. He felt later that we would have to put the pressure on them on important issues. He hoped that the Russians would turn to Czechoslovakia. The way to go was to follow a change in the Rules.
Mr. Bohlen said that all of the Commonwealth States, the Arabs, and some others were for India. So it is not just a question of the United States against the Soviets.
The Secretary said that the Rules should be changed first and then we would proceed.
Mr. Sandifer said he was not clear about the matter of changing the Rules. He said that can’t be done unless someone takes the initiative. The President of the Assembly has decided not to proceed on the Rules matter first. He said he understood we were going to vote once more and hold to India for the present. The Secretary said that was his understanding.
[Here follow special reports by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) and the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas), guests of the Delegation, on conditions in the countries to which they were accredited.]